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SHORT TALKS UPON PHILOSOPHY

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BY

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PREFACE

THIS work was designed as a series of lectures, but circumstances prevented their delivery, and the lectures were put into the form of a book.

The difficulty and controversial nature of the subject must be the author's excuse for its imperfections.

VILLA DES MARGUERITES,
BOULEVARD DE CIMIEZ,
NICE, 1922.

Lord, not for light in darkness do we pray,
Not that the veil be lifted from our eyes,
Nor that the slow ascension of our day
Be otherwise.

Not these, O Lord, we would not break the bars
Thy wisdom sets about us ; we shall climb
Unfettered to the secrets of the stars,
In Thy good time.

Drinkwater.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THE scanty knowledge which we have of the condition of primitive man reveals him as first seeking in caves protection from the fierce animals by which he was surrounded.

But even in the days when he only possessed stone weapons, he was far removed from the apes and from the remainder of the animal world.

His first efforts were of a practical character, directed to procuring food, shelter, clothing and fire. Being gregarious, men in the earliest times grouped themselves into families and tribes and nations, and thence arose the idea of moral duty towards their parents and chiefs and towards one another.

Observation of nature developed the idea of powers which, when volition was ascribed to them, became deities both friendly and inimical, by the aid of whom it was possible to procure food, victory, and medicines, and at last, as civilization began, there arose among the most intellectual a desire to explain the nature of the Gods and of the world around them. The exact progress of this thought is, of course, unknown to us, for though we have records of the opinions of the Indians, the Chinese, the Greeks, and of a number of nations which occupied Asia Minor and Egypt, these records are chiefly

concerned with religious systems, and it is not until about 700 or 600 B.C. that reliable accounts exist of those commencements of speculation which now form our current body of science and philosophy.

The first really important scientific ideas came from the Ionian Greeks. Thales of Miletus (640 B.C.) thought that water was the source of all existence, others placed it in fire. Democritus, who appears to have been a man of extraordinary genius, considered the world as made up of atoms of different forms. The interest of his theory lies in the fact that it may now be considered as established, though the ultimate nature of the atom is still a matter of conjecture. These early efforts consisted of attempts to frame a science of nature rather than a philosophy. It was not until the human mind endeavoured to pass over the boundary where science ends and speculation commences, that philosophy may be said to have begun. For philosophy deals with that which lies beyond science, and as science advances, and our knowledge extends, the domain of speculative philosophy recedes. It may be asked why it is necessary to interest ourselves in a subject so uncertain? The answer is, that the foundations upon which repose our most important beliefs, our incentives to action, and our hopes of happiness, are still within the dim borderland of speculation, and have not yet been reduced to hard and dry science.

The more simple and direct arts needed for our daily life are, so to speak, in the limelight. But if we desire to know about God or the true aim of human action, or whether we may expect an individual life beyond the grave, we find that these subjects lie outside the domain of positive science, and that apart from religion we must

ask of speculative philosophy for the only answers we can hope to receive.

These enquiries cannot therefore be stifled. They are as important as life itself, and hence, though the way be uncertain and the light dim, men have always turned with eagerness to religion and philosophy in the hope that if certainty cannot be attained, at all events they may be rewarded by probability.

The definition of philosophy, as that which lies outside and beyond science, necessarily causes the dividing-line between them to be changeable and uncertain. What is mere speculation to-day, may be science to-morrow. The atomic theory was philosophy in the hands of Leibnitz, to-day it is proved fact. Hence philosophy touches not merely on religion, but upon mathematics, physics, physiology, biology, sociology, and art. It has, in fact, a point of contact with every branch of human learning. In particular it is concerned with the theory of "being" and the theory of knowledge, and it is with these two problems that in the following pages we shall be principally concerned.

The task of giving a short, and yet a comprehensible, outline of the principal philosophic theories is not an easy one.

Instead of being able to start with a body of established facts, we are at the very outset presented with a cloud of contradictions, whence it follows that different meanings are attached to almost every philosophical term, so that in each case we have to discover not only the true meaning of the author, but also the sense given by him to the words that he is using:

There are many persons who deprecate attempts to vulgarize profound and difficult subjects. But though a

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little knowledge is a dangerous thing, it is only dangerous when mistaken for full knowledge, and it is perhaps more dangerous still to have no knowledge at all. Moreover, so many wild systems are being spread abroad, that it is more than ever necessary to try and trace them to their root-principles.

For in the use of philosophy we are in the position of seekers after a treasure. Though we trust that the treasure would enrich us if we could find it, yet we know not of what it consists. Some there are who regard the whole search as useless.

A late judge described philosophers as blind men seeking in a dark room for a black hat that is not there. But perhaps the men are not quite blind nor the room wholly dark. And in any event, if it could be finally determined that the hat was not there, a positive result would have been attained.

It is impossible to predict what the result of any enquiry will be till it has been tried. If a modern man of science had examined Kepler's nineteen different theories to explain the path of planets, he would have treated the whole enquiry as ridiculous, and yet one of them was successful. A manufacturer made a large fortune by a process which he would never have tried at all if he had been versed in chemistry. Many of the established theories of science appeared when first proposed to contradict the most elementary principle of reason.

With regard to philosophical theories we must keep an open mind, treating philosophers not as the children treated the bald-headed Elisha, but prepared to give them a fair hearing, even though at first sight they appear to contradict our most firmly rooted opinions.

Greek philosophy truly commenced when Parmenides,

abandoning physics, entered upon the much deeper enquiry into the nature of being itself. Nature appeared to exhibit change and permanence, and the question arose which is the most real? This question may appear at first sight rather a quibble. According to the philosophy to which we have been accustomed, we regard permanence and change as both of them real, whether we treat them as substance and attribute, or as matter and form.

But when we consider reality, it may well be that what we call change is only that difference of aspect of things which resembles the varieties of view obtained of a building from different standpoints, and that even such apparent permanencies as time and space are only relative to us as observers, not characteristics of things in themselves. What we take for changes brought about in time, may only be different aspects of an eternal unchanging existence.

Parmenides decided in favour of permanence, treating change as merely relative and apparent. The Eleatic School followed this view, and Zeno carried it logically to the point of asserting that all change, even motion, had no real existence.

As an example of the non-reality of change, he characteristically embodied his opinion about motion in a paradox. For he said that if a thing moves, it must move either in the place in which it is, or in the place in which it is not. But a thing cannot *move* if it remains in the place in which it is, nor, again, can anything move *in* a place in which it is not. Whence, then, what we call motion is, in truth, only different states of the permanent. He almost seems to anticipate Minkowski's four-dimensional space, according to which what we call an

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“event” in time is really a permanent “existence” in space of four dimensions.

Heraclitus (544 B.C.), on the other hand, considered change as a reality. It is true that he admitted some sort of permanence, for you cannot have “change” of a thing without admitting some permanence in the thing that is changed.

Parmenides’ view of “permanence,” as we shall see, influenced Plato in the formation of his theory of “Ideas,” and has played a most important part in the development of philosophy.

Thus, at the very outset, the question arose as to the difference between reality and appearance. Appearances, of course, *exist*, but only realities can be said to *subsist*.

This difference between subsistence and existence, or between reality and mere appearance, is seen throughout the whole history of philosophy. The word “existence” is used very loosely, most usually implying subsistence, and this loose use of the word “existence” has been productive of considerable confusion.

It is to be observed that about the same time at which philosophy arose in Greece, we meet with similar attempts to explain the unity of being and the nature of God in China by Laotsu ; and that Buddha is supposed also to have lived about the same period. The early philosophies of China and India so resemble those of Greece that it seems probable that there must have been some communication between them. On the other hand, those who believe that the notions of God and substance are innate would not be surprised at the occurrence of similarity of thought upon these subjects even among men who had never communicated with one another.

The first real step in philosophy consisted in a theory of knowledge, and was due to Socrates (fourth century B.C.)

His aim was to investigate the nature of our ideas, and to show that instead of being mere names used arbitrarily, or according to custom, they each of them contained an essential principle.

He pointed out that the mind of man has a generalizing power, by means of which our perceptions and ideas may be compared and grouped, and that each group contains a general principle which constitutes the essence of the whole of them. Thus correct thinking consists not merely in dealing with individual instances, but in making generalizations by means of which the true nature of things can be ascertained and expressed. Instead of talking vaguely about this or that thing being "just," we should endeavour to determine in what the essence of justice consists, and then use the general idea thus obtained to test and explain particular cases of justice or injustice. This method laid the foundation of a science of thinking and reasoning. An intelligent dog probably only reasons from instance to instance. His thought only holds particulars. He has not, like man, the power of amalgamating particular cases into general laws and principles.

This power is called the faculty of conception, and the results of its use are called "concepts," which represent in our minds the true essences of things. Concepts may be either individual or general. An individual or particular concept of an individual thing comprises all the special marks by which it is recognized. On the other hand, a "general" or "universal" concept contains only those characteristics which are common to a class of objects, and which form its general definition.

A general image of an elephant might be obtained by photographing a great number of elephants one on the top of the others on the same plate, just as the general concept of a tree is obtained by the consideration and comparison of a great number of trees.

An individual concept, of course, contains more than a general concept. For it contains the characteristics of a general concept and, in addition, differences which make it individual. Thus a general concept of a man would not contain a beard, for a thing may be a man without having a beard. But an individual concept of a man would contain the whole general concept "man," together with those other marks which made the general concept "man" into the concept of an individual man. On the other hand, numerically, or extensively, the concept "man" is wider and embraces a larger number of objects than the less general concept: "Englishman."

It is as a rule impossible to visualize a general concept even of a material object. The generality of its character prevents an exact image of it being formed, even in cases where an image could be formed of a corresponding individual concept. Thus, for example, it is almost impossible to form a mental picture of the general concept "knife," for knives may be big or small and of every conceivable pattern; but yet every one can form a general concept of "knife," and use it in thought and in language.

It is upon the power of forming general concepts that the power of reasoning depends. They provide us with, so to speak, a currency for thought. Each universal concept is a sort of bank-note which represents coin, and yet is not coin, for out of it you cannot get more than you have put into it.

The characteristic of a general concept is to afford a general description sufficient to designate a class of objects. It has nothing to do with number, it is not a group, but a description or definition of a group.

The possibility of forming general concepts depends upon the existence of principles and laws of nature. This is seen at once if we endeavour to form a general concept in a case where no such principle or law exists. Thus it is impossible to form a general concept of all objects whose name begins with a certain letter, say B. There is no principle common to such objects, as to render such a general concept possible. We cannot arbitrarily class things as people make up lots for a jumble-sale. Our general concept must be the expression of some natural general principle of classification, and the fact that we can form these general concepts is a proof that nature exhibits a scene of orderly arrangements and principles of being.

The formation of a well-arranged and accurate system of general concepts is essential to accurate knowledge. The communication of our knowledge is effected by giving a name to each of our general concepts, by which they may be indicated to other people.

Even in the most ordinary transactions of life we use general concepts. When we promise to pay a pound, we do not mean any specific pound, but a pound in general.

It may be doubted whether animals have more than the power of forming particular concepts. The bone that they beg for to-day is probably only an image of the specific bone they had yesterday, not a true concept, such as a boy forms when he thinks of a piece of cake.

As a rule, we are the slaves of our concepts instead

of being masters. We talk of "honour," "truth," and "the good," and "our rights" without knowing exactly what we mean by them.

The Dialogues of Plato afford us a series of pictures of Athenian youths being instructed by Socrates in the art of forming and analysing concepts, and being shown that false opinions and unwise actions are the consequence of carelessness in the use of general terms.

From the description above given of "a universal concept," or as it is sometimes called "a general notion," it will be seen that they exhibit the characteristics of unity amid diversity, and diversity in unity. They represent the essence of a class, or the distinguishing mark of a class. Hence it follows that you cannot have two universal concepts each respectively exactly similar one to the other. You may have a number of exactly similar individual objects, such as peas, but you cannot have two universal concepts of a pea. For two such concepts would be but one and the same concept. It is only individuality that can produce individual plurality.

Moreover, the universal concept is indivisible. The whole must apply to every individual.

It is true that you can divide a general concept, but only by making the two concepts resulting from the division different one from the other. Thus, the concept "animal" might be separated into the different concepts "man" and "beast." But you could not have two concepts "animal" exactly like one another. They would be but one concept.

Concepts are quite different from material objects, or even from mental images of material objects. For instance, suppose we join the concept of a material object, such as an egg, to the mathematical concept of

one-half. We should then have a concept of half an egg, which concept would in content be greater than the concept of an egg, because in addition to the concept egg it contained also the concept one-half.

Now such a concept could not be formed by simply cutting the concept of an egg into two similar parts. The concept of half an egg is possible, but half a concept of an egg would be incomprehensible.

So that when it is said that concepts are indivisible it is not meant that they cannot be analytically divided, but only that they cannot be cut up into pieces in the same way as matter can be divided.

CHAPTER II

IDEAS

THERE is not much difficulty in apprehending the theory of Socrates. We are to suppose that things have not only mere appearances, but deep inner principles of being, which we can discover by means of the intellect and express in concepts. We have bodily eyes to see the outward forms of things, but according to Socrates the eyes of the mind are required to see the real principles of their nature.

Even to those who rejected Zeno's attempt to show that motion was only an appearance, the Eleatic School of Philosophy had proved that since the whole world, as we see it, presents a scene of order and classification, these principles must be of a permanent character. For change itself presumes something which remains permanent while the change is taking place. Heracleitus, who emphasized the changeable character of all things, compared them to a river whose banks remain the same though the water flows away. When a candle is burning, the form of the flame remains, though the hot gas of which it is composed is constantly being burned up and passing off.

In natural objects a similar principle seems to prevail. The laws of growth and development in the physical world depend on new forms taken by permanent beings.

When a child grows into a man by the gradual shedding away of the old matter and the assimilation of new matter, so that in the course of time the matter of his body is completely changed, we have here *the same man*, though materially his body is different.

Plato, adopting the theory of Parmenides as to the permanence of the principles of nature, and agreeing with Socrates that it is to the reason we must look as the instrument for discovering these principles, raised the question whether the principle of a thing must be considered as having an existence independent of the thing in which the principle is embodied, or whether principles were to be treated as mere properties embodied in things, coming into existence when the things came into existence, and disappearing when the things in which they were embodied perished.

There is much to be said for both views. For instance, take the example of a hoop. Here you have a material object made into the shape of a circle. Now suppose that all the hoops and everything in the world which indirectly or directly embodied circularity were destroyed. We might suppose the whole world of matter annihilated. The material hoops and other material circular objects would disappear, but would the circle go with them? Again, would twice two still be four even if there were no objects to be numbered? Would the principle of Justice still survive the destruction of everything just or unjust? Are we to regard these laws and principles as existing even when dormant, and ready to come into action whenever anything comes into existence to which they can be applied? If so, we should regard these principles as "Ideas," and we should attribute to these Ideas an existence independent of objects material or

otherwise. We might even go so far as to say that if a God were creating a Universe, out of nothing, the Ideas would be the patterns after which he would make it, and the principles upon which it would work. He would not create new Ideas, but would only embody the pre-existing Ideas in the new objects which he created.

Inasmuch as Plato regarded things given to us by the intellect as much more permanent and real than things given to us by the senses, it would follow that Ideas of Honour, Truth, Beauty, and Justice are more real than Ideas of mere material objects.

Ideas given by the Senses are, of course, derived from Sensual Experience. Ideas given by the Reason might be innate, or born in us, or perhaps memories of some prior state of existence. In all cases our Ideas are dim and imperfect in consequence of our imperfect nature. We are like men imprisoned in a cave with our backs towards the entrance. At the mouth of the cave are the realities, the shadows of which are cast upon the background. These shadows are all that most of us care to see. The philosopher turns the eye of reason towards the realities, but is blinded by the light, and has at best only an imperfect vision.

Plato, of course, did not contend that Ideas of material objects must themselves be material. In fact, being Ideas, they could not be material. The Idea of a stone house would not be composed of stone. Nor, again, would he have contended that a material body could sleep upon a disembodied Ideal bed. A material bed is necessary to a material body.

But according to the Platonic philosophy, since Ideas are realities, they have not an *existence* only, like mere temporary images or impressions. They have a real

subsistence, apart from the individual objects in which they may be embodied, and, just as universal concepts have the property of giving unity to diversity of objects and bind together into one the variety displayed in nature by individuals, so does the Idea impart unity of substance to the various things in which it inheres.

We must, of course, not confuse the Idea with the concept of the Idea. The human mind cannot think except by means of concepts, and hence it is not the Idea that is in the mind, but only the concept of it, from which we conclude to the Real Existence of the Idea. For throughout the whole reasoning of Plato it is assumed that concepts represent realities, and that by the use of our reason we can gain at least some knowledge of the real.

It is easy to see what effect this theory had in giving majesty to non-material subjects. Justice, Fortitude, and Honour, being Ideas, are not mere words or mere concepts, changeable according to the state of mind of the speaker, but stand solid, eternal, and unchangeable, more lasting than the fleeting phenomena of a passing world. We can never open a page of Plato without feeling as though we had entered a temple, and were in the presence of the eternal Gods.

So far, Plato's theory of Ideas seems reasonable and satisfactory. We have, however, to consider the consequences to which it logically led, and the objections that can be raised to it.

An Idea, like a concept, cannot be duplex. There cannot be two Ideas, one exactly similar to the other. They would be but one Idea. There cannot be two exactly similar principles of attraction, or two exactly similar principles of Beauty. If exactly similar, they

would be but one. If you say all men are mortal, you do not intend to convey the notion that there are many sorts of mortality. Each Idea is therefore one and indivisible.

And from this it follows that you cannot treat an Idea as if it were a material object, and cut it up into pieces. While it is true that you can analyse many ideas, as, for instance, when Englishman is analysed into "Man," and "born in England," yet you cannot cut the Idea man into two halves, as you would cut up a fish and a man, and make an Ideal Merman out of the pieces.

And again, the Idea "man" that is in Socrates is the same Idea "man" that is in Plato. They are not two, but one Idea.

For Ideas, even of material objects, have an Ideal, not a material character.

Here, however, our difficulties begin ; for in this view the Idea "horse" is identically and indivisibly the same in all horses, whether they are near or far away from one another. The same identical Idea "horse" is present in all horses which have been, now are, or shall be hereafter. In each the Idea is present, indivisible and complete. From this it appears that the Idea must be independent of space and time. The Idea "man" is identically the same in Adam as in King George the Fifth. The same identical Idea "man," is now, ever has been, and ever will be in the whole human race.

We must, therefore, not look at two separate individual things which embody one and the same Idea as merely similar. The material clay out of which they are made is divisible, but the Idea is not divisible like clay. The Idea is actually identical in the two cups, though the clay in

one may be different from the clay in the other, just as the universal concept of a teacup is identical in two different cups, even when made out of different materials.

If we pursue this process and use our reason to discover universal Ideas, we shall find that nature, instead of presenting to us a system of isolated Ideas, presents us with groups of Ideas that are in intimate union. Thus, for example, the Ideas "man" and "beast" are united by the Idea "animal." And the very same necessity of reasoning that compels us to unite black men and white men under the Idea "Man," now impels us to unite "man" and "beast" under the Idea "animal." But this is included with "Plant" under the Idea "living Being," and this again under the Idea "material object." We are now on a logical path on which we cannot stop, until we arrive at the Idea "Being" which seems to be the terminus of the series. If we treat "being" as not a mere quality of things, but as a subsisting Idea, we must call it "substance." We are thus compelled to think of the principle of all things as "universal substance," the same and identical and undivided in all existences that ever have been, are now, and ever will be. So that we are here landed in what is usually, but not quite correctly, called Pantheism. It ought more properly to be called Pan-substantialism. It is the logical consequence of pushing Plato's doctrine of Ideas to its extreme limits. It assumes the reality of our knowledge of Ideas, and that by exploring the nature of concepts, we are attaining a knowledge of reality.

This conception is not easy to realize. We have to conceive universal substance, not as being like clay which you can divide into parts, and give a bit to each

object, but as a universal Idea, capable of pervading a multitude of things, and yet in its nature indivisible.

You could not, in strictness, call clay a universal substance merely because a great number of cups of different shapes were made out of the same clay, or even because everything that existed was made out of the same clay. In order that the substance of a number of things should be universal, they must have, not the same sort of substance, or be composed of similar substances, or of different bits of the same substance ; but all of them must be composed of the same identical substance.

This seems to involve the universal substance being in two places at the same time. This conclusion the Platonic Pan-substantialist must accept. As has been said, the universal is not subject to place or to time or number, nor is it material. It is an essence, like thought itself, and being indivisible, we must not treat universal substance as if a part of it were in some particular thing and the rest of it were somewhere else. The whole identical individual substance is in each individual space, and in each individual time, it is here, there, everywhere, and nowhere. This view, while it is difficult to apply to material objects, presents less difficulty when applied to non-material things. We do not conceive the idea of "Beauty" as if a part of it were in Wales and another part in Switzerland. The complete identical Idea is at one and the same time present in each of those two countries. It is only when we come to deal with Ideas of matter and space that the divisibility of the Idea seems to be possible. But according to the universalists, this division is only illusory. In reality each is in all, and all is in each, complete and indivisible so far as substance is concerned.

Even in connection with material objects, it is sometimes possible to form a conception of universality of Idea. Thus, for example, the theory of universal gravitation proposed by Newton to account for the behaviour of the planets and other matter, assumes that every single atom among the millions of millions in this vast universe attracts every single other atom. In theory no one atom can be moved without affecting all the rest, so wonderfully are they all interdependent, so universal is their relation one to another. This theory may or may not turn out to be true. It is at all events one way of representing undoubted fact. But is it more easy to conceive than the theory of universal substance? or for that matter than the theory of the universal ego of the Pantheists? If we are not repelled by the difficulty of conceiving the Newtonian theory, we ought not to pronounce the Neoplatonic system as inconceivable.

It is therefore evident that in proposing Ideas as the explanation of Reality, Plato introduced a new principle into Philosophy. The effect was to cause the reason rather than the senses to be regarded as the source of truth, and to introduce the notion of "essences" which communicated their nature to things, and which "essences" or Ideas formed the immutable body of principles of nature.

Aristotle, in his theory of Subsistence, applied the conceptual theory of Socrates in a very different way.

While admitting the existence of patterns and principles of nature, he was not prepared to allow that Ideas could exist apart from individual objects. The disembodied Idea was repudiated by him, and even ridiculed.

He took an example to explain his view; he said: "You can have an actual bed in which the notion 'bed'

is embodied, or you can have a concept of that notion in the mind of the carpenter who was going to make the bed, or in the mind of the painter who painted a picture of it. Here are two 'beds,' the actual material bed, and the concept 'bed.' But where is the third bed of Plato (the disembodied bed which is neither the actual bed, nor the concept of it) ? It is nowhere."

In fact, if the actual bed, the carpenter's concept of the bed, and painter's mental picture of it, were annihilated, according to Plato, the Idea "bed" would still remain ; according to Aristotle it would vanish.

This difference of view as to the nature of existence led to a profound difference between the Platonists and the Aristotelians, which has ever since their day remained the distinguishing difference between what we now call the idealistic school and the non-idealistic schools of philosophy. Both believed that substance was actual and a different thing from mere thought. Neither of them had advanced to the position of modern idealism ; but according to Plato the Idea itself had actuality, whereas according to Aristotle actuality needed the presence of individual substance as well as Idea. Aristotle therefore placed substance in the individual, Plato in the Idea.

It is not very easy to define the exact views of Plato and of Aristotle upon this question. They have been the subject of controversy among profound Scholars.

They each present difficulties. For example, are we to imagine that after some stupid sailors knocked on the head the last dodo, the Platonic Idea "Dodo" still survived ? Or, again, are we to believe that a whole menagerie of ideas of possible animals exists somewhere, huge monkeys as large as elephants, dragons with

fantastic tails, and all because they are "possible"? This objection omits to observe that Plato's "Ideas" were, generally speaking, confined to what he considered the nobler part of creation. The idea of a mere Oyster would have been the idea of pure matter and hence an illusion. The theory of Ideas strictly applies only to such things as the virtues and similar subjects. The heavenly bodies might perhaps come in, but only because they were to some extent divine.

The "beds" of Aristotle was not a fair illustration of a Platonic Idea.

To the objection that Ideas are inconceivable, apart from objects in which they are embodied, the Platonists may reply that principles are not destroyed by destroying the objects to which they are applied. When you kill an inventor you do not kill his invention, though you may destroy all means of putting it into execution.

The difference of opinion as to Ideas raises the whole question as to the nature of "Being."

Leaving this aside for the time, we may remark that the Platonic Idea of Substance is necessarily very different from that of Aristotle.

For if substance is, according to Aristotle, to exhibit itself in a number of individual objects, we may well enquire how we are to treat it as "indivisible." The Idea "horse" unites all individual horses precisely because it exists independently of the individuals. But if "substance" is individual, how can we consider any two horses as having the same substance? Similar substance they may have, but not *identically the same*.

Strict Pantheism becomes, therefore, impossible upon the theory of substance being in the individual. Hence, then, the "substance" of the philosophers who are not

Platonic Realists is quite different from the "substance" of the Pantheists.

For the universal substance of the materialists owes its universality to *similarity* of substance of different individuals, not to *identity* of the substance of different individuals.

In modern times some materialists treat all things as made up of the same sort of primordial matter. But this does not stamp them as Pan-substantialists, nor is materialism a form of Pantheism.

The bit of matter of which you are made is on a materialistic view different from the bit of matter of which I am made. For although, like teacups, we are of the same clay, yet our bits are distinct and different. This is not Pan-substantialism. In the universalist Pan-substantial theory, the bit of matter of which I am made is identically the same as the bit of which you are made, and the "bits" are only phenomenal. The Christian doctrine of the Trinity would be quite in accordance with Platonic philosophy and does no violence to reason; but it cannot be reconciled with materialism.

The Ideas of Aristotle have not the character of permanence and necessity that seems to distinguish the Ideas of Plato. Justice, Beauty, and Honour appear not as Ideal entities independent of space and time, but as qualities residing in individuals from whose actions we shall form our concepts of justice and honour; and we shall derive our knowledge of those qualities not so much from our inner consciousness as from observation of the actions of mankind.

Again, the Platonic idea of God as the immovable, unchangeable Idea of Ideas, becomes in the hands of Aristotle an artificer by whom the world was made,

and, indeed, is sometimes identified with the material world itself.

The Platonic view encourages man, instead of looking outwards on the world, to look inwards within his own mind. The most important of Plato's concepts would be framed after Ideas which are not communicated by means of external objects, but are derived from within. Matter and sensational experience no doubt are necessary in lower forms of thought, and necessary to the support of our imperfect bodily frame, but are a hindrance rather than a help to the higher thought. On the other hand, it is easy to see that Aristotle would constantly be concerned with actualities, and would make collections of animals and specimens of natural objects.

In consequence of this difference of opinion concerning the nature of the Platonic Idea, we generally find that philosophers, even when they adopt a universal substance, differ very profoundly in their views respecting it. Some, like the Neo-Platonists and the Modern German idealists, adopt the Platonic position. Others, like Spinoza, treat substance as divisible, and reject the independent Reality of Ideas.

The "Common Sense" school of Descartes, Reid, and the schoolmen, and the materialists, also take the same view. To them substance is a "stuff" out of which things are made, not an Idea which vitalizes them into Existence. Upon this view there might be more than one kind of substance. For not being an Idea, substance, like matter, might be of different kinds. On the Platonic view there could be but one universal substance. On the materialistic view there might be many.

We thus see that the theories of Plato and Aristotle contained the germs of differences which were afterwards

to divide philosophic thought. It would be a mistake to treat Plato and Aristotle as adopting the position of complete dualism, that is to say of dividing everything sharply into thought and reality, or mind and matter. The Idea was with them essential to subsistence. The "forms" of Aristotle were more than mere methods of classification. Plato and Aristotle were neither crude Realists nor crude Idealists. In truth, the contrast between Idealism and Realism had not at that time clearly and sharply manifested itself.

We shall see that in Scholastic times the greatest confusion was produced by the fact that while the philosophy of divine things, such as God and the angels, was based on the doctrines of Plato, the philosophy of man, the world and matter was based on the views of Aristotle. The attempts to reconcile these two into a consistent theological system was a task which Scholasticism attempted but was unable to accomplish.

CHAPTER III

EXISTENCE, SUBSISTENCE, APPEARANCE, REALITY AND THE BASIS OF KNOWLEDGE

BEFORE an attempt is made to describe the principal systems which developed out of the philosophy of the Greeks into the philosophy of the present day, it is desirable, indeed necessary, even at the risk of anticipating what is to come, to say a few words upon the general character of the problems that are to be discussed and the nature of the ideas involved in them.

The word *idea*, spelled with a small *i*, is used in the signification of "notion" and not in the Platonic sense of *Idea*. The misuse of the word *idea* is chiefly due to Locke and the schools which followed him.

We have seen that the principal difference of opinion between Plato and Aristotle was whether *Ideas* are to be regarded as having an independent existence, or whether they exist only as embodied in individuals. But the exact nature of Plato's *Ideas* is somewhat doubtful. Indeed, it is difficult to decide whether the "*Idea*" of Plato is to be considered as subjective or objective; it seems to hover between the two, at one moment to be a "*substance*" independent of the thinker and at another to be rather of the nature of thought.

The development of philosophy soon raised questions

as to the true meaning of existence and substance, of appearance and reality.

As a general rule the study of a science commences with definitions. These definitions are usually descriptions, not sufficient to give the complete nature of the subjects described, but sufficient for the purpose in hand. For example, in geometry a straight line is defined as that which lies evenly between its extreme parts. So long as we do not ask what the extreme parts are, or whether a straight line has any extreme parts, the definition is sufficient.

As to "being," however, we are not able to give any definition at the outset. For one of the chief objects of philosophy is to determine what "being" is; if we could give a definition of it, we should have arrived at the end of our journey before we had started.

The same remark applies to the words existence, subsistence, appearance, reality, truth, and knowledge.

These words are in daily use, and for our common needs they serve their turn.

But when we go more deeply into the nature of things, we find that we do not understand what we mean by any of them.

Thus, for example, some of us would say that a figure which appeared in a dream had no existence, and no reality. But since it took place, it has from another point of view an existence; and is, in a sense, a reality. Again, I can speak of my idea of Socrates as "existing," though there is no "existing" Socrates to compare it with. Again, some persons would deny, and others would admit the "reality" of a ghost. But what is meant by "reality"? and what by "appearance"?

These considerations lead us to see from the outset that

when we find these words we must be careful to examine, by the context, the sense in which they are used.

For in most cases instead of being used absolutely they are used relatively.

Thus, my own body, which I can feel, may be real as compared with the sun which I can only see, and which might be only an appearance. But, again, the sun is real when we compare it with a ghost, which may only be an illusion. And even a ghost may be real as compared with the mere idea of a ghost, which is probably less real than the ghost itself.

To a man who believes that we can know objective realities, the word "appearance" signifies only a quasi-knowledge of what appears to be ; not of what really is.

But to an idealistic philosopher who maintains that we can only know appearance, the appearance is the reality.

The word appearance has a totally different signification in the two cases.

In practice, therefore, the best plan will be to use the words existence, subsistence, appearance, and reality not as absolute terms, but as co-relatives, much in the same way as in mathematics we use the words positive and negative.

The distinction between things that "subsist" and things which, like the air-drawn daggers of Macbeth, only "exist," is deeply engrained into our literature. It is the distinction between "appearance" and "reality."

At first sight we appear here to be in possession of a clear and distinct division between existence and subsistence, between ideas and objects. The mind is conceived as looking out through the windows of the senses at an external world of objects which it at once perceives to be independent realities, from which by the faculty of

reflection it forms concepts, or as they are generally, though loosely, called "ideas."

This is usually known as the "common sense" view, and at first sight appears simple and satisfactory. But upon further consideration a doubt arises whether the division into objects and ideas is practicable.

When I look at a so-called "object" such as a house, and recognize it as a house, part of this "object" consists of a pile of stones, and part of an aggregation of ideas depending on my previous knowledge of the nature of houses.

For it is obvious that what is presented to me by my mere outward faculties of sight and touch is not all that is in my mind when I recognize the heap of bricks and mortar as a dwelling. The "house" that I perceive is partly presented to me by means of my memory of other houses. It is an intimate mixture of sensation and idea. But if this be so, then what becomes of the view that common sense perception at once separates ideas from realities? We began by dividing things into ideas and objects, but the most simple example seems to show that every object is in part compounded of ideas. Further investigation strengthens this opinion.

For if some strange object is presented to us, in order to determine what it is we have to take time to examine it. We have to go over its qualities and try to compare them with the qualities of other things we have known. But where a familiar object is presented, we perceive its character in a flash. Why is this? It is because the perception of the familiar object consists not only of a certain disposition of form and colour, but because that perception mainly consists of a whole group of concepts, which by previous association have been attached to the

object. We "perceive" not the simple object, but a compound object, consisting of the simple object united to a whole group of ideas, supplied, not from the perceived object, but by the perceiving mind.

Thus, even with respect to material objects, it appears difficult to separate the ideal from the real. When we come to non-material objects, the difficulty becomes greater still.

For example, are we to consider such a thing as the "charity" of some particular man a reality, or only an idea? In some respects it is real enough, in others it only seems to be an abstraction derived from his actions. Again, the "perfume" of a rose consists of a cloud of material particles of a volatile oil, but what are we to say of the "smell" of the rose? Is that a material object? If we take away the person who perceives it, the perfume remains, but the smell is gone. And yet we treat "smell" as a reality. Pain, from one point of view is objective, from another it is merely subjective.

This treatment of objects as sharply distinguishable from ideas presents further difficulties even when applied to material objects. For if I put out my hand and feel an object such as a ball, what is the object which I feel? Is it the ball, or the impulses which are received by my brain? Which is the object? The ball on the table, or the impressions upon my brain?

When I look at the sun, I say, "I see the sun"; but it is certain that what I see is not the sun, as it is at the instant when I look at it. In one sense it is the sun, but in another it is a group of waves thrown out by the sun some minutes previously. The sun is only an inference. A flash of lightning is not seen and recognized as an object until after it has ceased to exist.

From these examples it is clear that in many cases we do not perceive objects. We only perceive appearances from which we infer the subsistence of objects.

In fact, the dividing-line between object and idea is impossible to draw. The two, instead of being sharply divided, appear to melt into one another, and there is a debatable land between them.

Some writers have suggested that vividness of impressions distinguishes realities from mere ideas, but mere vividness is not sufficient. Although the impression of the pen I now hold is more vivid than the idea I have of the pen I held yesterday, yet some ideas are more vivid than subsisting objects. For example, the memory of a mother of a lost child, so far as mere intensity is concerned, is far more vivid than her perception of a material object such as a pen. A terrific ghost is more vivid than a man seen through a mist. The distinction, here, clearly does not depend on mere vividness of impression.

In a search for a test that will distinguish object from idea, the objective from the subjective, we next examine whether the notion of permanence will help us, and whether the true test of the objectiveness of a thing is that, if the perceiving mind is destroyed or removed, the object would still remain? When I leave the room, the chairs and tables still continue to be realities. I can carry away only the ideas of them.

This test is, however, no conclusive one. It might be that when I leave the room the tables and chairs also cease to subsist, coming again into subsistence when I return? Certainly when I leave the room the colour of the chairs will be gone, if I mean the sensation of colour that is produced in me by the chairs. In fact,

when I go, I carry away with me all of the chair that consists of idea, that is to say almost the whole chair.

Moreover, a further difficulty in treating objects as subsisting, and ideas as non-subsisting, arises from the fact that a distinction is necessary between that which properly belongs to me, and that which properly belongs to the objects. When I say "I" perceive a rose, what do I mean by "I"? Do I mean my whole being, including my material body with its nose? or do I mean my "soul"; my true inner ego? Is my eye a part of the ego, or a part of the thing I perceive? When on the window theory my soul looks out on the real world outside it, is my eye outside "me"? We can hardly say that it is inside the true soul, and yet if the eye with its faculty of sight is outside the true soul, then on this showing most of my ideas would be outside me too, and instead of a division into object and ideas I should be obliged to divide everything into the "me" and the "not me," the latter including all objects, both ideal and material.

Moreover, if there is in man a power of "common sense," by which, instinctively and certainly, he can distinguish realities from appearances, and the real from the ideal, how comes it that he so often takes the idea for the reality? For example, he sees a vision, he takes it for a real man. In cases like this we seem to have none of this "common sense" power. So far from instantly recognizing reality, we only conclude that things are real after long experience of them, and even when we call them "real" it is only because we expect to obtain again some group of sensations which we have experienced in the past. Our notion of reality, like the Platonic Idea of substance, is a mere product of our mind,

not the result of any immediate power of at once and infallibly distinguishing reality from appearance.

A sceptical view of common sense reality was taken by Pyrrho, a Greek philosopher, who lived about 340 B.C. Not content with asserting that as to many of our perceptions there was a doubt whether they were real or ideal, he denied to man any power of distinguishing ideas from objects.

This theory was ridiculed by Molière in the "Marriage forcé." A philosopher says to Sganarelle: "You must please change your mode of speaking about things. Instead of saying 'I am come,' you must say: 'It seems to me that I am come.'" "But," replied Sganarelle, "I must have come, for here I am." "That," said the philosopher, "does not follow, it may seem to you that you are come without its being so." "But am I not here and do I not talk to you?" "It may seem so, without being so in reality."

This paradox (which anticipates the theories of both Berkeley and Hume) conceals the difficult question as to what we mean by subsistence or real objective existence, and will be considered hereafter when we come to deal with idealism.

Protagoras (about 450 B.C.) had already raised the same question in another form. Without going so far as to say that reality was indistinguishable from appearance, he asked how one man could possibly know that his own impressions of objects were similar to the impressions of another man? What each perceives is personal to himself only.

In opposition to Protagoras, Aristotle observed that though a thing presented one appearance to you and a different one to me, yet in reality it could not be

two different things at the same time. Granted that it had existence, its existence must be definite. Therefore, as the generality of men are agreed as to appearances by comparing them one with another, the overwhelming probability is, not only that men in good health all see the same object, but that the object is such as they see it. Our reflective ideas obtained from objects may differ but our perceptions of objects must be the same.

This argument sums up the common sense view, but, of course, assumes that we can perceive reality.

We shall see further on that an attempt was made to reconcile the scepticism of Pyrrho and Protagoras with the common sense view, by the theory that though we perceive realities, we perceive them only as modified and transformed by our perceptive faculties much as a man sees things through tinted spectacles. These views will be dealt with when we come to describe the theories of Kant and Spencer.

The common sense view, having been mangled a good deal by the Schoolmen and the Scottish School of Philosophers, appears in a renovated form in the philosophy of Bergson.

The sceptical theory of Pyrrho reappeared at various intervals, being supported by Sextus Empiricus (third century A.D.) and other writers. But it remained comparatively neglected until it revived in the seventeenth century, and for a time became quite fashionable. It was advocated by Berkeley, early in the eighteenth century, in a series of dialogues so well written that his name is usually connected with modern Pyrrhonism. His view will be described in its proper place. It is sufficient for the present to say that he alleged that what we take for substances are only appearances. Objective

reality was considered to be in the appearance, and any objective reality beyond the appearance as a metaphysical fiction.

Hume followed in the same line. But possessing a mind of a far more powerful and logical character than that of Berkeley, he treated the ego itself as a mere appearance, so that man has no proof of his own existence. It is an appearance, not to the ego, for there is no ego. Our perceptions of ourselves are mere loose beads, not even strung upon a string to preserve their continuity.

On the opposite side to idealism, which placed all perception and sensations in the mind, and denied the existence of "substance" of any sort, whether universal or individual, the materialists contended that nothing existed but "matter."

Thought was a property of matter, or a phenomenon of matter, like heat, electricity, or chemical action. Those who carry this view to an extreme, contend that it is possible for everything to think ; nay more, to be logical, they are bound to go so far as to say that the organization of a mere machine gives to its co-ordinated action the character of a low form of conscious thought. These opinions became most prominent in France in the eighteenth century, and will be dealt with further on.

It remains only to mention the last and greatest attempt to reconcile the common sense view with idealism on the one hand and with materialism on the other, while adopting the theory of universal substance. This was the task of the German Idealists, beginning with Kant and ending with Hegel. Its principle was to treat the idea not as an objective ideality, but as a subjective reality, so that the ideal and real became identical.

In this brief preliminary review we therefore see that

reality may be considered from the standpoint of "common sense," by which the ideal is distinguished from the material, and both are treated as realities. Or, again, from the materialist theory which treats matter as the only reality; or, again, from the objective idealist standpoint, which treats ideas as the only realities, or on the theory of Hegel, which treats the ideal as identical with the material, and both as equally real and equally ideal.

But throughout we have not been able to give any definition of "reality." It seems to pervade philosophy like the air which we breathe, and yet we are unable to give an adequate description of it. We feel it, as we feel that we know our own ego and our own will, we are forever talking of them, and yet if asked what they mean, we can only treat them as necessary mysteries which we can neither explain nor dispense with.

The next question arises as to the sources of our knowledge of appearances and of reality. Part of the material of it clearly comes from our bodily sensations. But are the data of knowledge wholly derived from the senses, or is a part derived from thought itself, or is it termed "a-priori," that is before, and independently of sensation?

The simplest explanation is to regard it as entirely derived from sensation, and consisting only of sensations linked together. This is usually called sensationalism or empiricism. The use of the word empiricism has been rather ambiguous. Strictly speaking, it means experience, and experience may be derived from data of the pure intellect, just as from sensations. But the word empiricism is usually employed to denote the theory that the whole of our ideas, even of the most abstract

character, are entirely built up out of the material given us by our bodily senses. Empiricism is obviously compatible with any of the theories of being above mentioned. It was held by the idealists Hume, Hartley, and Mill, as well as by Condillac, Bonnet, and the French materialists of the eighteenth century. Sensations are supposed to have an agglutinative character, so that like chemical molecules those tend to adhere which have a natural affinity for each other.

To the "a-priori" school of thinkers, it however appeared that the derivation of the raw material of knowledge entirely from our experience of sensations was a very inadequate view. They asserted that many of our ideas do not come from sensation, or even from co-ordinated sensations. Some of them are innate. Thus, for instance, they asserted that the Idea of God was not derived from sensation, and further that mathematics and the principles of science, such as the laws of cause and effect, were derived from the mind quite apart from sensation.

From this latter point of view, a geometrical fact, such as a proposition of Euclid, depends not on sense-experience, but on laws of thought. Once a proposition is understood, it becomes in an instant more certainly true than if it had been supported by an infinity of empirical measurements.

For example, suppose I draw an oblique quadrilateral figure with parallel sides, and prepare to measure its area with a rule and a protractor. As I am about to do this, a geometrician shows me that I may liken it to a pack of cards pushed out obliquely—(Fig. 1). I have only to push them straight—(Fig. 2)—to see that the area in each case must be equal to the length of

a card multiplied by the thickness of the pack. Now this is no result of experience. The moment I see the proof I cannot think it otherwise. I need no numbers of different packs of cards; the thing is obvious. By other proofs he shows me how, by calculation, to estimate the length of the circumference of a circle. And the result he gives is so true, that the more accurately I measure, the more nearly I agree with his calculation.

With such examples, it is asked how it is possible to argue that mathematical truths have been derived from experience in the same way in which the smell of attar



FIG. 1



FIG. 2

of roses has been found to be agreeable, or that roses are generally red?

We might, perhaps, contend that the peculiar character of mathematics depends upon its having been taught and believed as Dogma,—simply on authority. It no doubt is true that a good deal of our scientific belief depends simply on authority, but every one must admit that mathematics appears to stand on a much firmer ground than that of teaching or custom.

We might regard mathematical truths as built up by individual men, each for himself, out of his own personal experience. But this does not account for their certain character, which makes a man as sure when he has once understood it as if he had tried thousands of experiments. He sees it as clearly true at the age of sixteen as at sixty. It seems to depend neither on books or masters, nor on

the experience of himself or others, it is certain the moment it is understood.

Another view would be to contend that mathematical laws are not originally laws of mind, but of matter, which by operating through the ages have so impressed themselves upon the early creatures out of which man has developed, that at last, according to the laws of heredity, a modern baby grows up with a ready-made set of geometrical machinery in its brain, and cannot think of lines and surfaces except in ways conformable to the laws of the material world.

And, lastly, the laws of mathematics and other laws of an equally certain character might be regarded as identical both for mind and matter, and therefore derived not from one, but from both, being not two sources of information, but in reality one and identical.

The various views sketched out above will be further dealt with when we come to consider different systems of philosophy. According to all the views lastly mentioned, the validity of intuitions derived otherwise than from sensual experience are admitted, and it is perhaps not going too far to say that those thinkers who rely entirely on sensation as the basis of knowledge are now in the minority.

We have thus briefly reviewed the nature of "being," and discussed the question whether we are to regard it as "appearance" or "reality," and shown the merely relative character of these terms, and how impossible it is to dogmatize with regard to them.

Next, we examined the nature of the sources of our knowledge, and the question whether it is wholly derived from sensation, or wholly from pure mental intuitions, or from a mixture of the two.

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It remains only to enquire what are the theories as to the machinery by which these sensations or intuitions are put together so as to form a body of knowledge.

The theories as to the machinery of thought naturally are concerned with the nature and personality of the thinker. The simpler and most common view is to regard thought as a faculty of a thinking being, by whom the data of thought are made up into a system of knowledge by a mental process which we usually term logic. By our faculties of comparison and unification of perceptions and ideas we form concepts, judgments, and trains of reasoning.

Differences of opinion may exist as to the real nature of the thinker, some treating the ego as an ultimate reality, others (especially Pantheists) as a mere phenomenon. In any case, however, the data of knowledge are supposed to be presented to, and operated upon, by a mind or soul which is not only capable of receiving them, but also of impressing upon them forms derived from its own nature. The study of these forms is called psychology, and the widest possible differences of opinion exist as to its character. Most of them agree in admitting the existence of a faculty of thought of some kind, although some of the idealistic school identify "thought" with "being."

Certain, however, of the empirical school above mentioned go so far as not only to reduce the whole thinking faculty, including appetite's desires and the will and the judgment and memory, to sensations only, but even to regard the ego itself as a mere aggregation of sensations. Hume appears to have held this opinion and also John Stuart Mill.

CHAPTER IV

NEOPLATONISM

UPON the breaking up of the ancient world, two new cities rose into importance, each destined to exercise an immense influence upon the history of Europe. Byzantium became the centre of science and literature.

The corruption of Byzantium was so great that Gibbon, in describing it, has often to veil his narrative in the obscurity of a learned language. Decency forbids the narrations of the abominations of the life of the Empress Theodora, and our morals are outraged by the stories of the intrigues and of the murders committed by the parasites into whose hands had fallen the task of governing the enormous empire.

There was, of course, a reaction against Byzantine immorality ; asceticism appeared in the deserts of Egypt which border on the Red Sea. The movement is said to have begun with St. Anthony and Paul the Hermit. If one can procure an old edition of the lives of these men, instead of the accounts in which the narrative has been altered to suit what are supposed to be modern susceptibilities, one is struck by the magnificent tone that pervades the story.

We are reminded of Epictetus the slave, and of the noblest characters in the days of ancient Rome. The

fame of these men so spread that a desire arose to see them, and to hear them speak. One can imagine the interest which would be aroused in the mind of some good man or woman, living amid the cheats and profligates of Byzantium, on learning that men were living lives of protest against luxury and vice. Expeditions were accordingly arranged, and we read that in one place a sort of tourist agency for camels had been contrived to take the rich and high-born ladies and gentlemen across the Desert.

When they got there, they were amazed at the new moral atmosphere in which they found themselves. Absence of ambition and disdain of luxury were made the rule of life. In one instance, a lady went to the head of the convent and said : " Are you aware who it is that is acting as your cook. . . . Do you know that you have got an ex-Archimandrite of Byzantium ? " Enquiry was made, it was found to be true. Soon afterwards the Archimandrite disappeared from the convent, and all trace of him was lost for ever.

These ascetics carried their doctrines to absurd extremes. It is not needful for us to be dirty in order to be good. But on reading the lives of the Fathers of the Desert, one is inclined to doubt whether their very dirt did not help their devotion. Asceticism is often made the subject of ridicule, but the effect which the histories of the lives of the Fathers of the Desert had upon the formation of Christian morality can hardly be over-estimated.

The other city to which I have alluded is Alexandria. Egypt had been given to one of the generals of Alexander the Great, who founded the dynasty of the Ptolemys. Alexandria soon became not only a powerful trade

centre, but the meeting-place of learned men of all countries.

According to some rather fanciful descriptions there was a fine museum and library. There were also to be seen the embalmed body of Alexander in a glass coffin, the real shield used by Achilles in the Trojan War, and other curiosities of equal doubtful authenticity. Here, too, were held, not only circuses for the vulgar, but shows of barbaric peoples living in their huts and ready to amuse and interest the public with their native songs and dances.

There was an observatory, with all kinds of scientific instruments, water-clocks, organs blown by water-power, optical illusions, prisms and lenses. The only wonder is that they did not discover the telescope. Certain it is that they used spectacles for long and short sight, and probable that they were acquainted with the magic lantern.

Their books, too, were of a high order. No one who will read the opening chapter of the great Astronomical Syntaxis of Ptolemy (A.D. 120 ?), can fail to be struck by the admirable scientific spirit that pervades it, and the precision and honesty in stating facts, the lucidity of exposition, and the closeness of the reasoning.

It is true that the fundamental error of believing that the Earth is at rest vitiated the book. But the arguments against the motion of the earth are so well put that they convinced not merely the contemporaries of Ptolemy, but the whole scientific world for more than a thousand years.

In this city learned men of all nationalities assembled together. The philosophic Greek, the ritualistic Egyptian, the bigoted Jew with his rigid Law and his very personal

national God, the sceptical Epicurean, the honest but equally sceptical Stoic, and joined to these a whole company of conjurers, professors of magic, soothsayers, priests of every sort of secret religion, reputable and disreputable, Oriental mystics, socialistic ascetics.

Out of this welter of opinion was to rise the Christian religion and a philosophy which reigned supreme for twelve hundred years, which formed the ideals of modern Europe, and which for efficacy in moulding character, and directing conduct, surpassed any system that had as yet appeared in the Western World.

Philosophy as studied at Alexandria was derived from the philosophy of Greece, but with a large infusion of other elements. It, of course, reflected and to some extent endeavoured to combine the divergent views of Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle appealed to minds of a concrete character, whereas the theories of Plato appealed to minds of a more abstract type. Both were scientific, but Aristotle appealed rather to empirical fact than to theory ; while Plato was possessed of an excessive desire to use theory as an explanation of fact. The same difference of mentality is found in all the great leaders of the arts and sciences. One is struck with it in comparing the infinitesimal system of Newton with that of Leibnitz, or the art of Hogarth with that of Blake.

An example of an Alexandrian thinker of the Aristotelian type is afforded by Claudius Ptolemy, whose "Criterion" (*circa* A.D. 120) gives an interesting view of philosophy as conceived by a mind of the concrete order.

In this work Ptolemy divides the faculties of the Soul into sensation and intellect. Exterior things are perceived by the senses, and intellectual truths by the intellect. He is a relativist, in that he considers that the

senses cannot reveal the inner realities of things, but only phenomena. The phenomenal data of sensation are worked up into concepts by the aid of the memory and the imagination. The intellect corrects the errors and defects of various senses, and harmonizes discrepancies by adding to the matter so given in sensation, intuitive universal concepts of its own, such as those of identity and difference of equality and inequality, etc. . . . Sensation can only give us the changeable and uncertain, it is to the intellect that we must therefore look for the formation of certain and general ideas. The senses can only supply us with imperfect geometrical figures ; it is the reason that gives these figures perfection. He takes a materialistic view of the soul, considering it divisible into a number of faculties each associated with some definite portion of the body. But for dates, one could believe that this book had been written in the seventeenth century A.D. instead of the second. A Latin translation was published at The Hague in 1663. It seems fair to conclude that the many learned men who visited Holland during the latter part of the seventeenth century were acquainted with it.

In contrast to these prosaic views, the theories of Plato appealed strongly to minds of a poetic, mystic and imaginative order.

Centuries before the Christian Era the Brahmins of India had evolved a Pantheistic System. It may be a matter of surprise to find so advanced a philosophy among a primitive people. But it seems not improbable that this pantheism was only the outcome of nature-worship. From the very dawn of civilization, man had an intuitive desire to seek after God. In the absence of revelation, the powers of nature were usually deified.

The Sun, the giver of heat and promoter of life ; the Earth, the universal mother, were endowed with volition and became objects of worship. To us, imbued with the modern scientific ideas of Descartes and of Newton, the notion of the sun as a God appears absurd. We only attribute volition to living beings. But in early times it appeared quite natural that the earth should be sometimes friendly, sometimes cruel, and that the sun should reward those who worshipped him. And as religion became more monotheistic, when the God of the Water was combined with the God of the Earth and Air, at last the idea arose of a universal world-god and received philosophic expression in the Pantheistic system of the Indians, in which everything was God.

This, when blended with the Platonic universal ideas, and the theory of universal substance in its Platonic form produced Neoplatonic pantheism. This system has been previously shown to be based upon universals. As when a tree bears an apple, the apple is developed out of the substance of the tree, and though separable from the tree, yet is part of the tree, so were all things supposed to be emanations of God, and to be of his substance, not by partition, so that the emanation ceased to be still a part of God, but to be, while separated, still united.

In this view all plants that are propagated by cuttings, as for instance roses, are identical plants when derived from the same identical seed. The mere separation of bushes is immaterial. And it is a curious fact that new sorts of roses are believed all to fall away after a certain number of years, and to need new seedlings. An attempt has been made to explain the failure after a time of new sorts of potatoes on the same ground. The roses though miles apart are really but one bush, just as a regiment is

one though one battalion is in England and the other abroad.

Among the Neoplatonists, the works of Plotinus (A.D. 205-271) mark him out as one of the greatest thinkers that have adorned philosophy.

His system may be briefly described as follows : All things are assumed to be derived from the ONE or Absolute, who is beyond time, or space, and not so much unconscious, as above consciousness. We have no faculties capable of apprehending properly any characteristic of the ONE.

Emanating from the ONE is the "Nous," or Divine Reason. In the system of Plotinus the "Nous," or great creating spirit, is God. The ONE or Absolute is rather a principle behind God.

The Nous, overflowing with life and action and desiring to realize itself, produces by self-contemplation the world-soul ; that is to say, the living principle of all created things. The world-soul has Divine intelligence as well as an inferior scientific intelligence.

It is illogical to ask whether the world-soul is one or many ; or whether it is universal or individual. Being a universal it is neither one nor the other, or rather it is both. It is at the same time the soul of the world and of every individual soul in the world.

Only the Divine part of the world-soul can understand this universalism, and then dimly and imperfectly ; but the logical and scientific part of the soul is unable to reason universally, being obliged to think in space and time and to consider existences not as they really are, universals, but as individuals.

In the process of emanation the Nous looks upward to the One. In its turn the world-soul looks upward to the

Nous, and tries to form a world after the pattern of True Reality. But being imperfect, sin and sorrow and pain are introduced into the earthly world. It is, however, a beautiful world, and if the soul in contemplating it will look upward and not downward, its order and beauty will become apparent. But souls that will insist on looking downward towards earth and away from heaven, of course become degraded. The heavenly part of the Nous is the true home of soul, and when the earthly body dies and is dissolved, the liberated soul again rises to the heavenly sphere. There things are seen in their reality instead of as shadows, and there things are not reasoned out, but are known by intuition. Logic is of no use where intuition takes its place. The question of personal survival of the soul after the body's decay is one only capable of arising in the lower faculties of the soul, obliged as they are to think in particulars. In heaven, in the real world, there is no time and no number, there is neither one nor many. The many is the one. And as the higher faculties of the soul partake of Divine Reason, the soul may be said to be in heaven, while the lower parts of it are on earth. It is our duty to live our earth-life so as to promote the return of the whole soul, enriched by its earth experiences, again to the bosom of the Nous and Reality, when the earthly and phenomenal have passed away. It must not be thought that because Divine Reason is above intellect that therefore the soul can know nothing of the higher Realities. On the contrary, the Divine or Spiritual part of the soul can recognize the three great Realities : Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, though earthly beauty, truth, and goodness are only shadows of the realities.

The Divine Reason is constantly engaged in emanating

soul ; pouring it, so to speak, into the world of phenomena and receiving back into its bosom the soul that has performed its earthly task. This may seem vague, and it is vague, when compared with the teaching of chemistry and physics, but the realities of the Divine Reason are not capable of being expressed in the language of earthly science.

In the Neoplatonic system the individuality of the ego, though real enough in the lower world and clearly to be apprehended by the lower part of the human faculties, was phenomenal only and not real. Hence at death the individual will be absorbed into the universal.

It is not necessary to conclude that by being merged into an absolute the individual will be destroyed, or that it will cease to exist, merely because it is no longer apprehended by the lower faculties.

It is quite reasonable to suppose the existence of a plurality in unity which would still preserve the ego.

The union of all things in a universal substance presents difficulties to the mind, but, as pointed out in Chapter II, hardly greater than those presented by modern science.

But all illustrations of the universal substance of the Pantheists drawn from objects perceived by the senses are apt to be misleading, for the universal substance of the Pantheists is quite different from the universal substance of material things ; as, for example, from a universal chemical atom of which all matter might be supposed to be composed ; or, even again, from universal space or time in which all bodies exist. For matter, space, and time are divisible, and the parts are separable. There is not such an identity of being in the different parts as is necessary to the true universal pantheistic substance, which repudiates the possibility of division,

and requires an absolute identity in different parts, so that what is "here" is also at the same time "there," and the past is identical with the present and future.

This position, though conceivable to the intellect, is, of course, unrealizable by any faculty which depends upon sensual impressions.

The doctrines of the Neoplatonists have developed in modern times into the Pantheism of Spinoza and Hegel.

In these later systems God, instead of being an emanation of the ONE, is usually represented as the absolute, and ordinary reason is treated by Hegel as sufficient to grasp all truth without the necessity of a superior intellectual faculty.

The concept of an all-pervading universal God, of which all existing things are emanations, fascinated a number of the noblest intellects of those days as it has fascinated some of the noblest intellects of our own.

It seems to raise the level of humanity, and to create a ladder by which the human intelligence may climb up to the highest things, destroying the fundamental gulf between the material and the divine, and rendering the difference of nature between man and God rather one of degree than of kind.

If Neoplatonism had stopped here, it's pantheistic system would have been, if not unassailable, at all events logical and consistent; unfortunately, however, the human mind never knows when it has gone far enough. So a new school began to develop out of Neoplatonism, with a more complete and detailed idea of God. That he was to be powerful went without saying, and intelligence followed as of course. But this was not enough. He must be also infinitely powerful, infinitely intelligent,

and here the mischief began. For what is Infinity? We have no definite Idea corresponding to it. Even the mathematicians in their Infinitesimal Calculus are obliged to admit that in using the idea of Infinity they are quite unable to define it, and that though it may be legitimate in Mathematics to make use of the term as a sort of unknown land to which things tend, it does not present itself as any Real Idea. This very fact ought to have warned the Neoplatonists against trying to apply it to God, who is the very embodiment of Reality.

But they had no restraint. They took all the qualities, swelled them out with the notion of Infinity till they became not merely balloons, but clouds, and then piled them up into a huge accretion of epithets. God was infinitely wise, infinitely good, infinitely just, infinitely merciful (overlooking the fact that mercy must of necessity set aside justice), infinitely powerful, infinitely beautiful, and so on.

This not being enough, they went further in the process of Idealization. The source of goodness need not himself be good, the source of beauty need not be beautiful, for goodness and beauty all imply limitations. You cannot, for example, have geometrical figure without limitations, and God is illimitable. Nay, more, although God is all affirmation, we must conceive him as a series of negatives, that is, of all negation which involves imperfection or limitation. Thus he is not limited, he is not definite, he is not reasonable, for reason involves a sort of division or limitation.

This exaggeration of attributes ended at last in making the Idea of God not only incomprehensible, but inconceivable; and thus of removing him altogether from the class of comprehensible Ideas.

And now into the pure regions of Neoplatonic thought there intruded the whole tribe of occultists, who degraded the noble simplicity of the earlier system as a mystery play has been often degraded into a pantomime.

It was not enough to have God as the central figure. It was not enough to reach simple Pantheism by representing him as the universal substance of all things, both spiritual and material. It was necessary to contrive a whole machinery to explain the working of the system.

For this the histories of all the gods and goddesses of pagan mythology were ransacked. Although research had created disbelief in the actual historical existence of Venus and Mercury and Apollo, they were brought forward as myths, having a deep Ideal significance, and in a sense a real Ideal existence.

Every mythology contributed its quota to the general scheme. Nymphs from the caves, Pan from his sylvan solitudes, the gloomy gods of Egypt from their underground abodes came to assist in the drama, and Demi-urges, accompanied by awful demons, were supplied from the imaginative property-rooms of Chaldea or Philistia.

These all appeared as Emanations of God, and as sources from which every imaginable thing could be evolved.

To the delight of the wonder-seekers, who abound in every society, both civilized and uncivilized, the corrupted Neoplatonic teachers told tales of demons of the air and sea, of angels both good and satanic, of powers of evil striving against the light, who might be raised by suffumigations of precious herbs, by magical jewels, secret names or censers burning dimly in underground vaults.

For the ladies, demons impersonating handsome young

men ; for the credulous, tales of Incubi and Succubi ; of hideous witches and love-charms and philtres, and all this under cover of the Mantle of Plato !

The whole system evolved into Gnosticism, which became a sort of sink into which was emptied every species of impurity. All desires were represented as lawful to the mind enlightened by the higher reason, all impurity pure to the initiated.

Finally, an imperial Edict put an end to the Pagan religion (A.D. 529).

Of course, it lingered on in dark places. Through the succeeding ages the Rosicrucians held their secret meetings, and even in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries poor old women who had never heard of Plato, or of the sonorous name of the beautiful Adonai, were burned for illicit dealings with Flibberty-Gibbet or Hob-a-lob.

But the extravagances of the Gnostics assisted in banishing the nymphs from the Groves, who hardly now survive as pretty modern fairies ; and the advancement of science bids fair to transform the materialistic supernaturalism of old times into modern spiritualism.

The fortunes of Pantheism have been curious.

We shall see the theory of Pantheism carried to Morocco and to Spain, and in the hands of the Arabian followers of Aristotle develop in a limited form into a system which, under the name of Averroes, was transported into mediæval Europe and became a synonym for blasphemy and atheism.

Again, we see it revived by Scotus Erigina and Giordano Bruno, and finally erected into a mathematical and logical system by the genius of Spinoza.

And lastly, under the influence of Spinoza we shall see Pantheism changed by Schelling into Pan-absolutism,

or the philosophy of the Absolute, which in the hands of Hegel has reverted to its original character, namely, a theory which treats thought and matter as identical and only different ways of regarding reality.

It must not, however, be thought that philosophy in the first three or four centuries was divided between the scientific school of men like Claudius Ptolemy and the Neoplatonists.

The Sceptics and Empirics had also their followers. Unfortunately the terrible destruction of libraries by the troops of Julius Cæsar and subsequently by the Turks, and finally by the Christians, has rendered it difficult to form a fair estimate of the various Schools. But the opinions of the Empirics have been preserved in the writings of Sextus Empiricus (A.D. 200 ?), who combined the Sceptical phenomenatism of Pyrrho with the theory that our knowledge is mostly derived from the senses.

Theoretically, of course, we might apply the word Empiricism both to experience of the senses and experience of the emotions and the intellect. In practice, however, the word was usually employed to denote the sensuous experience afforded by an external world as contrasted with the world of intellect and idea.

The work of Sextus is called "Pyrrhonian Hypotyposes." He first emphasizes the necessity of doubt and of merely treating things as appearances. He then deals with various ways in which appearances deceive us. These had been handed down from Pyrrho and his disciple Timon. He next agrees that we have no criterion for determining what is true and what is false. Even if we had a criterion or touchstone of truth, what assurance have we that this criterion is correct ? We should need

a second criterion by which to test the first criterion, and so on for ever. All this merely means to say that if you are to judge whether the known truly represents the unknown, you must be able to compare them, and to do this you must know the unknown as well as the known ; which is precisely what you cannot do. You cannot tell what is behind the veil till the veil has been lifted.

He defends scepticism as to the existence of God by saying that it is a contradiction to try and know the unknowable, or to comprehend the incomprehensible, and he concludes by some rather commonplace attempts to prove that since God has permitted evil, he must either be not good or else not all-powerful.

He then goes on to show that a number of things which we think exist, do not exist. What, for instance, is a line ? How can it exist without breadth ? It is a mere idea. And what is a surface ? The same, an idea. But if so, how can a number of ideas of surfaces make up a *solid body* ?

By a crowd of metaphysical arguments, all drawn from that method of deduction from abstract ideas which he condemns, Sextus endeavours to destroy our belief in realities. Thus, for example, he argues that time is either perishable or not perishable ? But it cannot be eternal and imperishable, because time that is past has disappeared. Nor can it be merely temporary and perishable, for in that case present time would have been made out of nothing, which is inconceivable. It is needless to say that Sextus attacks ethics. The Good can only be what each man desires and what satisfies his soul, but in that case it is subjective. Hence there is no such thing as objective good. (The same argument would prove that there can be no such thing as Sweetness,

because Sweetness is subjective. Sextus would no doubt have accepted this position. The only reality would be phenomenal sweet things.) It is curious to observe metaphysical arguments used for the purpose of destroying metaphysical ideas, the object obviously being to show that metaphysics and metaphysical arguments are both fallacious.

The Empirics founded a school of medicine which professed to repose on experience as opposed to theory. Empiricism became equivalent to what we now call rule-of-thumb, and its principles were slighted in ages which trusted to deductions from general concepts and ignored the necessity of placing those concepts upon secure experimental foundations. It was not till the sixteenth century that this great error was seen and corrected by the labours of Telesius, Galileo, Kepler and others, and popularized by the works of Bacon and Locke.

CHAPTER V

FOUNDATION OF CHRISTIANITY

CHRISTIANITY MAY BE CONSIDERED AS ESTABLISHED
ABOUT THE YEAR A.D. 400

BEFORE the advent of Christianity three rival systems of morality divided the educated pagan world: Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Æstheticism. The first advocated an active life according to our best nature. It produced a number of noble characters, and many fine treatises on morals. Life was compared to a game in which the stakes are not of so much importance as to play well. But a materialistic view of the universe was adopted. The Gods were represented as indifferent to the fate of men, and no practical result was set forth as the aim or reward of a virtuous life.

In consequence Stoicism made small progress among the masses, and only became the creed of more enlightened men.

On the other hand, Epicureanism, when carried to its logical conclusions, revolted noble-minded people. It is true that the more refined Epicureans were delicate in their choice of pleasures, but the theory presented no solid reasons why on Epicurean principles a man should not indulge in the most disgusting pleasures, provided only that they gave him satisfaction.

Epicureanism was not a form of morality which could appeal to the masses. To practise it, one must be wealthy ; a poor Epicurean is little better than a mere pig, and social life becomes impossible.

The *Æsthetic* theory, which placed morality in the beautiful, and thus fused together Ethics and Art, appealed strongly to the Greek nature, but not much to the Romans, who, as a nation, were deficient in the *æsthetic* sense. But this theory had no more roots than the other two, and presented no prospect of permanent results as the crown and reward of virtue. It meant little to the crowd of ordinary Roman citizens, whose tastes were as vulgar as the masses of the populations of the great cities of to-day.

The moral system of the Greeks and Romans was like seed which, being sown in stony ground and having no roots, withered away. The best they could do was to teach man to live according to his nature, but they had no theory upon which to found this maxim. The folly and evil of a mere pleasure ideal was exposed by Cicero and other writers. The attempt to treat moral rectitude as artistic beauty, which ought to be followed for beauty's sake, proved a practical failure. Nor was the theory that made virtue a sort of utilitarianism much more satisfactory. We all feel that virtue is something different from beauty or prudence.

Christianity as it presented itself to the pagan world offered several advantages. In the first place, it had gathered up and appropriated all that was best in the theological systems that had preceded it.

From the Jews and the Greeks it derived the principle of one all-powerful personal God, who took an active interest in the affairs of the everyday life of man.

From a number of sources it adopted the doctrine of the personal immortality of the soul.

More clearly than any other religion it apprehended the necessity of a thorough cleansing of the moral atmosphere and sensual life of paganism, and absorbed all that was best in Stoic morality. Even with these advantages it would not have prevailed had it not come as a direct message from God in the person of his Son, whose life and preaching presented the highest ideal of altruistic morality, and whose resurrection was a proof of the immortality of the soul.

Accordingly we find in Christianity a repudiation of pleasure or advantage as the end of moral action. Mere justice becomes insufficient, it has to be supplemented by generosity and self-sacrifice. Pain is considered as an aid to moral action, or at all events as in itself no evil. The idea of Beauty becomes transformed and purified so as to become less sensual and more spiritual. And perhaps, most important of all, the recognition of woman as having moral responsibility and a supremely important part in the great scheme of salvation.

The old world was a world of cruelty, injustice, and pleasure. More than half the people were slaves. These slaves were often most learned men. They wrote plays and treatises on philosophy, and the education of the children was largely in their hands. Yet their lives were at the will of their masters, and they might be sold like cattle.

What irresistible attraction must the figure of Jesus have had for a noble matron who was trying to save her children from the pollution of the political life of Byzantium!

For though a sceptical and polished judge might

scoffingly ask, like Pilate : " What is truth ? " yet even to him the question would seem to be answered when some poor unlettered Christian died under his sentence rather than scatter a few herbs on a pagan altar.

Must not the Roman official have sometimes turned his eyes with wistful longing to the man who had ideals which he loved better than life ? And to the poor, the slave, the daily victim of some stupid whim, how beautiful must have been the promise of a future life wherein the wrongs of this world would be righted, and how consoling the message straight from the lips of God, " Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted."

Further than this, the Christian religion presented the somewhat novel spectacle of martyrs, who were prepared not merely to die for their faith, but to renounce wealth and luxury with an intensity of purpose and on a scale that had never been seen among the Cynics or Stoics.

An illustration of the way in which the lives of the Fathers of the Desert were used by early Christian teachers in their fight against luxury is to be found in a passage from the works of St. Athanasius, who visited Rome (about A.D. 340), bringing with him a *Life of St. Anthony*, one of the first hermits.

" I ask of those who have countless wealth, who build palaces of marble, and pay for a single necklace of pearls and diamonds the price of many inheritances, what was wanting to this old man who had nothing ? You drink from cups of precious stones ; he from the hollow of his hand. You dress in golden robes ; his clothing was worse than the lowest of your slaves. But the heavens opened to receive this pauper, while your magnificence will be thrown down into the gates of hell."

Such an appeal as this was irresistible to the poor, and to the nobler minded among the rich. Stoicism and Epicureanism had failed to reform the ancient world, and there were now only two alternatives, moral ruin or Christianity.

The Christian religion from the outset had, of course, to contend with various other religious systems. Neoplatonism and Gnosticism and Magic have already been mentioned.

Then there were the old Pagan religions, and notably the worship of Isis, which appealed to minds of a Ritualistic order, like that of Apuleus, the author of the "Golden Ass."

There were also the Manichees, who believed in the struggle between the principle of good and the principle of evil, which they typified as light and darkness.

Mithraic religion appears to be derived from Sun worship. It was encouraged by the State and professed by the heterogeneous crowd of various nationalities who formed the soldiers of the later Roman Empire. Relics of Mithraism are found all over Europe, and survive in bonfires and celebrations of the first of May, when the sun first regains his summer vigour.

Its decay was probably due in great part to the fact that women were not admitted to the temples. A religion which ignores the educators of children is not suited for civil or domestic life.

The influence which philosophy had upon early Christian thought chiefly appears in connection with the dogma respecting the nature of God and the Trinity, and it therefore becomes necessary to say a few words upon these subjects.

The early Church inherited from Judaism a belief in

one God, and every other influence helped to confirm monotheism.

To God were naturally attributed the most noble characteristics that the human mind could conceive. This tendency to attribute to God the best qualities of man is sometimes disdainfully spoken of as anthropomorphism, or the shaping of God in the likeness of man. But if once it be granted that there is a God, who inspires man with good thoughts and principles, it becomes not only rational, but necessary, to attribute to him those principles which he is believed to have inspired.

The Neoplatonists, who treated the world as an emanation from God, were unwilling to consider sin, imperfection, evil, and matter as a part of the nature of God, and therefore considered them only appearances.

To the Christians sin and matter were realities, only to be accounted for as having no part in the nature of God, but to originate with the devil. Accordingly, consubstantiality between God and matter was denied by them. As a consequence it became logically necessary to conceive of the world as created by God, not out of his own substance, or as an emanation from himself, but out of nothing.

It must be remembered that during the period in which Christianity was being founded, and the corresponding philosophy of Scholasticism being evolved, the idea always prevailed that the human soul was indissolubly connected with matter.

It was considered as embracing not only the mind, but the whole principle of life.

Plato placed the seat of various passions in different parts of the body. Reason in the head, passion in the

heart, appetite in various other organs. By some thinkers the reasonable soul, which alone was immortal, was regarded as a sort of vapour which escaped at death from the body, and which in art was represented as a small winged spirit.

And all Christian theologians regarded the immortality of the soul as connected with the resurrection of the mortal body, not necessarily the actual material body which was united to the soul on earth, but such a body as it should please God to give to the soul.

Hence it was natural that consubstantiality should be rejected as between God and the soul of man, which was regarded as a mere creation.

The unity of God being admitted, it became logically necessary to reconcile it with the divine character of Christ and the Holy Ghost. All that had been revealed and was known by tradition of Christ pointed to him as a God. It was out of the question to consider him merely as a prophet.

But, on the other hand, he had come to earth while God remained in heaven, and had repeatedly spoken of himself and of the Holy Ghost as separate persons from God. This seemed to point to the existence of three separate Gods. How was this to be reconciled with monotheism ?

As a solution of the difficulty, Arius proposed for Christ a semi-divine position. God was presumed to have created the "logos" or "acting principle" or "son" out of nothing. The logos then created the world, the imperfection of which was not due to God, but to the imperfect and fallible logos. In the Arian view there was therefore no community of substance between the father and the son, though the son was no ordinary man,

but a combination of divine perfection and human fallibility.

It is easy to see that this view, though it was adopted in many pagan countries, could not commend itself to Christians, the vitality of whose religion had been derived from worship of and prayers to Christ. To consider him as the creator of evil and sin was inadmissible.

The doctrine of the Trinity therefore slowly developed, and attempts to reconcile it with philosophy were made, notably by St. Augustin (*circa* A.D. 400).

St. Augustin took views on space and time calculated to render them more phenomena than realities. Space he considered as a property of matter. Time as only a consequence of the changeability of things.

By an application of the theory that a concept of a concrete thing is a combination of unity with plurality, he arrived at the conclusion that we might liken the persons of the Trinity to the three terms of a syllogism. Subsequent thinkers constantly argued that the doctrine of the Trinity might be found reflected in the laws of logic and even in the material world.

The same philosophical view was also taken by the Neoplatonist Proclus, a contemporary of St. Augustin, who carried it further, maintaining that the union of two abstract opposites was the foundation of all human thought. This idea was afterwards developed by Hegel.

The doctrine of the Trinity has been embodied in the creed known by the name of Athanasius, the opponent of Arius. This creed represents the Father, Son and Holy Ghost as consubstantial, and hence as constituting but one substance, having however three persons. The Son, being in the likeness of the Father, is by a metaphor spoken of as "begotten." The Holy Ghost, by another

metaphor, "proceeds" as the third person from the love between the Father and the Son.

This doctrine is impossible to a materialist, for under no conditions can he conceive of three material things being one. To him matter involves separate subsistence for each individual material thing.

But to a Pansubstantialist the same difficulty does not present itself. To him there is no difficulty in conceiving the same identical action as at the same time good, beautiful, and true ; nor in conceiving the good as the beautiful, or the beautiful as the true. The impossibility of the identity of two different things principally depends upon their material character.

Hence, in the days when the Platonic spirit was uppermost, the doctrine of the Trinity seemed quite logical, as in fact it is, from a Platonic point of view.

But it will be noticed that at a later stage of Church History, when the Aristotelian spirit had replaced Platonism, a very different philosophical system was adopted to reconcile the doctrine of the Eucharist with current philosophy.

It is not just to cast doubt on these dogmas merely because of the failure of attempts to harmonize them with science and philosophy, but it is impossible not to notice the difficulty that is experienced when an endeavour is made to reconcile reason with theories which by their very nature are beyond the reach of reason.

The main characteristic of Christianity, and the cause of its success was not due to any system of philosophy. It prevailed by the crystallization round the name of Christ of all that was noblest and best in the moral systems of the world. The restraint of luxury and debauchery and cruelty, the abolition of slavery, the rise

of Knightly Chivalry, the generous treatment of the vanquished, the recognition of the proper position of woman, and finally, the spirit of modern liberty—all are due to Christianity, and even those sects which endeavour to promote anarchy derive whatever is good in their systems in the main from that Christianity which many of them profess to repudiate.

CHAPTER VI

SCHOLASTICISM

AT the date of the fall of the Roman Empire, which may be put at about A.D. 450-500, Christianity had been established with its concomitant system of philosophy founded upon Plato and Aristotle.

The last figure of importance at this time is St. Augustin. Then followed a period of confusion usually known as the Dark Ages, which lasted for about three hundred years and ended in a new political system based upon Feudalism. As soon as order began to be restored under Charlemagne and other powerful rebuilders of the shattered framework of society, learning revived, and the thread of philosophical progress, which had been interrupted by the lawless condition of Europe, was again taken up. It was not, however, till the eleventh century that a real advance was made by the movement known as Scholasticism. The most noteworthy figures of this period are Anselm and Abelard. Scholasticism steadily developed for about two hundred years, reaching its highest point in the thirteenth century under the leadership of Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas Aquinas.

It then began to decline under the influence of William of Occam, until in the fifteenth century it became thoroughly discredited. Its decay continued until the

time of Descartes (1637), who may be considered the last of the Schoolmen and the founder of modern philosophy.

During the nineteenth century it was revived, and now under the name of neo-Scholasticism is the recognized philosophy of the Roman Catholic Church. The movement known as "Modernism" is in part a reaction against neo-Scholasticism.

The main characteristic of Scholasticism is, first, an attempt to reconcile Faith with Reason. Upon this question the opposite views are represented by St. Anselm and St. Bonaventure on the one side and Abelard on the other.

In a book upon the Trinity called the *Monologion*, and in another called "Faith in Search of Reason," which was afterwards called "The *Proslogion*," Anselm clearly defines the orthodox position. Reason was to be applied to the study of Dogma in order to explain it. In case of difference Dogma was to prevail. The same view was put forward two centuries later by St. Bonaventure: "First one must believe, then one must understand what one believes, and then confess it. Belief follows from authority, understanding from the reason, and enunciation from speech."

On the other side Abelard asserted that no one could believe anything that was not clear to the reason (Abelard, "History of his Misfortunes"), and he even went so far as to lay down the principle, which shocked the orthodox of his day, that he could not believe anything merely because God had said it, unless also it was approved by reason. ("Introduction to Theology.")

These two opposite principles have only to be stated in order to show the bitter controversy which they were certain to provoke, a controversy which went on for about

five hundred years, and which finally led to the general abandonment of the attempt to explain dogma by the reason.

The next characteristic of Scholasticism was its attempt to harmonize the conflicting views of Plato and Aristotle.

Plato, as we have seen, relying on data afforded by the intellect rather than those given by sensation, treated Ideas as independent realities. This led naturally to the theory of Universal Substance and to Platonic Pantheism, as in the case of the Neoplatonic School.

From the eleventh century onwards, however, the prevailing tendency of thought was rather towards Aristotle than Plato. Accordingly a theory of "Substance" grew up quite different from the Platonic view.

The scholastic theory of substance in its most finished form is to be seen in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas and is derived directly from Aristotle.

We are first to suppose a "materia prima," or primordial matter without form and void ; it is divisible. To ask whether this materia prima is uniform, so that each part is like every other, is to ask more than we know. It is, at all events, quite different from the universal substance of the Pantheists. This materia prima is united with "forms," the various kinds of which have been fixed by the creator, and which, united with primordial matter, give us material objects.

Matter may receive a number of forms, either successively or together ; but forms are not transmutable one into another by any but a divine agency. Change, therefore, is produced by the loss of one form and the acquisition of another. They are put on and off like garments.

It is by means of the rigidity of forms that the universe is kept to a stable order, they are the laws of nature, and cannot be violated or changed by any earthly agency.

Among the forms which a material object may take on, there is one called the substantial form. This substantial form is sometimes called its "quiddity," or that which makes the object what it is. Thus the quiddity of a man is his reasonable soul. Without it he would have a mere animal soul, and be an animal.

The substance of a thing is the union of the *materia prima* with the substantial form. Any other non-essential forms it may possess are called accidents. Thus a man may be dark or fair, but these differences are not essential, they are merely accidental.

We may therefore suppose, as an example, that a form "carbonate of lime" has been imposed upon a portion of *materia prima* so as to make it into chalk. The substantial form of chalk is "carbonate of lime." If a crystalline form is superposed, the chalk now becomes marble. Its substantial form is replaced by the new substantial form "crystalline carbonate of lime." After the sculptor has done with it, its substantial form again is replaced by a new one, "marble statue." In each case the matter remains the same, but the substantial form changes. The forms are not transmuted; the old one is thrown off like a garment as the new one is put on. At first, being mere *materia prima*, the object could not be said to subsist, or to have a subsistence. The first rudimentary form it received would however give it substance, the "substance" of chalk would be the matter joined to the substantial form "chalk," and so on. A thing can only have one substantial form at the same

time. Starting then with substances and forms, we have next to enquire how they can come into action so as to produce the spectacle of a changing and progressive world.

This is due to potentialities or powers of matter for taking on new forms. These potentialities are of two kinds. Passive potentiality is the capacity to be acted upon, as of wax to receive the impression of a seal ; and active potentiality the capacity of acting, as of a coiled-up spring, needing only a touch to release it. In each case, however, potentiality needs to be brought into play by some external act. It is the bringing of potentiality into action that gives rise to the evolution of nature. When on the point of action, potentiality is said to be "virtual" ; a virtuous man is one in whom morality is in a virtual condition, it is with him not a mere potentiality, but a potentiality always ready to come into action upon the least stimulus.

In proportion as changes of form, or rather replacements and additions of forms, take place, the potentiality of the matter to receive fresh forms decreases. It is "worked out" ; its potentiality is converted into "actuality." Finally, if a point were reached at which its potentiality was exhausted, and no further new form could be put upon it, then it would be said to be complete or perfect. This perfection would no doubt be relative ; a thing perfect for one purpose might be capable of improvement for another. There is only one existence that is all actuality, and hence perfect for all purposes, and that is God.

When an object changes, that is to say when old forms are put off and new ones put on, the old are not necessarily destroyed. Some may retire into potentiality, ready

again to be brought into activity by the operation of efficient causes.

From the above description of substantial form it will be seen that it has distinctly an Aristotelian character, and though forms resemble Ideas they are not easily reconcilable with the Ideas of Plato.

For the theory places substance in the imposition of form upon matter ; not necessarily upon material matter, but still upon matter of some sort, and the possibility of form existing apart from matter, as in the Platonic Idea, is, though not absolutely prohibited, at least not encouraged.

The practical application of the doctrine of form and substance is seen in St. Thomas's theory of the soul and body of man. The body is considered as the substance, of which the reasonable soul is the form. It therefore follows that a body is essential to the existence of a soul, which, unless provided with some sort of glorified body, could not survive the death of the mortal body.

His doctrine as to angels is curious. For revealed religion tells us that the angels are not material ; hence, then, angels are form without matter. From this it follows that there cannot be more than one angel of each form. For, like an Idea, each form can be but one. It is only matter that can introduce multiplicity and repetition, and only in material things that there can be two individuals exactly alike. But if so, how can there be a number of different angels ?

From this dilemma we escape by recognizing that each angel is a separate "form." Not being material, they are not subject to the laws of space and time. Like our thoughts, they can travel from place to place without passing through the intermediate space. Thus they could

go from Paris to Rome without travelling over the intervening countries, and they can, of course, be at more places than one at the same time. A thousand angels could stand upon a needle-point, for they occupy no space at all. One may smile at these fancies, and Macaulay, the historian, never fails to jeer at St. Thomas. But it may be asked whether, if one had to imagine a being that was non-material and yet intellectual, one would not be driven to describe him as St. Thomas has described the angels.

But in the view that form can exist apart from matter, we are adopting a Platonic doctrine and abandoning the true theory of form and substance.

If St. Thomas had given up his theory of soul as the form of the body, and admitted that they can be separated; or again had treated the souls of men as capable, like angels, of existing without a body, he would have anticipated the step taken by Descartes about four hundred years afterwards.

We have seen that Plato, following Parmenides, was inclined to rely upon the intellect as a source of certain knowledge of realities, rather than upon sensation; whereas Aristotle relied more upon evidence derived from individual cases given by our senses.

Accordingly, while it was always admitted that the laws of thought played an important and indispensable part in the construction of knowledge, it became more and more common to ascribe the material of thought to sensation. And at last the axiom was generally admitted that there is nothing in the mind that has not originally been derived from the senses.

This sensationalism tended to discourage mysticism. For although mysticism played a most important part in

the development of the Church, it had but little influence upon philosophy. In its positive, nay, almost materialistic, way of looking at life, Scholasticism differed very materially from the philosophy of the Neoplatonists.

In the thirteenth century a further impetus was given to Aristotelianism by the introduction into Europe of some of the works of Aristotle which had hitherto been inaccessible. Among them was a Latin translation of an Arab version of a Syrian translation, with a commentary by Averroes, a teacher of Morocco, well versed in the philosophy of the Arabian schools, and imbued with the Pantheistic theories which had been inherited from the Neoplatonists. Before this the only work of Aristotle known directly to the learned world had been a translation by Boethius of a portion of the "logic."

The commentary generally followed Aristotle except upon one important point. Seizing upon a passage which was quite Platonic in character, and entirely opposed to the general teaching of Aristotle, Averroes asserted that the mind of man was a universal Idea, and consequently that all individual men had but one mind, of which they all partook. It hence followed that when men died, their individuality ceased, and the doctrine of the personal immortality of the soul was not true. He also taught that matter was eternal, that creation was impossible, God being unable to create something out of nothing, but only to transform things already existing. These two last were probably truly Aristotelian.

As an example of the absurdities produced by the adoption of fanciful ideas, it was gravely argued that as the world is eternal it is impossible to suppose that God could have always been creating or evolving individual immortal souls. For if he had done so, those already

existing would be infinite in number, not to speak of those that would be created in the infinity which is to come. There would be no room for such a throng.

At first the commentary of Averroes was received with rapture, approved by ecclesiastical authority, and anything contrary to the theology of the day was accounted for by the admission that science and reason might be expected in some points to differ from and need correction by revelation.

But as time went on, and the consequences of the system of Averroes were perceived, the theory of a universal mind, which was after all only the application to mind of the Platonic doctrine of a universal substance, was considered contrary to the Christian faith; the doctrine that all things were produced by development or emanation, and not by creation, was destructive of the position of God as the creator, and contrary to the express words of the Bible.

Averroism therefore became the byword for all that was impious, blasphemous, and heretical. Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas wrote treatises against it and largely modified their philosophical theories in order to avoid its errors.

But Averroes, being in reality Aristotelian, was not a consistent Pantheist. He only asserted the doctrine of the Real Existence of Universals with respect to thought, and to God and the human soul. As regards matter he adopted the Aristotelian view of objective individuality.

It is rather difficult for us to understand the extreme repugnance of the Schoolmen for Pantheism. It was an article of faith that man was made in the image of God, and that at every instant God supported the world, and that in him all things live and move and have their being.

The mere fact of the consubstantiality of God with the soul of man would still leave God in the most supreme position. But Pantheism, as presented to the world in the twelfth century, regarded God as consubstantial, not merely with mind, but with matter, and would have made the universal substance divisible, changeable, subject to the vicissitudes of time, and to decay. No one had proposed a dualistic Pantheism which would have postulated a twofold or double universal substance, one for mind and the other for matter, one to be thought of in universals, the other as groups of individual modifications of a uniform matter. The era of Descartes and Spinoza had not yet arrived.

Pantheism appeared to the Schoolmen to involve the treatment of God as material, the denial of the creation, of the personal immortality of the soul, the assertion that matter was indestructible and eternal, and that man was consubstantial with the three persons of the Trinity. Its rejection was therefore inevitable.

Although the Scholastic movement was a gradual transition from the doctrine of Plato to that of Aristotle, and Ideas fell into the background, yet they survived in various dogmas, and in a subtle way influenced the whole body of Scholastic teaching. For though ideas were rejected as independent entities, they were received as entities embodied in objects, and thus introduced a crowd of unnecessary notions. What object does it serve to tell us that gunpowder possesses a "potentiality" for exploding? Why, instead of simply saying that matter attracts matter, should we contend for an Idea or "Principle" of universal gravitation, and at last persuade ourselves that the principle of attraction has an existence of its own apart from any matter which is attracted?

Throughout the history of Scholasticism we see substances, essences, potentialities, principles, causes, appearing not merely as ways of representing facts or as properties of things, but as if they were angels or demons creating the phenomena which they were introduced to explain.

This tendency to substantialize causes was one of the great vices of the Schoolmen. If it was necessary to explain why stone fell to earth and fire rose to heaven, they thought that they were aiding knowledge by saying that the stone possessed a "principle of gravity" which caused it to seek to go towards the earth's centre, and that fire possessed an "appetency" to seek its like in the fiery circle of the stars, causing it to strive to ascend to them.

We are informed that a thing subsists which has in it a "principle of subsistence." Instead of saying that opium sends us to sleep because it does, we are told the reason is because there is in opium a "soporific" virtue.

Examples of Scholastic reasoning are to be found even in the most modern Scholastic textbooks. Thus, for example, we learn that "accidents," that is to say accidental qualities, are real and positive, of which a substance can be "deprived." Again, it is gravely argued that no accidental quality can be transmitted from one subject to another. From this it follows that if a ball strike a second ball no energy is conveyed from one to the other. What happens is, that the blow of the first ball awakens into action potential energy contained in the second ball, while a portion of the action in the first ball is converted back into potentiality. Again, we are told that it is impossible for a body to create itself. For, in order to create anything, a body must be in act,

and no body can be in act and in potentiality in respect to the same quality at the same time. But a body that is in act cannot be created, for it is already in existence. Whence it is argued that spontaneous generation of life without a creator is not merely experimentally, but logically impossible.

We find the same tendency to rely on occult entities in the theory of perception. Instead of saying that objects are perceived, we learn that objects make an "impression" like a seal or wax, and that it is the impression, not the object, that is perceived. In all these cases we trace the Idea of Plato still pervading a theory of substance derived from Aristotle.

The slight sketch of Scholasticism above given is sufficient to show that its general trend was in the direction of sensationalism, and that under its guidance philosophy was assuming a positive character. The curious blend of Platonism with Aristotelianism which it presented may be illustrated by an examination of four principal controversies which divided the philosophical world in those days, namely, the nominalist controversy; the proof of the existence of God; the dispute as to the nature of the Trinity; and transubstantialism.

Let us briefly consider these in the above order.

First, as to the nominalistic controversy. It has been already explained that there are three different opinions which may be held concerning the Ideas of Plato. First, we may regard them as principles of substance apart from objects, and as capable of subsisting, though there are no objects nor any minds. They are independent. They are thus said to be *ante res* or "prior to things." In addition, of course, these Ideas can exist in objects, and concepts of them are possible. This view is that of the

Platonic Realists, or, as they are also called, Platonic Idealists. A second view is that of the Nominalists, who altogether deny the possibility of the independent existence of Platonic Ideas. They do not deny that we can form general notions of things, nor that there are principles in nature from which such Notions can be derived. Thus they admit that corresponding to the general notion "horse" there is a well-marked group of animals. But they do not attribute any independent existence to the general notion "horse" which is formed entirely "post res" or "after things," not "ante res" or "before things." Thus a Nominalist instead of saying "man is mortal," would prefer to say "all men are mortal." To the Platonic Realist the Idea "mortality" would be a part of the universal Idea "man." To the Nominalist "men" would be contained in the class of mortal things.

The third view would be that there are no general principles in nature, and that if any such principles seem to exist, they have been wholly created by the human mind, and are therefore merely names.

The first of these views was held by William of Champeaux in the eleventh century. The second by Roscellinus, the teacher of Abelard. Abelard opposed both views with the greatest ingenuity and brilliance. His extraordinary rhetorical power and his love-story render him one of the most conspicuous figures of his day.

As against William of Champeaux, Abelard argued quite correctly that according to Platonism the universal Idea by which an object is constituted must exist whole and undivided in that object. If so, then the Idea "Man" would be whole and undivided in every man,

say in Socrates. But by the same reasoning the whole Idea "Man" would be also in Plato. Now if Plato were in Rome and Socrates were in Athens, this would be impossible and absurd. The reasoning ignores the whole theory of universal Ideas. A Platonic Idealist would have no difficulty in admitting that the same identical Idea could be in two places at once, as we have already seen when dealing with this question.

The real sting of Abelard's attack lay in the fact that the Platonic Idealists did not dare to accept the full logic of their position, which would have entangled them in Pantheism.

To Roscellinus Abelard replied by misrepresenting his views, as if he had taught the third view above mentioned that general notions were mere matters of convention and words. It seems certain that Roscellinus never held so absurd a theory.

Abelard's own view appears to have been a reasonable nominalism, which has been miscalled conceptualism. But when he came to apply nominalism to the doctrine of the Trinity, he of course fell into heresy. For according to nominalism identity of substance of three distinct persons was an impossibility. Hence he could only retain a belief in the unity of the three persons of the Trinity by treating them as in reality not distinct, but only as attributes of one supreme being. This position was clearly heretical, and St. Bernard had no difficulty in procuring the condemnation of Abelard by the Councils of Soissons and Sens (A.D. 1141). He was sentenced to be imprisoned in a monastery, and his books were ordered to be burned. He died in retirement, leaving the controversy between Idealistic Realism and Nominalism still undecided.

The Schoolmen therefore remained Platonic realists so far as the Trinity is concerned, but with respect to material objects they adopted as the foundation of subsistence a material substance capable of division and not of the character of a Platonic universal. This was not a logical position, but it seems the only way out of the difficulty. It, of course, led them further in the direction of Aristotle and away from Plato.

Another point of controversy is as to the proof that reason can offer apart from revelation of the existence of God.

Upon this question the most important contribution to philosophy was made by Anselm about the year A.D. 1089. His view is distinctly Platonic in character. It usually goes by the name of the "Ontological argument for the existence of God."

It may be stated as follows: Ideas like concepts are capable of being combined. Accordingly, we can always enlarge Ideas by adding others to them. There is only one Idea that is so wide and all-embracing that we cannot consider it as being enlarged so as to form an Idea wider still. In this sense, if we try and realize the widest and most complete Idea of all, which includes everything, this Idea will be "God," and must of necessity contain the Idea "Existence" or rather "Subsistence."

Whence, then, God cannot be considered otherwise than as subsisting. It will be observed that this argument is only the reasoning of the Neoplatonists in a new form.

It has been objected to, on the ground that it merely proves that the existence of God is a necessity of Thought, and does not prove that it is a fact. The objection is fatal if we adopt a nominalistic view, and deny to Ideas the character of reality.

But against a Platonic Idealist the objection has no force. For to a Platonist, the Ideal is the Real, and consequently any Idea, the very nature of which involves subsistence, must subsist. A mere concept may only exist, but an Idea is a Reality.

From this it proceeds that all Pantheistic Platonists consider that the subsistence of a universal substance is an absolute certainty, not a mere mental necessity. They regard it as a fact given by the very nature of the mind itself. To them Ideas are more real than sensations. We may be deceived about matter and sensations, we cannot be deceived about the Reality of God. It is necessary clearly to apprehend this view before we can understand the argument of St. Anselm.

Accordingly, the acceptance of the ontological proof is an indication that the person who accepts it is a Platonic Realist. St. Thomas Aquinas, who was partly a Realist, accepts it with some doubt. Descartes accepted it. Kant rejected it. The Schoolmen generally reject it. One might expect this, as they adhere to Aristotle more than to Plato.

From a theological point of view the argument of St. Anselm proves too much, for strictly interpreted it establishes not so much a God as a universal substance, thus involving Pantheism.

It has been generally rejected by the Schoolmen in favour of the proof to be derived from the necessity of attributing the design, which evidently appears in the world, to the agency of an all-powerful intelligent being.

The doctrine of the Trinity may be traced back to a very early period. It has been described in the last chapter, which sufficiently shows its Platonic character. Abelard wrote upon it and, owing to his nominalistic

tendencies, speedily fell into heresy. For in his "Introduction to Theology" he treated the three persons of the Trinity as attributes of the divinity: power, goodness, and wisdom; thus resolving the distinct personalities of the three persons into mere qualities of one central being, and ignoring the unity of substance of the three persons.

The objection of Abelard is exactly what might be expected from an opponent of Plato.

We have thus seen that as regards the Trinity, the philosophy of the Schoolmen was based upon Plato.

On the other hand, when we come to the philosophical explanation of the Doctrine of the Eucharist, we find the direct influence of Aristotle.

Previously to the eleventh century the prevailing belief as to the sacrament was that of St. Augustin, who treated it as a mysterious means of grace.

Whence it followed that only those who received it worthily received the grace.

But in the reign of Charles the Bald (about A.D. 875), one Radbert put forward the proposition that the Sacrament contained the very body and blood of Jesus Christ, not merely mystically, but materially. This doctrine was opposed by Raban Maure. In A.D. 1040, Berengarius treated the presence of Christ in the sacrament as a trope after the manner of St. Augustin.

So great, however, was the desire to provide for man a special means of grace, and so much did materialism prevail, that Radbert's opinion, supported by Lanfranc, Archbishop of Canterbury, gained favour not only with the public, but with the Ecclesiastical Authorities, and Berengarius was on several occasions compelled to retract his errors.

Thus arose the doctrine of Transubstantiation. By this it is not meant that the Godhead of Christ enters the bread ; that would be to make the bread itself a God. It is only the substance of the Corporeal body which died upon the cross that enters the bread.

This substance of the Body and Blood of Christ (which consists of the *materia prima* united to the substantial form) not merely replaces the substance of the bread and wine, but (by a miracle impossible except to a divine agency) the substance of the bread and wine is actually *transmuted* into the substance of the body and blood of Christ ; so that the substance of bread and wine is thus not displaced, but transformed. This substance of the body and blood of Christ is unlike the substance of the bread and wine in that it is indivisible, indestructible, and identical all over the world with the actual body of Christ crucified. Here, however, we have an introduction of Platonism into the theory. For on Aristotelian principles a universal of such a character as this would not be admissible, and no philosophical explanation could be given of the fact that the whole identical body and blood of Christ was present everywhere, and at all times and places, and indivisible though the bread was broken.

At one time an opinion prevailed that an excommunicated priest could not consecrate the elements. The contrary and the more reasonable view was afterwards adopted that the unworthiness of the minister hindered not the sacrament.

At one time also it was contended that the transubstantiation depended on the worthiness of the recipient. Such a view would have been productive of confusion, and made the sacrament a mere memorial ceremony.

Accordingly, what may be called the physical view

prevailed, that there was not merely a typical transmutalism but a substantial one, so that Alexander of Hales, writing in the thirteenth century, maintained that if a mouse ate the consecrated wafer, it would be eating the body of Christ. The faith of the recipient had nothing to do with the transubstantialism, but only with the effects of the sacrament.

The dogma had a profound effect in increasing religious fervour. It was repudiated by Luther, who adopted the theory of the co-existence of the substance of Christ's body with the substance of the bread and wine. This view has, however, been rejected by nearly all the Protestant sects, by which the sacrament is regarded as a solemn mystery not to be explained by philosophy.

The materialistic tendency of the Middle Ages is also shown in various other minor points.

For example, positions in space were assigned to Heaven, Hell, and Purgatory. Hell was located in the middle of the earth, and Paradise in the Sphere of the Stars, where in the imagination of most of us it still remains.

It was natural in an age when few could read, that pictures and painted windows should be used in churches for the teaching of scripture history; but images, instead of being regarded as aids to devotion, were treated as incorporations of divinity. Holy water was considered so sacred that even in the hands of unsanctified persons it could expel demons and cure diseases. Amulets were universally worn, and battles were fought to secure the possession of relics.

This sketch of Scholasticism shows that it was from the beginning an attempt at compromise which could only end in eventual disruption. Revelation cannot be

expected to justify itself to Reason, and the Realistic Idealism of Plato is incompatible with sensationalism.

Accordingly, in the hands of William of Occam and his followers, the independence of Reason and Revelation was proclaimed, nominalism prevailed, the Ideas of Plato were repudiated, and the way was prepared for the philosophy of Descartes.

The principal work of Occam consisted in the wholesale sweeping out from philosophy of Ideas, entities, substance, and principles. This was done with such thorough zeal that Occam's system was known as the "razor." But these principles were so engrained into Scholasticism that in shaving them away he went far to destroy the whole system. He avoided the accusation of heresy by the theory that truth given by revelation was supreme, and had to be accepted without any regard whatever to philosophy. This, of course, was to abandon almost the whole position of Scholasticism.

It must not be too rashly concluded that he was right in this attempt at wholesale destruction. Even if we allow that the doctrine of Ideas has been pushed too far, yet it is difficult to think without concepts of generalities, and difficult to realize the nature of principles or laws. Accordingly, all the schools of philosophy which followed Occam still retained not merely the terms of Scholasticism but the very notions themselves, and to-day, when we use such words as "heredity" or "relativity," we are still attributing to these principles a quasi-existence.

The Reformation aided in the work of disintegration of Scholasticism by encouraging the spirit of free speculation.

The most formidable attack, however, came from the

physical sciences. The scholastic philosophy in its zeal for Aristotle and for the resolution of scientific questions by the deduction from universal concepts, had induced a very careless method in physics ; treating happy guesses as though they were proved, and proceeding by the analysis of concepts, rather than the accumulation of facts.

This method was of course perfectly sound within its limits, and when applied to mathematics and geometry had produced surprising results.

But deduction is only valuable when applied to a body of concepts, the truth of which has been determined either by the most certain intellectual knowledge, or by the most exhaustive experiment and enquiry.

The Schoolmen never saw the necessity of this. Their attention was too much directed to the method of deducing conclusions, and too little to the verification of the facts upon which these conclusions were based. They would argue with the greatest acuteness as to the reasons why a heavy ball ought to fall to the earth more quickly than a light ball, without pausing to enquire whether it was a fact. Aristotle had said it, the fact was established, it remained only to discover the reason. The inveterate habit of accepting ancient authority in matters of faith closed their eyes to the world of material realities which lay open for observation.

The conflict between the old philosophy and the new views of science which were gradually dawning went on, until at last it broke into a well-marked and open dispute in which compromise was impossible, and which afforded the public spectacle of a direct issue, to be decided not by authority or revelation, but by an appeal to facts which lay within the compass of ordinary observation.

It was like a battle, the issue of which is to decide a campaign.

The question arose as to whether the earth is so fast that it cannot be moved, or whether it is in motion round the sun.

The immobility of the earth had been asserted by Ptolemy in his great "Syntaxis" (second century A.D.), and had been accepted throughout the Middle Ages, not merely as a scientific fact, but as a direct teaching of the Bible.

Ptolemy's proof of the earth's immobility rested on the fact that if a bird flies up from the earth in a vertical direction its flight will still be vertical, and it will remain overhead.

But if the earth were rotating, a place on it near Alexandria would be moving at the rate of ten or twelve miles per minute, and the bird instead of being overhead would be left far behind and be out of sight in an instant.

The view that the earth was fixed was first questioned by Copernicus, who, being a monk, did not dream of controverting the teachings of the Church. He showed that motion being relative, you might, if you pleased, explain the whole of the apparent movements of the stars and planets by taking the sun as the centre of the planetary system. All that you need do was to translate geometry from a geocentric to a heliocentric standard ; for the apparent motions of the heavenly bodies could be explained just as well by supposing that the earth went round the sun, instead of the sun and planets going round the earth. To him, however, were objected the arguments of Ptolemy against the earth's motion. He was unable to reply to them. Like a good son of the Church he submitted his will, and died still treating his new theory.

as a hypothesis. But about the year, A.D. 1615, Galileo, then a professor of mathematics at Pisa, who surpassed Copernicus as a man of science just as he surpassed most men of his day in literature, suggested that the reason the bird appeared to fly up vertically and not to be left behind, was because at its start it partook of the motion of the earth, so that though relatively to the earth its flight appeared vertical, yet in reality it was carried on along with the earth. He showed, by an actual experiment, that a ball allowed to drop from the top of the mast of a ship in motion ought, on Ptolemy's theory, to be left behind and fall behind the mast, whereas in reality, partaking of the motion of the ship, it fell exactly vertical relatively to the vessel. This theory, widened and corrected, forms what we now know as Einstein's theory of relativity.

Ptolemy's objection was thus answered, and the principal argument against the motion of the earth was swept away.

Had Galileo been a peaceable man of science he might have propounded his theories as theories, and they would have gradually dissolved the mists of error, as correct chemistry dissolved the dreams of the alchemists.

But that was not the nature of the man. Sarcastic to the verge of insolence, witty beyond most men of his time, accomplished in the arts as well as in sciences, he could not hold his tongue. He delighted in controversy. When his friend whom he had converted to his mathematical views became Pope, he rejoiced, but could find no other way of giving vent to his feelings than to write a dialogue, not in Latin, which at least might have covered his doings with a decent veil, but in Italian, to be read by all the world.

In this most amusing production, which ought to be in the hands of every schoolboy, he ridiculed an Aristotelian philosopher, whom he nicknamed "Simplicius," and had the audacity to assert that the new mechanics had now removed the great obstacle to the theory that the earth is at rest.

His enemies were not idle. They could have pardoned his science, they determined to stop his ridicule, so they persuaded the Pope that, in laughing at the views of Simplicius, Galileo had in substance attacked him. Galileo was left to his fate. A body of professors stuffed with Aristotelian theories examined both him and his books. They were horrified by the terrible nature of the new science. Bible texts were ignored and the whole method of Aquinas, which was to explain the Bible by Science, appeared to be replaced by a theory that the Bible was to be *corrected* by Science. In fact, that theologians had better confine their attention to divine things and not try to explain the motion of balls. They sentenced him to write no more, to repeat daily the seven Penitential Psalms and to other salutary spiritual exercises.

Really, when one reads the case, one can hardly wonder at the condemnation. A man has no right to stir up a lion, especially when one is in the cage with him.

It may be imagined what an effect this striking defeat of the Schoolmen had upon their whole system. It did not stand alone. Jupiter was discovered to have satellites moving round him, Venus to wax and wane like the moon, and the whole geometrical cycles and epicycles by which the motion of the heavens had been explained was overthrown by the labours of Kepler.

Once the attack was understood, it produced a general

assault against the old citadel. The theory of Ideas was ridiculed, the possibility of real knowledge of them was disputed. The doctrine of substantial form was impugned, and in a short time Scholastic philosophy was treated with a contempt which it really did not deserve.

While Scholasticism was thus being discredited by physical science, it was also attacked from another side. For the capture of Constantinople by the Turks caused the dispersion over Europe of a number of Greek literary men, bringing with them Greek manuscripts and able to teach that language.

One consequence of this was the revival of Platonism in the sixteenth century, and the reappearance of the dreaded Pantheism. Among those who introduced Platonism into Italy were George Gemistus, the tutor of the young Medicis, Marsilius Ficinus and Pico del la Mirandola.

This interesting movement was a revival of Neoplatonism, but mixed up with heathen mythology, Chaldean and Oriental theosophy, Christianity and Judaism. It was, in fact, an endeavour to reconcile all the past religions of the world with Christianity, and to cast the whole into a Platonic mould. It suited the sensual eclecticism which was then fashionable in Italy.

On the other hand, the defence of Aristotle was undertaken by Pomponacius and others, while Cardinal Bessarion endeavoured to reconcile the contending parties.

The outcome of the whole movement was unfavourable to Scholasticism. The revival of the study of Greek resulted in a return to sane criticism, and an endeavour to arrive at the true teaching of Plato and Aristotle, not by tradition, nor by translations of translations, but by

an actual study of their works. It unquestionably aided in preparing the ground for the new thought.

The Church, however, viewed with alarm the dissolution of theological philosophy.

The works of Averroes and of Alexander of Aphrodisias (who in the second century had taught that the soul was not immortal) had been formally condemned by the Council of Beneventum in 1513.

The Inquisition, which had been at work from the commencement of the fifteenth century, was strengthened, and several men of science and philosophers fell under its censure.

Repression, though it succeeded in stamping out heresy in localities, and in Spain destroyed the best intellect of the country, was unable to stem the progress of the new thought in Europe, and at the close of the eighteenth century was practically at an end.

The successful revolt of the Netherlands made Holland into a place of refuge for those whose views conflicted with the authority of the Church, and accordingly the new movement began in that country with the philosophy of Descartes.

CHAPTER VII

DESCARTES

DESCARTES was educated in Scholasticism, of which in the main his philosophy is a development, but with such sweeping changes as to make it disputable whether he ought to be called the last of the Schoolmen, or the destroyer of the Scholastic system.

After serving in the army he retired to Holland in 1629, and thenceforth devoted himself to the study of philosophy and wrote his first philosophical work in 1639.

We shall have to consider his theory of knowledge and his theory of being.

At that time the works of Sextus Empiricus were in the hands of the learned world in Holland, and Scepticism, therefore, was a well-known doctrine, and the attacks on Aristotle by the Italian schools had already been made.

Descartes, therefore, very naturally commenced the explanation of his system by a very critical enquiry into the criterion of truth. Having pointed out how uncertain it is that the senses could give us the knowledge of material things in themselves, and how certain it is that our sensations do not reveal the real nature of the objects which cause them, he admits the certainty of the conclusions of mathematics so far as the processes of reasoning are

concerned. As to "BEING" or "SUBSISTENCE," he finds it immediately given in one conspicuous instance, namely, in the real subsistence of thought. This is expressed in his celebrated dictum, "*Cogito ergo sum*"—I think, therefore I exist.

The validity of this proof depends upon the principle which, as we have seen, was adopted by Anselm, namely, that any Idea, of which the conception involves existence, must exist.

On this view, both the Ego and God must be considered to exist, because in the case of the Ego thought involves existence, and in the case of God the Idea of complete perfection involves existence. These are the only two instances in which existence is a necessary part of the Idea. The Idea of an external world, or of matter, or of the human body, would not necessarily involve its existence. It might be thought of as non-existing.

One could not correctly argue, "I eat, therefore I exist."

Descartes considered that there are two and only two kinds of substance, namely, thought and extension. These are respectively the foundation of mind and matter. Matter is totally and radically different from mind. The complete severance of thought from matter is one of the salient features of the system of Descartes. It had never been done so sharply by the Schoolmen, or by contemporary thinkers.

This view, of course, influenced Descartes' theory of knowledge. For if mind is completely separated from matter, and the soul is substantially different from the body, and can exist apart from the body, it follows that knowledge can be obtained from intuition, and that by analysing the fundamental ideas of the mind a body of

scientific knowledge can be built up, which is independent of sensation.

On the other hand, the theory left the ground free for the most ultra-material and mechanical views as to the nature of matter.

Accordingly, the fundamental substance or essence of matter was pronounced to be extension in space, and the whole of the physical phenomena of the world were to be accounted for by the motion of extended matter.

This led to a very ingenious hypothesis. For if extension were a property of matter, then where there was no extension there would be no matter, and wherever there was extension, you might conclude that matter was there also. Whence it followed that the whole of space was absolutely filled with matter. The idea of "empty space," or of matter, as a quantity of little balls with interstices between them, was to Descartes a scientific impossibility. This very Scholastic way of making an ingenious sweeping hypothesis to cover the whole ground is, of course, justifiable if it yields results ; and according to Descartes it yielded results in the theory of vortices.

For if space is quite filled up by matter, we must imagine matter, whether of air, water, or earth, to be continuous, and then, if motion is to be possible, we must suppose that parts of this matter can be pushed aside like parts of a fluid.

But if a part of a fluid is moved, it can only be moved by pushing some other part out of the way, and this can only result in the other part pushing away something else, and the transmitted replacement going on until the last displaced part slid into the space left by the part that is first moved. Deductively, there is no other way in

which the imagination can conceive motion. But this motion is vortical, that is to say, is a sort of whirlpool. Whence, by sheer deduction alone, it seemed to Descartes that all material motion, including that of the heavens, and all bodies, must be vortical.

It is most singular how true to a great extent his conception is ; only instead of being vortical we now treat such motions as "orbital" ; a very different theory in reality.

NEWTON'S theory of gravitation, which was put forward in 1687, was based on the idea, not of matter shouldering other matter out of place, but of masses of matter acting on one another across empty spaces. He therefore adopted the atomic theory of Democritus. For Newton showed that if two masses of matter were shot off in paths not in the same straight line with one another, on the simple supposition that they had inertia, and attracted one another with forces varying directly as their masses, and as the inverse square of their distances apart, they would begin to rotate round one another like the vortices of Descartes.

The Newtonian theory had the advantage of explaining the motions of the whole celestial cosmos ; it was not necessarily incompatible with the Cartesian theory, but it presented so different a picture of matter that, when it was adopted, the Cartesian vortex died a natural death.

From Descartes' very mechanical view of the material world it followed that matter could not think, and that no combination of matter, and no machine, could think. And as Descartes included sensation in the realm of thought, no being that had not a mind could feel. Inasmuch as a mind, or what was the same thing to Descartes, a soul, is denied to all animals, it follows that they do not feel either pleasure or pain. When a dog was beaten, its

howls were a mechanical result of the blows, it did not feel pain any more than a little squeaking doll feels when it is made to squeak by pressing a bellows. The squeak would of course be the result of the pressure, but what we know as pain, pleasure, or sensation, could not be known except to a soul.

It is, of course, easy at first sight to ridicule this view, but if examined in connection with the meaning that Descartes gave to the words "mind" and "sensation," it becomes more worthy of consideration in the light of his philosophy.

What we now call reflex-action is not necessarily accompanied by consciousness. Under chloroform the muscles of man and all the animals respond to stimulus, and they sometimes cry out as if in pain. Yet here is no consciousness. The question, therefore, becomes transposed to the enquiry whether any animals have conscious thought, which in Descartes' view would be represented by asking whether they were conscious of an Ego, or permanent self. When, for example, we see a baby gradually developing consciousness, is he like an animal until the stage comes when he can consciously think? If so, his condition is analogous to the condition that Descartes assigned to all living things that have not a soul. A division of this kind is essential to a dualistic system like that of Descartes by which mind is sharply divided from matter, for if it is not made, then thought would shade away into mere response to action by such insensible degrees that at last one would have to say that gunpowder consciously exploded when a light was put to it. The division may not be truly made where Descartes put it, namely, between man and the animals, but a division there must be. People who are fond of

dogs often speak as though they believed that in some way there was for them a happy hunting-ground after death. But this only raises the question whether cats go there also, and if so, why not mice ? Where then are we to stop ? This difficult Gordian knot is cut by the materialists by saying that there is no such thing as soul, and by the extreme Pantheists, by saying that the Ego is only a phenomenon, and that rightly considered the whole universe is "soul."

Descartes' philosophy had therefore important features. So far as the soul is concerned it entirely repudiated materialism, and asserted the immaterial nature of the soul, thus claiming to put religion on an impregnable basis.

On the other hand, it aimed at a complete freedom of the physical sciences from Scholastic philosophy and from theology. It professed to explain all merely material processes by the hypothesis of extension and motion, and, therefore, so far as the material world is concerned, was a completely materialistic system. This was itself in those days a great innovation. The release of science was so dreaded by the theological party that Descartes, having heard of the condemnation of Galileo, paused before publishing his own works, for he was well aware that his new theory of matter as extension and motion contradicted the theory of substantial form, which was almost a dogma in the theological world, or at all events had been inextricably woven into some of the most important dogmas of the Church.

It naturally followed that according to Descartes our knowledge of merely material things came through sensation.

But in all matters respecting which knowledge comes

through the thinking mind it is innate, and not derived from the senses or any materialistic source.

Thus our knowledge of the existence of God, and of his truth and goodness, is innate ; so also are logic and mathematics. But our knowledge of the mere properties of matter is empirical. The ontological proof of the existence of God, from it's very nature, appealed to Descartes ; and he went further, declaring that the veracious character of God was a proof that the evidence of these senses which he had created might be relied upon to give us the truth respecting matter. This was, in fact, saying that we know by intuition that the evidence of our senses is true ; and went decidedly outside the logical limits of his system.

Descartes' criterion of truth, as well as his proof of the existence of the Ego, were both derived from the Schoolmen. St. Augustin had written, "*Vivo ergo sum,*" and St. Thomas, "*In hoc enim cogitat percipit se esse*" ; also, "*Quod aliquid certitudinem sciatur est ex lumine rationis directus interius indito.*"

It is easy to see with what eagerness a doctrine would be received by men who realized the necessity of a free hand for scientific investigation, but who were not prepared to surrender a belief in the existence of God, and who desired to consider the soul non-material and immortal.

The success of Descartes' splendid discovery that geometrical problems, being problems dealing with quantity, could be handled by Algebra, also contributed to the success of his philosophy.

For many years the system of Descartes was received with acclamation, both in France among the liberal catholics and in Holland by the Reformed Churches.

The subsequent decline of the Vortex theory with its

plenum of fluid matter, and its replacement by the Vacuum theory of Newton, did much to discredit Descartes' philosophical ideas.

Two other difficulties militated against its reception.

For although at first his theory of the soul's independence and immortality was attractive, yet, as has been pointed out, his theories of matter were not easy to reconcile with the dogmas of the Church.

Thus the doctrine of transubstantiation became difficult to harmonize with Descartes' materialism. For, by adopting extension as the universal substance of all material things, the theory of transmutation of substance became impossible. How could mere extension be transmuted? All that could take place would be a transmutation not of substance, but of qualities of a substance. To meet this difficulty, Descartes suggested that the change was made by a transmutation of the bread into the body of Christ, similar to the change which in the human body transmutes food into muscle. But this was merely playing with the difficulty. Descartes' system was founded on the repudiation of substantial form. His treatment of extension as the ultimate substance of matter was as impossible to reconcile with transubstantiation as with the universal substance of the Pantheists.

Accordingly, his theory was condemned as a heresy, and his book ordered to be burned by the Paris hangman.

On a review of the keystone of Descartes' system, namely, the dictum, "*Cogito ergo sum*," one is inclined to question whether this proof does not largely depend on a mere question of words. What is meant by "existence" in the dictum, "*I think, therefore I exist*"?

If only such existence as we attribute to objects given

in sensation, then it would only prove that the Ego has the same phenomenal existence that Descartes attributed to the material objects around us. But he clearly meant more than this ; by "existence" he meant absolute subsistence. In that case, however, the question arises whether such absolute existence as this necessarily arises from the fact that the Ego thinks. Does the dictum mean more than "I think, therefore I appear to exist" ? And has Descartes escaped from the sceptical criticism of Pyrrho ?

But the most fatal flaw in Descartes' system was his inability to explain how mind could act upon matter, or matter upon mind.

His own theory of the necessity of contact for one thing to act on another, and his repudiation of action at a distance pervaded his system, and made any reasonable explanation of the action of the soul on the body impossible.

Readers of "Hudibras" will recollect how this contact theory is ridiculed when the philosopher is kicked "just in the place where honour's lodged, as wise philosophers have judged, because a kick in that place more, hurts honour than deep wounds before."

It led Descartes to propose the theory of occasional causes.

Among the various meanings attached to the word "cause" by the Schoolmen, two were of especial importance, namely, the "efficient cause" and the "occasional cause." An illustration may explain the difference between them. Suppose William insults John, who knocks William down. The insult would be the occasional cause of William's fall, the blow would be the efficient cause.

According to all received doctrines of philosophy an event could not be an efficient cause of another event unless some community of nature existed between them, so as to enable the one to act on the other. But as it was of the essence of Descartes' system to deny any community of nature between the soul and the body, it followed that no material act could be the efficient cause of a mental change.

Thus, for instance, a wound could not be the efficient cause of the hurt to honour.

It must therefore be the "occasional cause." That is to say, the wound must "occasion" the coming into play of an efficient cause for the injury to honour.

It was admitted that God could act upon and receive impressions from both mind and matter. Whence, then, the only feasible explanation on the Cartesian theory was to suppose that the universal intelligence which pervaded all things when the wound was given, felt it, and then efficiently caused the feeling of injury to follow. Thus, when a man saw a bird, and struck it, his desire was the occasional cause which was transmuted by God into the blow, which then became the efficient cause of the bird's death.

Malebranche subsequently enlarged this view, treating God as a sort of mirror in which matter was reflected so as to affect mind. This resembled the view of Telesius and Bacon, but Malebranche's cause really ceased to be occasional, and became equivalent to an efficient cause. The whole theory of occasional causes seems to involve the question: How can a thing seem to act on another upon which it is incapable of acting? and really was an attempt to give a reason for what is now at this day

quite inexplicable ; that is to say, how mind acts on body.

The philosophy of Descartes is, upon the whole, more nearly than any other the current common sense philosophy of the day.

The treatment of the soul as independent of the body, of God as revealed by self-consciousness, of matter as altogether different from mind, of our perception of the real subsistence of mind, and of the phenomenal existence of matter, of the relativity of sensation so that except in the case of extension our sensations need not resemble the causes of it ; the theory that our ideas of matter come from sensation, but that our ideas of geometry and logic and other kindred sciences are derived from mind, are all in accordance with what is known as the common sense school, and although Descartes' theory of a universal substratum of matter differs from that of the Church, yet, on the whole, his system is nearer to that of the ordinary theology of the day than the system of any great philosopher since the time of St. Thomas Aquinas.

CHAPTER VIII

SPINOZA

SPINOZA (1632-1677) was a Portuguese Jew of Amsterdam, who supported himself by grinding optical glasses.

He built up a system of philosophy founded on that of Descartes, but into which was introduced a theory of universal substance, by means of which he endeavoured to re-join together Descartes' severance of mind and matter, while still preserving a fundamental distinction between them.

He based his theory upon Descartes' doctrine of the absolute validity of clear and distinct intellectual concepts. From this it follows that a philosophical system can be built up like mathematics, by the laying down of a number of definitions, axioms, and postulates, and then reasoning from them in an accurate manner.

His philosophy, therefore, claims the certainty and rigidity of mathematical truth.

According to Spinoza, the mind, though it cannot realize to the imagination substance and attribute, yet can have a knowledge of them by the exercise of the highest faculty of the reason, or as he calls it, "*sciencia intuitiva*." The lower kind of knowledge rests on sense-experience and the results obtained by the use of the ordinary reason. It is by the exercise of this higher

faculty that we know the general characteristics of infinity, substance, attribute and mode. We seem here to be on doubtful ground, for one can well ask how a mere mortal mind can apprehend the absolute by intuition.

This use of the higher reason is somewhat like the Extasy of the Neoplatonists. But with Spinoza it is not the use of a super-rational faculty, but rather the supreme cultivation of the reason.

There is nothing necessarily illogical in the assumption of this *scientia intuitiva*. Indeed, we seem in religion to be perpetually using it. It is a necessity in the system of Spinoza, for the series of admissions which his philosophy demands is certainly greater than could be granted by the use of that reason which we apply to the common affairs of life.

The principles with which we are to start, on the validity of which the whole system depends, must next be examined.

The most important of our clear ideas is that of perfection or infinity. By this is not meant mere perfection in this or that respect, but absolute perfection all round; in other words, absolute infinity.

The next foundation concept is that of "substance" or "being." This is not a mere fancy Idea, but a truly real one, being in fact the most real that it is possible to conceive. It is, according to Spinoza, far more real than the concept of the "ego" or of "matter," which depend upon the senses.

From its very nature, the idea of substance is universal, self-existing, perfect, self-caused, uncreated, eternal, and everlasting, so far as such words can be applied to that which is beyond time. Spinoza's definition of it is "that

which is conceived without the necessity of any higher concept from which to form it." We are at once reminded of the universal substance of the Neoplatonists. Spinoza has no patience and, indeed, cannot argue with people who are so dense as not to be able to conceive this substance, with all its characteristics, and treats their opinions as absurd.

Here, however, we have an inconsistency. For if we are to conclude to a universal substance, from the fact that it is an all-embracing concept, we ought logically to adopt the Platonic conclusion of the identity of substance of all things. We ought to consider the manhood of Socrates as identical with that of Cicero. But this view Spinoza is not prepared to adopt. He is a Nominalist ; he does not believe in the independent subsistence of Ideas, and therefore his universal substance is like that of the materialists, a "stuff," of which all things are composed, rather than a true universal.

This "substance" he calls God. He would have given us a better idea of it if he had simply called it "the absolute," for it does not possess many of the characteristics which religions usually ascribe to the Deity.

It has an infinite number of attributes, which are each of them perfect and complete. By these attributes it makes itself known. We, however, can only apprehend two out of all these attributes, not by sensation, but by the mind. It hence follows that what we can know about substance is indefinitely small compared with the infinity of other attributes which we have no power to comprehend.

The two attributes which we can comprehend, are thought and extension. But the attribute "thought," as conceived by Spinoza, is different from thought as

conceived by Descartes. Descartes considered thought as involving a conscious ego. The "thought" of Spinoza needs neither personality, nor consciousness, nor sensation, nor will. It is a sort of thought-stuff, which may be individualized but is not necessarily individual.

Extension is regarded by Spinoza as the attribute upon which matter depends. It is a Cartesian conception, being everywhere, all-embracing, continuous, and devoid of a Vacuum. It can be divided, but not by putting anything else in between the parts. For though divisible, it is not severable.

Thus, thought and extension, like two infinite continuous seas, embrace and constitute everything that we can know.

It follows, of logical necessity, that if substance is infinite, and has an infinity of attributes, there cannot be more than one substance. For if there were two, then since they are both infinite and both have an infinity of attributes, they would be indistinguishable from one another, and therefore but one. Hence there can only be one infinite substance, namely, God.

God, being substance, is incapable of individual thought, and could not design or plan. Hence he cannot be regarded as the artificer of the universe, nor capable of individual volition, nor has He any care for men. He is conceived simply as a great unconscious spirit.

These attributes have modes, which, instead of being infinite and eternal, are temporary and limited. Man's soul and body are groups of modes of thought and extension respectively. Substance can be thought of in an infinity of different modes, but these modes go in pairs, according to the attributes of thought and extension. These modes are individual and concrete, and it is in

them that we carry on our reasoning in everyday life. They are individual, and constitute "things."

Substance can therefore be apprehended as material and non-material. For example, man can be apprehended as soul and body. These modes of existence are only phenomena, like waves or ripples on the great ocean of thought and extension.

The form of Pan-substantialism peculiar to Spinoza differs essentially from that of the Platonists. For, as we have seen, the application of Ideas of the unifying principle of concepts ends by making all Ideas identical in Substance. But nominalists repudiate the independent subsistence of Ideas. They regard Ideas as only existing in individual things. Hence the "substance" of a nominalist is not a true identity, and resembles the substance of a materialist. It is rather a sort of universal "stuff" than a universal identity.

For this reason, Spinoza's Pan-substantialism has a materialistic appearance, and Bayle treated it as a form of materialism.

It is difficult to explain the character of the individual mind upon Spinoza's principles. For on Pantheistic principles, all individual minds are identical with the one universal thought. But if thought and extension are of the nature of "stuff" and divisible, one does not see how universality of substance can be predicted of them.

Nor, again, is it clear how a phenomenal ego which is a mere bundle of modes can apprehend the absolute.

In fact, any system which repudiates the Idealism of Plato and attempts to establish a Pantheistic philosophy on a nominalistic basis is very difficult to understand.

In truth the "ego" of Spinoza is in a very unsatisfactory condition. It is a group of modes of mind united

to a group of modes of extension (body). They exist on parallel lines and are two ways of apprehension of the same thing, and to each mode of the one there is a corresponding mode of the other.

As thought can apprehend matter, so perhaps we might be tempted to conclude that matter could perform some process equivalent to an apprehension of thought, so as to make the relation of thought to matter reciprocal. Spinoza does not give a hint of this, and his system has often been reproached with putting an individual thinker outside the whole system to look at it, whereas the thinker is really only a mode of the system. This difficulty is characteristic of all idealistic systems except those of the later German school, which adopt the theory of the identity of thought and being.

The "thought" of Spinoza is absolutely different from "extension," and therefore mind is essentially different from matter, and could not be considered as a product or property of matter any more than matter could be considered as a product or property of mind. Spinoza was not a phenomenalist in Berkeley's sense, nor, on the other hand, was he a materialist.

In Spinoza's system God has no will. Will is entirely modal and transitory. For though God is free, it is only in the sense that there is no other substance to constrain him, but he can only act according to his own nature, which thus seems to prescribe his actions.

Hence, then, to talk of ends, or design, is mere modal illusion. It is absurd to treat the eyes as made for man, with a design that he shall see ; or the sun, with an intention that it shall lighten the world. Everything evolves with a purposeless regular certainty in which modal, or human design, or will has no place at all. Good, Evil,

Beauty, Praise and Blame, Sin, Merit, Reward and Punishment, are all mere products of imagination. Men adopt them because they seem to perceive what they call an "order" in nature, whereas there is no order in nature independently of our own imagination.

All these ideas are the mere imagination of men "who judge of things according to the disposition of their own brain, and put the results of their own imagination in place of realities. . . . So many heads, so many opinions. The brains of men are like their palaces. If men only understood things truly, they would all be of one opinion . . . the science of mathematics is a proof of it."

Spinoza therefore sweeps aside all such questions as "How God comes to permit the existence of sin," by simply saying that there is no such a thing as sin, or right, or wrong. They are all imaginary. Nominalism could hardly be carried further than this. The explanation how the mind of man can act on the body, which so greatly perplexed Descartes and Malebranche, is disposed of by Spinoza, by showing that the relativity of their action is only due to the co-presence of two modes, each derived from its own attribute, but which attributes are united in the universal substance. The doctrine of occasional causes was not necessary to Spinoza's system, as it was to a system which made mind and matter substantially different one from the other.

Novalis called Spinoza a "god-intoxicated man." Anything less like intoxication than Spinoza's theory of God can hardly be conceived. His God is certainly not human and in any religious sense cannot be called divine.

According to Spinoza we can therefore conceive the world in two different ways and from two different points of view.

According to the higher view the world and ourselves are part of a harmonious whole, each part of which is united to the others in a great system, the discrepancies of which are only apparent to our lower faculties, the common reason and the senses.

It is the part of the philosopher to think, as Spinoza calls it, "*sub specie eternitatis*," or to think of the unchangeable.

As has been said, the God of Spinoza is quite unlike the God of any religious system. He is merely an unthinking, unfeeling absolute, an abstraction of that faculty which is above our ordinary reason.

There would be room in his system for a God of an inferior order, possessed of illimitable intellect and power, and endowed with every possible virtue and benevolence ; but he would only be a modal God. He would not be the God of Spinoza.

One would have been inclined to think that Spinoza's treatment of the soul of man as only a mode would have involved a negation of the immortality of the soul, or at all events of personal immortality.

Theoretically, so long as extension endured, we might imagine the soul at the death of one body being attached to another, or being reborn. Or we might even, like the ancient Egyptians, believe that the soul could be, by association, connected to matter, so that the soul could animate a statue if a suitable one were prepared for it. Or, again, that it might inhabit matter as the soul of Sir Christopher Wren might inhabit St. Paul's, or the spirits of Drake and Nelson haunt the ocean.

The proof of Descartes, founded on the assumption of the absolute existence of the Ego, is not open to Spinoza.

In his "*Ethics*" he, however, puts forward the soul's

immortality as mathematically proved, but only by the somewhat illogical process of taking the higher part of it away from the lower.

Of course, by treating the Ego, not like Descartes, as a certain fact of consciousness, but as a mere phenomenon, a mere bundle of modes, Spinoza might be accused of destroying all chance of personal immortality, but immortality is always capable of being explained upon any system of philosophy which admits the independent existence of mind.

It must appear rather strange to find Spinoza building a system of morality and social conduct upon a basis which seems so little capable of supporting them. For there does not seem to be any room left in his system for moral action. He was, however, a deeply religious man.

By this it is not meant that his religion merely consisted in giving the name God to an absolute substance. He adopted a real morality, which may be shortly described as trying to see from the widest point of view what God's nature is, and shaping our actions accordingly. It results in the adoption of Christianity as a practical system ; but in the hands of one who denies freedom of the will except as a mere phenomenon, the morality ceases to be connected with the idea of merit or of a system of rewards and punishments, or to be connected with the will of a personal God.

It rather places blessedness in the calm of a direct knowledge of the divine essence and of self-realization as beings derived from God. It would not suit ordinary human beings.

By most theologians and the Jews of his own Church, Spinoza's religion was regarded as atheism and his system mere materialism.

The importance of Spinoza's system chiefly lies in the effect it had upon German thought. For about eighty years it was neglected, but in the latter part of the eighteenth century it evoked a veritable enthusiasm in Germany, and inspired Schelling, Goethe and Hegel.

It is significant that the same period witnessed the revival of the philosophy of Locke in France, and Hume in both France and Germany.

The period which preceded the French Revolution and the reconstruction of Germany was one of intense philosophic speculation.

CHAPTER IX

THE EMPIRIC METHOD OF THE 17TH CENTURY

TELESIIUS—BACON—GASSENDI—LOCKE AND THE MATERIALISTS

THE scientific attack on Scholasticism which, as we have seen, derived most of its force from the new mechanism of Galileo, had a philosophical side in the revival of Empiricism.

Telesius published the two first books of his "Principles" at Rome in 1565, and the whole work at Geneva in 1588. He went so far as to found a society at Naples devoted to the destruction of Aristotelian philosophy. His books caused such opposition that he retired to Cosenza, where he died in 1588. His books were put upon the Index in 1608. VIVES, a Spaniard, also attacked Aristotle. He taught in England in the earlier part of the sixteenth century. His works were published in 1555. Having been expelled from England, he died in Holland, which by that time had become an asylum for free-thought and remained so until the end of the eighteenth century.

Lord Bacon adopted and enlarged the views of the Italian empirical school, and wrote a treatise on the philosophy of Telesius, whom he highly praised.

Bacon's two principal works were the "Advancement of Learning," published in 1623, and his "Novum Organon," published in 1620.

He states the object of philosophy to be threefold, an enquiry into God, nature and man. He was opposed to the method of obtaining knowledge by deduction from intuition, preferring instead inductive methods applied to the materials given by sense-experience. Thus, for example, he alleged that the knowledge of God is not derived directly from God, but only from God as reflected in nature. He avoided the extreme materialism of Telesius, but his philosophy had an important effect in promoting scientific methods of thought in England, and was the starting-point from which sprang the empirical school of Locke, and finally the materialism of the French philosophers of the eighteenth century.

We have now to follow the development of the Baconian philosophy until its main current ended in materialism.

The movement may be said to have begun in France, about the middle of the seventeenth century, by the publication of the works of Gassendi (A.D. 1655) and was a reaction against Cariesianism. The philosophy of Gassendi contained two main principles, sensationalism and Pyrrhonism. Sensationalism was derived from the principle of the Schoolmen that there is nothing in the mind but what can be traced ultimately to the senses. This maxim had, however, not been applied to the whole of human knowledge, but only to the theory of matter and man, and other created things.

It was accompanied by scepticism or Pyrrhonism, which professed to treat all knowledge as knowledge of appearance only.

Owing to the power of the Church these doctrines were not professed openly by Gassendi and his school, except under the guise of religion, and it is a curious fact that they were put forward ostensibly with the view of showing

that man's powers of knowing the truth, otherwise than by means of revelation, were so feeble as to throw him back upon religion. This may be seen in the Dialogues of La Motte le Vayer (A.D. 1671), the tutor of Louis XV, and in Huet's treatise on the feebleness of the human mind (A.D. 1722), and in the works of Sorbières. The views of Gassendi were popularized by his pupil Bernier, about the year 1680, who instilled them into the minds of Boileau, Racine, La Fontaine and Molière (who had been a fellow-pupil with Bernier under Gassendi's tuition).

The works of Sextus Empiricus were edited several times in France, and finally a translation was made by Hervet and addressed to the Cardinal of Lorraine. Bayle, in his Dictionary (published A.D. 1695), briefly describes the system of Pyrrho.

In England the empirical movement was continued by Hobbes, whose books date from about the middle of the seventeenth century.

But he was far surpassed by Locke, who wrote his book on the Human Understanding in 1690.

The main points of the philosophy of Locke are as follows :

He adopts and emphasises the theory that all our ideas are derived from sensation. Hence he does not admit the possibility of innate ideas of any kind, meaning by this, ready-made ideas born in man and not derived from sensation.

He is a realist in that he asserts that the primary qualities of material bodies, extension and hardness, are metaphysically such as we apprehend them. With regard to other qualities, such as colour, he is a relativist, holding that our perceptions of these are only relative.

He is obliged to admit the existence of mental machinery, by which the data given by sensation are united into ideas. Consequently he asserts that the mind has a power of combining and associating sensations according to modes, substances, and relations.

This adoption of the idea of substance shows that, in spite of his repudiation of metaphysics, he was obliged to fall back on "substance," which is a metaphysical idea. His substance was, however, not the universal substance of the Platonists, but substance for qualities to adhere in. Again, he allows that the law of "cause and effect," by virtue of which we always assign a cause to every phenomenon, is a law of thought. So also is the principle of identity, by which we recognize that the group of sensations and the substance that we saw yesterday is the same as the substance that we now see to-day.

Following Descartes, he admits the reality of the ego. With regard to God, he denies that we have direct knowledge of him. His existence is only given to us by demonstrative knowledge, that is, knowledge derived from what we know of his works. In this he follows Bacon.

It is thus evident that Locke was not a thoroughgoing Empiricist. It is also clear that he was partly a metaphysician, though only a half-hearted one. His work does not indicate that he had ever apprehended the position of the Platonists.

He might even be said almost to be a follower of Descartes, if it were not for the repudiation of the doctrine of Innate Ideas, which forms the most important point of Descartes' philosophy.

His reason for denying the existence of innate ideas is that they are not found in children nor in savages. Nor,

again, are they found in their perfection in men born deaf, dumb or blind.

Thus, for example, certain savage nations have no innate idea of God. Children have no innate idea of geometry.

This reasoning is, however, very inconclusive. For even supposing that a country could be found of which the natives had no idea of God, and admitting that it was certain that the traveller had rightly understood them, it would be open to argument that this particular race was defective, just as a race of men might be colour-blind. One cannot argue from the fact that one particular child, or a group of children or savages, has no innate idea of a God of any kind to the conclusion that this idea may not be innate in those better endowed by nature. One could not argue that a European child was born without an innate idea of God, merely on the ground that no such idea could be found among the anthropoid apes.

It is practically certain that animals and insects have innate instinct. For example, a spider that has never seen a web, spins one resembling in every detail that which was constructed by the parents that it has never seen. Are we to suppose that the idea that a bee has of a hive is the result of education or experience ?

And if instinct is allowed in animals, on what ground is it to be dogmatically denied in the case of man ?

An important part of the work of Leibnitz, whose system will be presently described, consists of an attempt to refute Locke's contention that there are no innate ideas. His refutation of Locke was accomplished by showing that it does not decide the question merely to prove that babies have no ideas of mathematics, and

savages no innate idea of God. It might be that there are born in every man seeds, which later develop into ideas, which ideas are therefore "innate," and yet do not appear at first. On this question, which is discussed in Leibnitz' "*Nouveaux Essais*" (A.D. 1703), one cannot but feel that Leibnitz' views, whether or no they decide the question, certainly dispose of the arguments of Locke.

In fact, to argue that because innate ideas are not found in a child, no idea in a man can be innate, is as illogical as to say that because children have not got beards, therefore they must have been added on to the face of a man from the outside, and not developed from some innate principle. For surely the capacity to grow a beard is innate and not derived from experience.

The whole question is put on a new basis when we reflect that since a child undoubtedly comes into the world with an organism, part of which rapidly develops into a brain, it is natural even on the most materialistic view to suppose that this organism may carry with it groups of ready-made ideas, as well as groups of faculties. In fact, the dividing-line between an innate faculty which Locke admits, and an innate idea which he denies, is so vague that it is impossible to reject the possibility of an innate idea and yet to admit an innate faculty.

If we choose to widen the dictum of Gassendi and Locke that all knowledge comes from sensation, by alleging that the whole framework of our faculties comes by heredity from parents, who are the result of the evolution throughout the ages from Protozoa, then it might be argued with more plausibility that our ideas were derived partly from our own experience, partly from that of our ancestors. But, again, what is "experience" ?

An idea is not a piece of matter taken and pushed into the brain ; it is the result of the operation of some faculty upon data given in sensation or otherwise. The very word " experience," when we come to use it in the widest possible signification, is so vague as to afford no reasonable ground for asserting that it is the only source of knowledge.

Locke was of course a nominalist. It may be added that he was a Christian.

The work of Locke produced in France an impression out of proportion to its real merits. Voltaire, in comparing it to the works of Descartes, said that it was history as compared with mere romance. It is reported that the enthusiastic Frenchman wept on seeing his niece reading Locke's works. He gave in his Dictionary an outline of Locke's theory, in which he showed that he had misunderstood Locke, to whom he attributed the theory that all thought was only sensation.

It is quite evident that the theory of the sensationalists could not be left in the confusion shown in the works of Locke. The tendency of the human mind to generalize, naturally led his disciples and followers to endeavour to explain by means of sensationalism the faculties of the mind which Locke had recognized.

Accordingly, Condillac, in 1754, published his treatise on sensation.

In this he contended that man has but one single faculty, that of sensation, and that our mental operations and ideas are all products of that faculty. By this faculty sensations are compared with one another, united, separated and arranged, whence comes our whole body of knowledge.

It is to be observed that this theory is not materialism,

for the soul is admitted as having the faculty. It is not alleged that the sensations are themselves identical with the faculty that arranges them, nor that the sensations are material. Condillac admits the existence of a soul, only he treats it as a white table upon which sensations write the whole of our knowledge.

The sensational movement was continued by Diderot and Condorcet.

Diderot was a professed Atheist, but he was not logically a materialist. He believed in the unity of nature, and the philosophy to be gathered from his scattered writings is much more like a sort of pantheism than materialism.

Cabanis went further, arguing that the brain took in sensations, digested them and sent them forth as ideas, just as the stomach took in and digested food. Yet even he recognized the stomach as different from the food, and recognized an unknown principle of thought.

The most thoroughgoing materialism is to be found in the work of Helvetius on the mind. In this book man is treated as an ordinary animal. Interest and pleasure and the most gross sensualism take the place of ideas of duty. He even went so far as to assert that genius is only a fancy, and that the most useful discoveries are only the result of chance. He was a man of fortune, and an idea of the depravity of the circle in which he lived can best be given by quoting the words of Mme. du Deffand : " He has spoken out every one's secret opinion."

Baron Holbach, a rich German who resided at Paris, published between the years 1750 and 1767 a number of books upon chemistry and the applied sciences. After this date, however, his work took a more philosophical turn, and he published a series of very violent attacks

upon Christianity. His house became a rendezvous of the principal thinkers of those days, who at Paris were preparing the way for the Revolution by undermining the ideas of Religion and morality which had hitherto prevailed. He gave dinners twice a week, to which were admitted the most advanced free-thinkers. In 1770 he published his "System of Nature," and in "Good Sense," in 1772, he put atheism and egotism in a popular form so as to be comprehended by the masses.

Most of these works were published anonymously at Amsterdam to avoid proceedings against them being taken in Paris.

Holbach was a man of generosity and simplicity of life. The style of his egotism and atheism somewhat resembles that of Franklin, who, like him, advocated a materialistic and atheistical philanthropy. He died in the same year that the Revolution commenced, which his influence and works had so largely contributed to bring about.

La Mettrie carried materialism to the most brutal extreme.

In one of his books ("Man a Machine," A.D. 1748) he treats man and mind as a mechanism. He asks what is the use of supposing that man has a soul when we see animals without a soul do in a lesser degree everything that man can do? His books caused his expulsion from France and from Holland, but he was received as an intimate friend by that congenial spirit Frederick the Great at Berlin. His wit recommended him to Voltaire, who was then living at Frederick's Court, but who did not share these extreme views.

His doctrine was pure atheistic Egotism. He died of a surfeit after an enormous meal, which was terminated

by a pheasant stuffed with truffles, at the house of the English Ambassador at Berlin. Frederick the Great sent a eulogy upon him to the Berlin Academy.

In England no writer of distinguished eminence adopted pure materialism. For Hobbes cannot be called a materialist, though many of his opinions tended in that direction.

Among the crowds of minor writers who attacked Christianity there were numerous materialists. Coward ("Thoughts on the Human Soul," 1702) may be cited as an example.

Materialism has had many advocates in recent years. Among these Hæckel may be taken as a prominent example. This distinguished man of science adopted as a philosophy what he called evolutionary monism. In his works, one of the principal of which is "The Riddle of the Universe," he commenced by contemptuously sweeping away all religion and metaphysics, pronouncing mind to be a mere product of matter, and man to have been evolved through some form of ape from the most elementary organisms.

Having, however, adopted this position, which appears agnostic so far as philosophy is concerned, he assumes the existence of a universal substance without any proof or even argument for its existence.

He praises the monism of Spinoza, and bases the origin of all things on matter and spirit.

Having thus apparently joined the metaphysicians, he suddenly turns round upon them, saying, "Let us leave to the metaphysicians the sterile task of hatching the impossible thing-in-itself, and as wise men and realists content ourselves with the immense progress of our science and philosophy."

Hæckel was followed by men like Buchner ("Kraft and Stoff," 1855) and Moleschot. They all exhibit the same tendency, first to decry philosophy and metaphysics, and then to advocate some metaphysical system. For so overpowering is the tendency of the human mind to seek for ultimate truth down in the abyss in which, according to Empedocles, it resides, that men of science like Priestly and Huxley cannot resist the temptation to philosophize.

Two arguments usually form the basis of materialism. First, that loss or injury to the body or brain of man involves a loss of, or a change in, his mental powers.

While this shows that the brain and bodily organism of man is necessary for the exercise of thought, and for making that thought effective in speech or action, it does not show that thought is itself material. For one could not argue that the art of painting was a material thing, merely because a man could not paint when his brushes had been lost or his canvas injured. The brain and body may be, not the machinery of thought, but the tools by which the spirit operates.

It is argued by advocates of materialism that the whole world of animated nature must be considered as having the power of thought in greater or lesser degrees. Thus, for example, a dog may have not merely instinct, but a low form of consciousness and intelligence. We have therefore no right to consider man as different from the brutes and even from vegetables. If we are prepared to assert that a dog has not a soul, by what right do we ascribe a soul to a human being?

This argument has considerable force when used against the Cartesians, who account for the actions of the

higher animals upon a purely material basis, and yet refuse to consider the mind of man as material.

But the argument has no weight against those who are prepared to treat the intelligence of animals as only differing in degree from that of man, and who are prepared to admit that a dog or an ape may have a low form of soul.

But when the opponent of materialism has been driven into this position, the materialist may ask what becomes of the doctrine of the soul's immortality? Are we to deny it, or are we to people the future world with the souls of all the animals, insects and flowers that have existed in this world?

To this it may be answered that the truth or falsehood of materialism cannot be decided by the question what sort of a world it would produce in a future life, nor need those who believe in immortality be at all dismayed by the prospect of a survival in some form even of the beasts that perish. A future life would not be less beautiful because our horses and dogs and flowers were found there.

Besides this, there may be degrees of intellectual capacity necessary for survival, and those lower forms of life which have not reached any form of conscious thought, however low, may not have qualified for survival after death.

The argument used by Averroes, that a future world would not be big enough to contain such a large assemblage of men, animals and plants, is not in point. Even if space were wanted, our telescopes show that there is plenty of space to accommodate every one, and if, as is most probable, space is a mere form of thought, then no space would be required.

If again it is urged that imagination reels before the contemplation of such a countless assembly of immortal beings, it may be replied that such a crowd is in mere number small as compared with the countless atoms which we know as a fact to exist in the great planetary system. Yet we do not refuse assent to the atomic theory merely because the number of atoms which it posits appears stupendous.

The question of immortality is really a question of religion, and has no bearing upon the metaphysical question of materialism.

On the other hand, two difficulties present themselves to the materialist.

For, in the first place, he must establish the real subsistence of matter ; to him it must be a reality, not an appearance. But how is he to do this ? The idealist has the advantage that in seeking to show that thought is the basis and substance of all things, he can urge that we have an immediate knowledge of thought because we think, whereas our knowledge of matter is only an inference, and the materialist is unable to show that we have an immediate knowledge of the foundation upon which his whole theory rests.

A second difficulty in the way of materialism is that those who assert that thought is a mere product or quality of matter, are bound to give some reason for the opinion that mere matter can think. We ought to expect that machines should have some form of thought. So far is this from being the case, that no mere arrangement of dead chemical matter has ever yet shown signs of thought or even of life.

The work of Pasteur was based upon the opinion that mere inorganic matter could not develop life, and there-

fore, when he saw life apparently coming out of nothing, he sought for its origin and found it in microbes. And if no one has yet proved that life is "material," still less has any one shown ground for the opinion that thought is material.

Hence, then, the materialist is faced not only with a metaphysical difficulty, but finds himself confronted with an adverse weight of experience and experiment.

For these reasons the opinions of our great scientific leaders, which during the latter half of the last century were tending in the direction of materialism, are now inclining more to some idealistic explanation of the riddle of "substance."

Under the name "monism," a philosophical system has been proposed which treats mind and matter as only the manifestations of one absolute. It is apparently an attempt to reconcile Hegelism with materialism, and is really only materialism under a new name, for most of its adherents take a purely mechanical view both of mind and matter.

CHAPTER X

OBJECTIVE IDEALISM

BERKELEY, HUME, AND THEIR OPPONENT REID

WE have seen that the theory of "being" of the Schoolmen, which was practically adopted by Locke, involved the assumption of a "substance" which formed a foundation for our perceptions. And this substance was assumed to be that which made the difference between an object that really subsisted, and a mere idea of an object.

This substance was, however, a mere assumption. Its existence was considered a logical necessity, but it could not be directly perceived, and was one of the superfluous entities that Occam's razor shaved away.

It was therefore only a step forward to deny the necessity of substance, and to treat appearances as the only realities of which we can have any knowledge.

We have now to see how this progression of thought took place.

The fundamental distinction drawn by Descartes between mind and matter rendered it, as we have seen, impossible for him to explain how one could act upon the other, and induced him to account for the apparent miracle by ascribing it to the Action of God, who provided us with ideas of matter which corresponded to realities,

and whose nature precluded us from believing that he would deceive us.

We have seen that Spinoza rejected this explanation, accounting for the reciprocal action of matter and mind by the theory that they were different aspects of one and the same substance.

It is obvious that the explanation of Descartes is quite inadequate. It is a mere attempt to evade the difficulty, not an explanation of it.

The theory that our ideas of matter must correspond to realities because God could not from his nature suffer us to be deceived, was manifestly untenable in face of the fact that our senses constantly deceive us in all manner of ways.

Accordingly, Malebranche, a follower of Descartes and a Priest of the Oratory, in his "Search after Truth," published in 1674, while adopting the Cartesian axiom that clear ideas of the intellect were to be trusted, denied that any of our senses was adequate to convey to us a knowledge of the external world, or even of the fact of its existence.

He gave many instances to prove this, and among them he endeavoured to show that our vision is quite unable to perceive directly geometrical extension in three dimensions.

But although he supplied all the arguments for a complete scepticism as to the existence of matter, he recoiled from the logical consequences of his views, and being intensely religious he invoked the aid of revelation, and of the common opinion of mankind, to assure us that though our ideas of matter are imperfect, yet we have some knowledge of material reality ; and that certain of our ideas, such as those of extension and motion, may be

trusted to represent realities, although vision and hearing are incapable of giving us any knowledge whether or no there is an external world.

He does not seem to have perceived that the path he was pursuing was the same that had led the Neoplatonists to Platonic Idealism, and ultimately to Pantheism.

His theory was in reality a Deistic Idealism.¹

In France the philosophy of Descartes and Malebranche was supported by the Oratorians, and opposed on the one hand by the sensualistic and empirical followers of Gassendi and Locke, and on the other by the Jesuits, who adhered to the views of the Schoolmen that all knowledge came ultimately from sensation. The controversy ended (according to Voltaire) about the year 1730 by the triumph of the empirical school, which thenceforth pursued its career until it ended in the materialism of La Mettrie and Holbach, as is shown in Chapter IX of this book.

In England, Malebranche's views were received with favour by the English Platonists ; and Taylor, who had translated from the Greek several portions of the works of Plotinus, translated from French the "Search after Truth," and published his translation in 1794.

Before this, however, Norris, rector of Bemerton, published in 1691 an essay on the human understanding, and in 1701 a work in two volumes entitled, "An Essay Toward the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World."

In this book he reproduced the substance of Malebranche's "Search after Truth," but though he came very near to absolute Idealism he seems never to have

¹ It ought to be noted that Malebranche's main arguments had been anticipated by Geulincx, a poor professor who lectured at Leyden about 1663, but whose works were not published until 1691.

taken the final step of denying the subsistence of an external world, and of reducing all our knowledge of it to a knowledge of Phenomena. When he distinctly asserts the existence of a "natural" or "sensible" world, it is not clear whether he is treating that world as a separate and distinct entity, or merely as an appearance.

His book received much attention, and was the subject of a refutation by Locke which was not published until it was found among his papers after his death.

Meantime, Malebranche's views had attracted the attention of Berkeley, who in 1700 had entered Trinity College, Dublin. The philosophical dispute between the Theistic Idealists and the empiric followers of Locke was in full progress, and to all appearance the empiricists were gaining the victory in England as they ultimately gained it in France.

Berkeley threw his forces into the opposite scale, and in 1710 produced two works which attracted considerable attention. In his "Theory of Knowledge," and his dialogue between Hylas and Philonous he explicitly argued that all our knowledge of matter is of appearance only, and he followed Malebranche in ascribing our ideas, both of spirit and matter, to the action of God.

A perusal of Malebranche's "Search after Truth" can, I think, leave no doubt that Berkeley largely availed himself of the theories and arguments of Malebranche, and that Malebranche was the more profound and original thinker of the two.

About the same time another clergyman, Arthur Collier, entered the field by the publication of his "Clavis Universalis ; a new Inquiry after Truth," (1713). The book is badly written, and the author adopts to

excess the detestable habit of arguing on every page with an imaginary opponent, to whose good sense he repeatedly appeals, and whom he alternately lectures and ridicules.

But there is no doubt about his meaning. He calls the unknown substance, whose existence he denies, "extra-existence," and dogmatically rejects the existence of a world external to our ideas. There is ground for thinking that Collier had adopted Complete Idealism even before Berkeley's attention had been drawn to the matter, and it is not improbable that the publication of Berkeley's book determined Collier to publish his views. The fact that two men should, independently of one another, push Malebranche's theories to their logical conclusion, shows that sooner or later this important step was certain to have been taken.

In spite of the fact that Berkeley received his inspiration from the works of Malebranche and Locke, and that many of his arguments are obviously fallacious, due merit must be awarded to the youth of twenty-five who could seize on the conclusion for which others had prepared the way, and could see with the greatest clearness the points in Malebranche's theory which Locke had failed to recognize.

Although the works of Berkeley met with a favourable reception in England, they fell rather flat in France, and Berkeley was treated as a sort of follower of Malebranche, and when empiricism triumphed in France, Berkeley's work was forgotten and its importance not perceived until, together with the work of Hume, it aroused Kant from his "dogmatic" realism, and started the movement known as German Idealism.

Berkeley was not, however, prepared to go the whole length of Pyrrhonism. Logically, he ought to have said

that God was a phenomenon and that there was no proof of his existence. Instead of taking this view, he asserted that there is a God, from whom all the appearances are directly derived. But this assumption was contrary to his own theory, for the same arguments by which he tried to show that we have no right to assert the existence of substance, would also show that we had no right to assert the existence of God.

The ontological proof of the existence of God is, of course, not open to Berkeley, inasmuch as he is not a Realist.

He thought to destroy Materialism by destroying the notion of substance. But his argument went too far. For in destroying substance he destroyed the proof of the existence of God which he was so anxious to preserve.

The danger of his position, from a theological point of view, was shown when a man of first-rate intellect pushed the doctrine of Pyrrho to its logical consequences.

Hume ("Treatise on Human Nature," A.D. 1738) approved of Locke's empiricism and of Berkeley's abolition of substance, but he proceeded to apply the same critical process to all Ideas whatsoever. He saw at once that if the law of cause and effect were true, and we were bound to assign a cause to every effect, we should be obliged to assert the existence of substance and of God as causes of appearances.

He therefore denied the validity of the law of cause and effect as a Law either of thought or being, maintaining that it was really only the result of our empirical experience that like follows like, and that it in no way established the necessity of the existence either of a God as a first supreme cause, or of any other foundation for appearances.

The thoroughgoing phenomenalism of Hume required that he should consider perception of the pen I hold in my hand as differing only in vividness from the concept I now have of the pen I held yesterday.

Locke at least allowed substance to the one and not to the other, but Hume rigidly excluded it from both. To Hume the perception of a pen was a mere image.

Hume denied to the mind the power of adding anything to the data of sense; the mind could only compare phenomenal sensations. Mathematics was entirely an "a-posteriori" science; that is, one not dependent on the nature of mind, but posterior to, and derived from sensation.

Apart from experience the mind could only produce analytical knowledge, as when one dissects a sensation, not synthetic knowledge such as is afforded by geometry.

The Ego, the reality of which Descartes regarded as the most certain datum of consciousness, is with Hume a mere phenomenon. No one can be certain that the "I" that I knew yesterday is the same as the "I" that I know to-day, or, for that matter, that there ever was a yesterday to know it in. The position of the Pyrrhonian philosopher in Molière's play (written in the seventeenth century) was adopted. The position of the thoroughgoing Idealists is put with admirable clearness in the fourth part of Hume's "Treatise on Human Nature."

But the scepticism of Hume as to the real existence of the Ego appears to have gone beyond Idealism. He says: "I never can catch myself without a perception, and never can perceive anything but the perception." And he treats man as only a "bundle of perceptions."

It is one thing to maintain that the ego is only

phenomenal and that the reality is a sea of being of which any particular ego is only a passing mode. But it is another thing to go on and say, as Hume says, that this ego is not even phenomenal. For if our mind is only a "bundle of perceptions," what is it that "perceives" them? He calls it "I," but what is this "I"? If there are nothing but perceptions this "I" must be one of the perceptions perceiving the others. But how can this be? and what is the agency that builds the perceptions into a "bundle"?

The truth is that in denying that we have a consciousness of an ego, Hume goes too far; the ego we are conscious of may be phenomenal only, it may be a temporary wave on the ocean of eternal being, but at least it is something that perceives. Even though phenomenal, it is more than a mere perception. In fact, by no effort of mind can we conceive a *mere* bundle of perceptions perceiving perceptions—there is a consciousness of unity which, even though it be a mere phenomenon, is distinct and individual. Two different questions seem here mixed up by Hume, the question whether we are conscious of an ego, and the quite different question whether, as Descartes maintains, this consciousness of the ego proves that it is not a phenomenon, but has a substantial subsistence.

There is also a great difficulty in the way of objective Idealism. For if all that I know is only a subjective appearance, then you are only a phenomenon, an idea, in my mind, while I am only a phenomenon in your mind; so that we are not even as different as a pair of ghosts appearing to one another. Each is only in the mind of the other.

These and other difficulties led Hume finally to the

opinion that "reason leaves us not the lowest degree of evidence on any proposition either on philosophy or common life." In plain words, that philosophy as well as religion is a delusion.

The challenge thus thrown down to the world by Hume, Berkeley, and the Pyrrhonists, was taken up by a thinker of singular power and acuteness, namely, Thomas Reid. ("Inquiry into the Human Understanding," A.D. 1763).

Reid's argument is that we must know something immediately, that is to say directly, and without the intervention of any representative idea of it. Now what do we know directly? On the phenomenal view, we only know ideas. But what then is the nature of the idea that we know? The phenomenologists admit that we take it to be a reality. If there is nothing beyond it, no substance behind it, no cause of which it is the effect, then the idea is itself real, and when we call it real we are only following the dictates of common sense. For what is the difference between saying "this table that I perceive is real," and saying: "I have a perception of a real table"? The reality of the table is given in the act of perception.

To put the matter another way, if we admit with Hume that all things that we perceive are mere phenomena, then these phenomena are for us existences; they are real; they are actualities. We may, if we please, suppose them not to be actualities, but that is as if we were to say, "the actual does not exist." Such a supposition would be more fanciful than the supposition of "substance."

In fact, we cannot get beyond our perceptions by making some fanciful assumptions about "reality." In

one sense a dream is a reality ; it would remain a reality to a man who has never been awake.

From this point of view the so-called phenomenon of the Pyrrhonists is a reality. Berkeley's theory was only half-hearted phenomenalism. He wanted to treat matter as only a phenomenon and thus cut the ground away from materialism, but to preserve the reality of God and of the Ego. Hume showed that this attempt was an impossibility.

The expression "common sense" originated with Aristotle, who treated it as the sense which includes and is common to the other five. He even localized it in the heart. It was recognized by the Schoolmen and finally, in the hands of Reid, came to mean that immediate perception of reality which he alleged to be common to all men.

Hume, with his complete phenomenalism, cut away "substance" both from mind and matter, but this resulted in his phenomena becoming his realities. He had abolished the concept "substance" only to find that the word "phenomenon" had slipped into its place.

The importance of Reid's common sense view lies in the fact that it serves as a basis for modern thought, and also the harmony between the ideal and the real which characterises the philosophy of Hegel.

CHAPTER XI

LEIBNITZ

THE philosophical system proposed by Leibnitz arose originally from his disapprobation of the Cartesian theory of matter, as merely depending upon extension. As we have seen, matter was regarded as a continuous unbroken space and its properties depended upon motion, position and extension.

This theory seemed to Leibnitz to be defective, as it could not account for the property of matter which we call mass, and which produces inertia or resistance to being moved. Mere geometrical extension could not produce resistance to motion.

The alternative to a consideration of matter as a continuous fluid sea was to adopt the theory of Democritus, and to consider it as made up of an enormous quantity of atoms of various shapes with spaces between them. This theory had been propounded by Gassendi in the earlier part of the seventeenth century, and adopted by Huygens, Locke and Newton. (It is rather curious to reflect that this theory of little balls as atoms led Newton to his corpuscular theory of light, whereas Descartes' fluid resulted in the wave theory, according to which light is propagated by ripples in an ether as sound is propagated in air.)

The atomic theory of matter may now be considered proved. For we are in a position to be able to measure and weigh atoms and electrons, and to estimate the enormous forces locked up in them.

But the atomic theory is not a philosophy, it is merely mechanical and chemical science.

Moreover, the mechanical atomic theory gives no explanation of the forces by which the atoms are moved so as to evolve into the world as we know it.

Leibnitz considered that he could only form an adequate philosophical theory out of the atomic hypothesis by considering each atom, not merely as a dead mass of matter, but as an individual living soul. By analogy to the soul it would thus be simple and indivisible, and two souls could not be merged into one. In order to characterize them, he called these souls "monads." They were not consubstantial, like pantheistic universals, but were each separate and distinct.

This theory, by constituting monads as souls, did away with the essential distinction of Descartes between mind and matter, because everything had both a material and spiritual character.

Though monads could not be fused together so as to make two monads into one, they could be mechanically united in either of two ways, first, as a simple herd like fish in a pond, or else in an organism, in which latter case the whole became more than a mere aggregate, it became a composite organism, and was under the rule of a dominating or King Monad. The enormous group of monads that form the body of a man are under the rule of the monad which we call the soul. If the soul quits the body, the monads of the body become a mere aggregate. They may be attached

to some other composite system, perhaps the body of an animal, or they may disperse like sheep without a shepherd.

The mere acting together of monads is not enough to form a composite substance. The union must be organic. Thus a clock would not have a ruling monad. No sharp definition has been given by Leibnitz of a kingdom of monads, so as to distinguish it from a crowd. It is a question of fact in each case and does not affect the validity of his system.

The monads must not be imagined as inert. They are centres of activity. They differ infinitely from one another, and no two can be exactly alike. In this they differ from our conception of chemical atoms. It will be remembered that St. Thomas, in treating of the nature of angels, argues that as they are immaterial, and therefore only forms, no two can be alike, for two similar form, or forms, having the same form must be identical. The adoption of Leibnitz of a similar opinion as to monads shows that he treated these monads not as material but as Ideas. These monads must not be conceived as small material bodies like atoms. They have not necessarily anything to do with size or shape. They are souls with a greater or less degree of knowledge and consciousness. In lower forms they are, of course, very elementary. But, being simple, they are indestructible ; for there are no separate parts to pull to pieces, and there is no force capable of destroying them. Death is produced by the dispersion of the monads which compose the human body, and their separation from the King Monad, which is the human soul.

Space is not a reality apart from the monads ; it is only a relation between them, so that the appearance of

a world in space and time as we see it is a phenomenon only.

The metaphysical individual character of monads renders them incapable of interaction one upon another, and thus each monad can only develop along its own lines.

We must not therefore conceive of the monads as small bodies external to one another. Though they cannot be fused together, one monad may be transfused, so to speak, through any number of others. Potentially each monad contains its whole past and future history. This would be impossible if the action of any other monad could change its character or development, or alter the course of its history.

Changes in the world can, therefore, only take place by changes in monad-compositions and rearrangements of them. All phenomena are due to the constant rearrangement of groups of monads.

The position of God is that of the Great ruling monad. From this point of view the whole cosmos may be regarded as a composite of monads of which God is the active ruler. Leibnitz, following the idea of St. Augustin, calls this the City of God.

Having got so far, Leibnitz tells us that he thought he had got safely into harbour, but when he came to try to explain how his soul-monads could act upon one another, he found himself again at sea. For as simple substances they were indestructible, and each had its own independent life to follow out.

Here arose the same difficulty that confronted Descartes, and of which he attempted to give a solution by the theory of occasional causes. This was, however, felt by Leibnitz to be an evasion of the question. Besides,

even God, the King Monad, could not act upon the other monads.

Leibnitz therefore substituted for the occasional causes of Descartes the theory that the changes in a monad are due to a continuous spontaneous development, according to a nature that had been given to each monad at its creation. He compares this to Plato's suggestion that our ideas are remembrances of a former state. This he called the theory of pre-established harmony.

On this view, one must imagine that when the world was made, the whole cosmos was set going, each monad having such a character that they all developed simultaneously, just *as if* they acted on one another. It was *as if* two seeds of the same plant developed simultaneously in different gardens. So far does he carry this view that he suggests that if a judgment-day and destruction of the world is to come about to punish the sins of the wicked and to reward the good, it would be by the natural means of pre-established harmony. It is obvious that the system of Leibnitz made all the ideas of a monad soul derivable from its inner nature, so that all our ideas are innate, and none are derived from the outside. His doctrine as to the origin of knowledge is therefore the very opposite of that of Bacon and Locke. It is a sort of idealism.

Each monad knows the others, not by perceiving them directly, but by means of inner intuition derived from its own nature. The fact that each monad is different in some degree at least from every other monad, follows from the fact that the different positions at any time of two monads must arise from a difference in their life-history.

The theory, of course, involved fatalism. For if the

life-history of each monad is predetermined, no room is left for free will. Leibnitz devotes considerable time to endeavouring to show that freedom is compatible with his system. But what he calls freedom is not autonomous absolute choice, but only freedom from outward constraint. It is very difficult to reconcile his system with that autonomy of the will which our consciousness seems to reveal to us.

It is easy for us who have been educated in the Aristotelian school with the idea of forces and actions and reactions to ridicule this theory. We may ask whether it was predestined from the commencement of the world that a pheasant should fly up at the exact instant that it had been prearranged that a sportsman should level his gun in that direction.

But Leibnitz does not suggest that in the solution of practical problems we should abandon our old nomenclature of cause and effect and of mechanics.

It is interesting to contrast this system with the subsequent theory of Hegel that the harmony between our ideas and the world of nature arises, not from a pre-established harmony between them, but from the fact that the idea and the corresponding fact are one and the same thing, and instead of being "in harmony" are identical.

Leibnitz considered himself bound to think that the world as constituted was the best of all possible worlds. Hence pain and sin were only means to a good end. This opinion he based upon a belief in the goodness and perfection of God. Voltaire retorted that, in his opinion, the world was the worst of all possible worlds, and made merry over Leibnitz, ending by ridiculing the optimists in his novel, "Candide," the story of a prince

who insisted in believing in the best side of everything, in spite of the most disconcerting appearances. The dispute became general. Voltaire cited the earthquake of Lisbon as a refutation of the alleged invariable benevolence of God. Rousseau replied by saying that it was a result of a debased civilization, and that if men had dispersed over the country and led the simple life, only a very few would have been sacrificed.

The dispute has gone on throughout the whole course of philosophy and has not been settled yet.

We find in the philosophy of Leibnitz the notion of continuity, that is, not merely the ordered arrangement of nature, but a progression from simple to complex in a regularly continuous manner, protoplasm to plant, and plant to animal.

This notion of continuity was very characteristic of the man who shared with Newton the honour of inventing the mathematical method of infinitesimals, which shows that growth proceeds by the constant addition of infinite numbers of infinitely little quantities, and that if you know the law of growth, which is the law of these little additions, you can predict the result of their action.

Leibnitz's philosophy is an interesting example of an attempt to apply metaphysics to mechanics and physics. It resulted not only in an expression of the law of continuity, but also of the great law of the conservation of energy, according to which it is assumed that energy is indestructible and that the cosmos must be supposed to possess only a fixed amount of it. This law may, of course, eventually require modification.

The idea of nature as an organic growth—that is, a growth dependent on laws of the being of a thing—has

played a supremely important part in the formation of modern ideas. It involves the study of things through their history, not merely by an examination of their present condition. It forms a leading feature in the philosophies of Hegel and of Bergson.

CHAPTER XII

KANT

THE philosophy of Leibnitz was systematized and developed by Wolff, whose philosophy became the current system in Germany ; but the monadology of Leibnitz was not wholly adopted, and the germs of the old theory of knowledge remained. Knowledge was not considered as purely intuitional, but as derived from two sources, the intuitions or direct data of sensation, and the intuitions of the intellect.

These last were distinguishable by their characteristic of certainty and necessity, whereas the intuitions of the senses were regarded as contingent, that is to say as uncertain. The distinction depended on the fact that mathematics and the kindred sciences, which were considered as derived from the mind, were invariable, whereas the properties of matter and all data derived from the senses appeared to be to a large extent of a very variable character. It was a survival of the old Greek distinction between permanence and change. Certainties were said to be determined by the law of "impossibility of contradiction," called for short the law of contradiction, that is to say, by the impossibility of thinking the thing otherwise ; as when we say that two and two make four. Contingencies were said to be governed by the law of "sufficient reason," which merely afforded a

reasonable proof that the thing was so, without going so far as to say that it could not be otherwise.

Facts were therefore divided into "a-priori," or independent of experience, and "a-posteriori," or subject to experience. That snow is white is an a-posteriori fact proved by the sufficient reason that it is always seen as white, but that the area of a rectangle is obtained by multiplying its sides together is a-priori, and depends on the law of the impossibility of contradiction. A thousand experiments make it no more certain than one experiment. It cannot be otherwise.

When we speak of a proposition as involving knowledge, we mean an addition to our stock, not a mere restatement of the same thing in other words. The analytic statement that a triangle has three sides is only the statement of a definition. A synthetic statement, such, for instance, as that the three angles of any triangle are together always equal to two right angles, is really *constructive*.

Kant describes the work of Hume as having roused him from his tacit acceptance of the philosophy of his day, or what he calls his "dogmatic slumber," and set him thinking not what things were, but how and why they came to be so. He was following the mode of enquiry started by Locke.

He began by admitting a distinction between the three important characteristics of man, namely, the senses, the intellect and the will. The two former of these are dealt with in his work upon the Pure Reason.

The first problem that presented itself (the solution of which afforded the key to his whole system) was as follows: Assuming (as he felt bound to do) that all synthetic judgments, that is to say, judgments that are

more than a mere analysis of already existing ideas, are ultimately derived from data given by the senses, and admitting that all our sense-perceptions are contingent and uncertain, how is it that any such judgments exhibit the character of being necessarily and certainly true ?

Thus, for example, how can we have a constructive or synthetic science of mathematics, whose conclusions relate to objects of sense-experience, but yet appear absolutely and necessarily certain ?

The answer can only be that, though mathematics and all sciences of an a-priori character must necessarily depend upon forms of thought, yet the forms of thought are united with forms of sensation which supply the content which the forms of thought work up into a-priori mathematical propositions. So that mathematics is derived from two sources, viz. forms of thought combined with forms of sensation.

Following up a hint of Leibnitz, Kant suggested that the part of the forms of mathematics and of the sciences which depends on data derived from sensation might be found in space and time, and that all our sensations are received by us under the forms of space and time, with the laws of which they are obliged to comply, for the good reason that unless they do, the intellect cannot deal with them. We may perhaps get a vague sensation without time or space, but it will be a mere blur ; to constitute objects of thought, our sensations can only be ordered or " formed " by time and space, which therefore have no independent existence, but are only forms of the sensibility.

This at first seems rather difficult to conceive, for we may ask what becomes of objects in a room if I leave it, taking my space and time with me ? Kant would reply :

“The room and the things in it remain, and can get on very well without you and your space and time-forms, to which they would no longer be subject.” This notion of time as only connected with our way of apprehending things had been suggested in earlier philosophies.

The question is raised in the commentaries of Boëthius, a statesman and a philosopher who lived in the sixth century and who wrote “The Consolations of Philosophy,” a work translated from the Latin by our King Alfred the Great.

Boëthius, when speaking of the Eternity of God, pointed out that the true Idea of God’s Eternal nature was not obtained by merely considering God as the Ancient of Days, and as lasting for ever. The true idea is to consider him as outside time, so that when we think of God as subject to time, we are thinking of him not as he really is, but only according to the necessity of our way of thinking.

An illustration of his meaning may be given by supposing a child to be taken round a waxwork show and shown the whole series of Kings of England from William I to King George V. As the child looks at each scene, each monarch appears alive and present, but as the child is taken on by his teacher to the next king the earlier one disappears from view. Thus, as we progress in History, the past appears to die, and the future to be born. But to the maker of the waxwork, all the historical personages are present together at the same time, all are equally eternal. Time has nothing to do with the real character of the show; the idea of succession in time, of dissolution and birth is only an effect of the child’s notion.

In reality, William I co-exists with George V, and the

showman can go back if he pleases and actually alter past history as well as future.

The attempt, however, to apply this theory to practical life is bewildering.

That the past should be the future, and the future the past, and both together the present, seems a contradiction in terms. It can only be contemplated as a theory. It is most difficult to picture to the imagination.

We might perhaps picture it to ourselves as if the life of a being, from its origin to its finish, were fossilized at every stage in the same way that a layer of stratified rock is formed by the deposits of ages. In a sense every part of its past history exists still, and by cutting into it we might take any period we pleased. Or again, we might imagine our life-history to consist of a series of successive fleeting glimpses from a train as we shot through a country ; the changes being due, not to changes in the country, but to changes in our point of observation. So that in going from south to north we might think we had gone in time from summer to winter, when, in fact, we had all the time been receiving different views of a changeless season in a changeless land. Time, in fact, would be relative and not absolute. It would be subjective and not objective.

If it is true that time is merely relative and subjective, then the notion "time" falls from its position as an independent reality. Time is no more objectively real than some adventitious quality of matter.

The very same mode of treating a similar object occurred to the acute mind of Scotus Erigena in the ninth century.

The reasons which induced Kant to select space and time as the two forms of the faculty of sensation are that they are universal, in that every inward impression is

subject to time, and every outward one to space. They therefore pervade everything ; they cannot, like colour or hardness or other attributes of objects of sense, be thought away.

On the other hand, they must be sense-forms and not forms of the reasoning faculty, because they are divisible. The forms of the reasoning faculty, being conceptual, must be universal, and therefore indivisible. You cannot divide up a concept. But you can divide space and time and put two things into different parts of space and of time. This peculiarity of being divisible gives an empirical character to these forms of the mental faculty and distinguishes them from intellectual ideas.

The application of the forms of sensation to the manifold data given by the senses binds up the confused blur into groups connected together by time and space, thus producing an intuition of epoch and locality, so that a thing is here or there, and then or now.

These intuitions are then formed into concepts, so that the bundle of sensations is now converted into an object. This effect is produced by the aid of the imagination, which calls up other similar bundles, and by uniting them with the bundle before us, produces an object, such as a horse. This object thus embraces in a unity, not merely the bundle of sensations before me, but my general concept of horses, consisting of all the previous general knowledge I have of them. It enables me to class the objects. But here comes another operation of the intellect, which makes me recognize the object not merely as belonging to the class of horse, but brings my own ego into contact with it and produces the final effect : " my concept of this horse," so as to result in a definite perception and recognition by me of the animal.

Here, however, we must pause to enquire what are the forms by means of which the mind, aided by the imaginative faculty, works up the manifold data given by the senses into definite objects.

These forms are called schemata. Being the means by which the pure understanding is applied to the data of sense, they have a double nature. They are sensuous on the one side and intellectual on the other.

We here see how Kant endeavoured to explain the mystery that had puzzled so many of his predecessors, as to how mere sensual things could act on mind, by introducing an intermediary between thought and the data of sensation. These schemata derive their nature from logic, which, as we have seen, professes to classify and describe the general principles of the thinking faculty. Kant did not attempt to form a new system of logic. He was content with the system in vogue in his day and which had been derived from Aristotle. Accordingly, he treats the faculty of thought as governed in all its various forms by the division into :

- 1°—Quantity : Universality or singularity.
- 2°—Quality : Affirmation or denial.
- 3°—Relation : Dependence or independence.
- 4°—Modality : Necessity or contingency.

From this we derive the purely mental side of the schemata.

The empirical side will be evolved by introducing the form time, which is the universal form of *all* sense-perception, into each of the above four forms, so as to produce :

1°—Number (which in Kant's view depends on time).

2°—Reality or non-reality in time.

3°—Relationship in time, involving : (1) Order in time, i.e. cause and effect ; (2) Permanence in time, giving us "substance" ; and (3) Co-existence in time, giving us reciprocity.

4°—As necessity of thought, as possibility, or as actuality.

These are the principles upon which the sciences are formed.

Thus we have a tabular view of the method in which the human mind builds up a framework of knowledge out of the data given to it by sensations and feelings. The confused blur of sensation is marshalled into order by the forms of space and time. This by the aid of the schemata is then arranged into concepts, and finally by means of the faculty of reason these concepts are compared and made up into a body of knowledge.

And we are now in a position to answer the question, Can any part of constructive synthetic positive knowledge be shown to be derivable from formal data only, apart from experience ? The answer is that this can be done. The faculty which gives us our concepts, and forms them into systems of cognition, can be applied directly to the schemata ; those empty forms according to which concepts are formed. It is true that when this is done you do not get objects of sense-perception, but you get objects which the mind can conceive. From the first two schemata we get pure mathematics, the truth of which is shown not to depend on experiment, but on the formal laws of sensibility and thought. Again, (from 3) we get pure physics, according to which things are thought

of as substance and quality, and cause and effect ; and lastly (from 4) we get the science of existences, from which we derive theories of the necessity, possibility, or actuality of things.

These four principles are the principles of the pure understanding as applied to the objects of perception. Here, then, we have a whole fabric of a-priori knowledge. Add the form of space and you have geometry, and it is to be observed that this geometry is not derived only from the intellect. It has a sensuous side, in that its framework is constructed out of the forms of the sensibility, not out of those of the intellect.

But this knowledge is a-priori ; it is not empiric. In order to make it empirical, the forms above given must be filled up by actual sensual experience. Mathematics and Geometry will only give us a theoretic circle, we need the aid of actual sensation to give us a hoop. The form of " cause and effect " may explain, but it will not afford us the experience of an explosion.

In all this a-priori system Kant adopted a relativist position. He denied that the senses could ever give us the things as they were in themselves, the noumena as a realist mind would apprehend them ; and therefore it resulted that the fabric woven up by this loom was only phenomenal. The laws, beautiful and ordered as they are, are laws of sensibility and of thought, not of reality.

This conclusion causes us to ask with anxiety, where then in this system is the assurance of the existence of an external world ? What am I ? What is to be said as to immortality ? What is God ? Where does the freedom of the will come in ? And are we to have no room left for Morals or for Art ?

Kant's answer is, that all these are not noumenal realities, but necessities of thought, and are only produced by the application of the reason to mere empty machinery, in the hope that it will produce knowledge of noumena, when, in fact, it cannot give any synthetic knowledge at all. These necessities of thought or illusory Ideas of the Reason are derived from the forms of logic.

According to the received system of logic, the operations of the reason take three forms. The categorical, the hypothetical and the disjunctive syllogism. Accordingly, we have three Pseudo-Ideals: the soul, the universe and God.

The "ego," supposed by Descartes to be a certain intuition of the intellect, is treated by Kant as a mere vision, and he agrees with Hume in denying that at any time man has a clear intuition of himself. It is important, however, to observe that the only ego which is thus treated as an illusion is the ego in space and time, with its corresponding notion of immortality. The Ego which binds up the data given by sensation into knowledge, the thing that thinks, is not so destroyed, it is the machine. But we must not treat it as an individual entity existing here and now, it is only a sort of principle of thought, not "Socrates" or "Plato."

So again, the Ideal of an external world with a beginning in time, or without a beginning in time, is a mere inexplicable hypothesis leading to contradictions. We suppose a noumenon of some sort to exist, but we have no right to think of it as an external world in space and time.

The ontological proof of God's existence only shows that we have necessarily to conceive him as existing, not that he exists. And the cosmological proof from

cause and design would not give us a noumenal God, but merely a wise architect in space and time, not a spirit independent of both. We have therefore no right to conceive of God as a person existing in space and time, we can only conceive him as an Ideal of the Reason.

Hence the philosophical basis of the whole of current theological philosophy is swept away by Kant.

The Universal substance of the Pantheists, the arguments for the existence of God from cause and effect ; the arguments in favour of the immortality of the soul ; the imagined intuition of the real existence of the world—all are treated as illusions. The freedom of the will has no place in a system governed by the rigid laws of causality, and with the freedom of the will morality disappears also. So far as intellectual knowledge of reality is concerned, we are reduced to agnosticism.

But such a system can never harmonize with our practical knowledge of man.

If you were to tell a schoolmistress, who was engaged in the task of reducing an unruly class to order, that there was no such thing as the freedom of the will, she would laugh at you. She would say : “ My life is spent in a contest of wills. Rather than deny the freedom of the human will I would attribute will to every object in nature and say that a flower grew up by reason of its will to develop from a seed ; nay more, even in organic life I would attribute will to the sparkling dancing atoms of carbon which are released from bondage when coal is set on fire.”

Again, when you tell a man that he has no ego here in space and in time, and that the world is a phenomenal ideal of the reason, you violate his common sense. It is not enough to say that these are mere illusions of the

reason. For opposed to the operation of rigid cause and effect he feels that he has volition, and that he can do this or that as he pleases.

These considerations led Kant to enquire whether, since our senses and reason together cannot assure us of the real subsistence of the Ego, or of God, or of the external world, there may not be some other source whence we may derive a knowledge of these things. It will be remembered that Kant accepted the division of the mental faculties into the senses, the reason, and the will. Having exhausted sense and reason, we now turn to ask what information our "will" can give us. We are met here by the knowledge of something that is neither sensuous nor intellectual. The knowledge is not mediate, like the production of phenomena from noumena. We are in direct contact with the thing in itself, not merely with some schema of it. There are no "forms" like space and time through which the perception of it comes to us. It is independent of both space and time. It comes to us as a power of acting, both on sensations and ideas, and as a sense of freedom quite emancipated from the thralldom of cause and effect and necessity which dominate the ideas of the reason. Its only limit appears to come from itself in the law which it applies to itself, namely, the law of self-government and of duty, and out of which springs morality. Morality, therefore, is not based upon reason nor upon sensation. It is, for example, not prudence, or a calculation of means to ends. It is not the pleasures of sensation, nor rules how to obtain them, nor obedience to a law given from outside the will, nor the rules dictated by reason. The will stands, simple, imperative, and not subject to the intellect, whose only function is to show how to apply it to the world of objects.

We seem here to have attained a position that carries us beyond the world of intellectual and sensible phenomena, beyond the realm of mathematics, physiology, and chemistry, and to be in contact with the noumenal and real. Our reason cannot help us, its machinery is not capable of being applied. There are no forms nor schemata of the will. It stands like a sort of sphinx, real, but insoluble. We do not know whether the "I" that wills is an individual Ego, or a Platonic universal. Indeed, we cannot think about it, for the reason that our intellectual machinery is unable to analyse it, or cope with it. We can only approach it with awe and try and deal with it by means of the practical reason, as a man practically applies mathematical formula, the theory of which he does not understand.

The dominating law of the practical reason is, according to Kant, the law of Duty to submit our will to law, and to act in every case upon general principles, conforming our conduct to our nature.

This really is Stoicism. It can only be translated into action by the command to discover what we were designed to do, and to do it. To obey like a soldier, asking no questions.

On this basis Kant has drawn a magnificent picture of moral duty, sterner but more grand than almost any other moralist.

But when we ask what we are to do in this or that case, we find no content to this doctrine. In European countries people think it right to take care of their aged parents. In certain savage countries they think it right to kill them. Which are we to obey? On what principles are we to base our action?

In answer to these questions Kant proceeds to apply

his general principle, and to found sciences of law and virtue, religion and the Fine Arts.

In the very voluminous writings which he devoted to these subjects, much is found that is of great interest, but we do not find any philosophical foundation for the virtues of charity or philanthropy, or any explanation of how we come to have these sentiments and how far they are based on solid foundations or are mere illusions. The English Moralists, who in general followed Locke in basing all mental data ultimately on the senses, and thus felt bound somehow to explain how we obtain our feelings of morality, were obliged to declare that we have a "moral sense" which at once apprehended virtue and vice in actions, just as we apprehend heat, cold or other sensations. This very unsatisfactory solution was not altogether so very different from that of Kant, except that Kant, by connecting our moral sense with the unquestionable fact of free-will, gave it a far firmer foundation.

But the answer to the question why we think some things right and others wrong, and what is the criterion we apply to action, has never yet been satisfactorily solved, and does not receive its solution in Kant's philosophy.

There were many to whom this introduction of free-will and God into the sphere of philosophy gave offence. Thus the poet Heine complained that no sooner had Kant got rid of God, than he reintroduced him to please his old manservant. There is a class of mind that is rather pleased to get rid of God, not so much from an inability to believe, as from a desire to be rid of a troublesome schoolmaster, who prevents one from doing what one pleases. Heine belonged rather to this order. Kant was

a theist and a Christian, though he denied many dogmatic doctrines of the Christian faith.

As a moralist he was the upholder of the stoical system of duty for duty's sake. Utilitarianism of any form he treated as mere prudence. The morality which acted out of a hope of reward, or because virtue was pleasant, or out of mere charity or sympathy, was in his eyes no true morality at all.

Perhaps the most important part of his system was the method which he introduced into philosophical thought.

He found a dogmatic common sense realism opposed to a scepticism which was endeavouring to reduce all reality and law into empirical appearance. He endeavoured to steer between these extremes, and give its due share to each system. His labours, however, ended in the establishment of a dualistic idealism which divided our faculties into sensations and thoughts, which avoided realism by pronouncing things in themselves to be unknowable, but which also opposed the mere empiricism of the sceptical phenomenologists such as Hume.

He had shown how large a portion of our knowledge of objects was really dependent upon our perceptive faculties, and, on the other hand, how much of what were supposed to be merely intellectual truths, such as mathematics, depended upon sensation.

His theory helped idealism more than it helped the common sense school. For while he had shown the impossibility of knowledge of things in themselves, he also established the a-priori and intellectually certain and ideal character of mathematics and, in fact, the logical principles of all the sciences.

He reduced the thing-in-itself to a mere hypothesis,

needing only a further extension of idealism to sweep it away altogether. On the other hand, he explained that the logical outcome of phenomenalism and idealism was not a mere chaotic empiricism, but the formation of an ordered world of laws of sensation, perception and thought.

In addition to this, by pointing out that the will presented features quite different from sensation on the one hand and intellect on the other, he made an attempt at the foundation of realism in the sphere of man's moral action, thus treating morality not as a phenomenon like material objects, or as a mere ideal like the ego, or even our idea of God, but as an actual reality, being known by us as it really is. This in its turn has served as a starting-point for several subsequent philosophical systems.

CHAPTER XIII

FICHTE AND SCHELLING

THE fault that Fichte found with the Idealistic philosophy of his day was that it consisted of various ingenious theories as to appearance and reality, without founding them upon some consistent system. For example, Berkeley pronounced objects to be "appearances" presented to an ego. He contented himself with endeavouring to destroy the notion of substance, without attempting to explain how phenomena were related to the ego, or formulating a philosophy which explained their existence. Kant again assumed the existence of noumena as the ultimate unknowable causes of phenomena, without explaining how phenomena and noumena were related to one another. Again, the window-theory which treated man as a subject looking out upon the world as an object, made no attempt to show what a subject is and how it differs from an object. All these systems failed to bring together subject and object as parts of a comprehensive system.

The explanation which Fichte proposed was to make subject and object intimately dependent on one another by treating the object as a modification of the ego, so that in observing a material object the ego was really observing a modification of itself, not something presented to it by God, or matter, or some foreign source.

From this point of view the ego must be considered not as dependent for its perceptions upon some outside cause or noumenon, but as producing its own objects of contemplation, and hence, as an activity, free in the sense that it was not actuated by any cause outside itself. But considered as an activity, it must have something to act on, and therefore in the absence of any being other than itself, one must suppose it to act on itself ; to create an object world out of itself, and to perceive and operate upon that object world which it had created.

The ego is thus dual in character. Instead of being a visionary idea of the Reason, as with Kant, the Ego now becomes the centre of the whole system.

Hence, the idea of any being independent of the ego, such as God, is inadmissible in a philosophy which derives everything from the ego. If there is a God, the ego has produced him. The activity of the ego in producing an object world need not be conscious, nor again need it be individualistic ; it is a creative universal ego with two sides to it, namely, subject and object.

The object would be one with the subject, as when a man contemplates himself in a looking-glass, where he contemplates the object that he produces. (Care must be taken to observe that this is only a metaphor.)

Fichte proposed a very high standard of morality, though his system entirely repudiated the idea of a personal God. He and his wife both died as a result of their exertions in relieving sick soldiers during the great war between Prussia and France. No nobler figure has appeared in the history of philosophy. But the position of Fichte was philosophically untenable. For it failed on its own ground. It could not explain why the object should be produced from the subject rather than the

subject from the object. If it is admitted that some explanation should be given of the relationship between the ego and the non-ego, and some attempt made to unite them by deriving one from the other, why should the thinking ego have produced the world of objects rather than the objective world have produced the thinking ego ?

Fichte's system had the merit of uniting the subject with the object, but it did not explain why one should be arbitrarily selected as the producing principle rather than the other.

It was partly open to the defects which he had alleged against objective idealism, in that it asserted that the world was derived from the ego, without explaining how that process had taken place.

It professed to be an advance upon mere objective idealism, but in reality it was a transition stage between objective idealism and the philosophy of Schelling and Hegel.

Schelling continued the idealising progress by raising the question why, if an explanation of the ego and non-ego and of mind and matter was to be given by supposing the object to be produced by the subject, and the non-ego to be a product of the ego, it was not equally reasonable to suppose the ego to be a product of the non-ego ? He suggested, as a solution, to consider them, not one as the product of the other, but each as only a different aspect of the same identical thing. This theory is known as that of the "absolute." From this it follows that nature and spirit are two poles given by the ego, which mutually suppose and demand one another. The ego is a process of production that ever makes itself its own object. When once we acknowledge that spirit and nature are

but one and the same thing, it follows that the laws of thought set forth in logic must be the same as the laws of nature set forth in physical science. The divisions, classifications, laws and rules of nature ought to find an exact counterpart in the concepts, syllogisms and judgments of logic. If our enquiry proceeds from nature to spirit, from matter to mind, phenomena becomes gradually spiritualized, and the perfect theory of nature would be the resolution of it into spirit. Thus natural science becomes the philosophy of spirit.

The other point of view is to begin with spirit and work towards nature by means of logic. The result of either process would be the union of spirit-science and nature-science into a harmonious philosophy. A complete body of philosophy would be identical with a complete body of science ; spirit would exactly resemble nature. A-priori logic and experimental science never could contradict one another.

Nature is to Schelling only the external mode of existence, as mind is the conscious mode of existence. This is not materialism. It is not as if my thought of a tree were treated as a sort of product of the action of one sort of matter, such as a tree, upon another sort of matter, such as my thought, so that I and the tree and my thought of the tree are all individual things made out of the same world-stuff, like various different articles made out of the same clay. The thought is not merely of the same sort of substance as the thing, nor is it a combination of my ego with the thing. The thought *is* the thing, and both are universal and not individual.

This is a pantheism which treats the cosmos not as composed of emanations of God, nor, as in the system of Spinoza, two different modes of one God. The world

and thought, both of them, are the universal substance, which, if you like, you may call God, though it is less question-begging to give it a new name and call it the Absolute. The only difference between thought and existence consists simply in different modes of looking at what is really the same identical thing.

Here, then, we have a system that is not materialism, nor is it objective phenomenalism, nor again is it Neoplatonism which separates things into different kinds of emanations. Nor again is it even Spinozism which treats thought and extension as different modes of action of one substance. It is a system of an absolute which exhibits differences determined by laws which are laws both of thought and existence.

Physics and psychology are hence only two different ways of pursuing the same study.

Nature must not therefore be regarded as an organism which develops apart from thought, and knowledge as a sort of mental picture of nature. Both knowledge and nature are one. It is true that no one individual man has full knowledge of nature, but that fact does not make nature more limited.

It is the universal thought in which each man participates, but does not possess in full, which is the thought that is identical with nature. The successive steps by which this view of philosophy is reached are somewhat as follows: Before we begin to think, we treat our bodies and their affections and things around us as realities. Experience, however, shows that what we take for one thing often turns out really to be another, and we are thus forced to make a further examination. We first regard our own ego as one thing and external objects as other things. This is the simple common sense

window theory. Next, we advance a step by admitting that the things we appear to see may not in reality resemble their appearances any more than a printed description in a book need physically resemble the thing described. This is the view of Kant. We may next imagine that after all the appearances are the only realities, and that there is nothing behind them. When we ask how they come to be and to appear, we may answer with Berkeley that God sent them somehow, or else like Hume decline to give any answer. Fichte now suggests that the reality is produced by the ego, as if, for example, a magic lantern could look at and enjoy the pictures which it was producing. Finally, Schelling comes with the suggestion that the ego and non-ego, the subject and the object, the spectator and the landscape, are only one and the same identical absolute. Here we have again become realists. Everything is real as well as ideal, and for practical purposes we are pretty nearly in the pre-philosophic position from which we set out. But with this great difference. We have experienced a change of mind; we cannot cease thinking in universals. We naturally now say not so much "all men do this," as "mankind does this."

The ego of Descartes gives place to a universal ego, and the individual becomes a phenomenon rather than a reality. To say that nature develops is to say nature thinks, and in its ultimate form of thought it rises from unconscious thought to conscious thought, and the whole world and ourselves in it becomes one huge thinking and living organism, which is at the same time both material and ideal, and we only individual and temporary phenomena. We are realistic pantheists.

CHAPTER XIV

HEGEL

THE philosophy of Hegel is idealism carried to its extreme limit.

Although in most respects a new system, it claims to be the natural development and outcome of the philosophies which have been proposed by various thinkers at successive stages of thought. Whether therefore we consider the intellectual process of a single mind, or of a nation, or group of nations, the path of thought always presents the same successive features of development ending in the Hegelian position. The philosophy of Hegel may roughly be divided under two principal heads : namely, his theory of Idealism, and his theory as to how the ordered world as we see and know it was evolved out of a vague and chaotic absolute. We might agree with the first head without necessarily committing ourselves to an agreement with the second, though it is true that the two parts fit very well into one another. We will first consider his theory of idealism and existence.

As has already been said more than once, the earliest theory of existence is the "common sense" or window theory, a view beyond which the majority of men have never advanced, and which, as we have seen, treats man as an intellectual being placed in a world of

external objects whose nature is material and quite different from his own. We have here the fundamental distinction between "mind" and "matter."

According to this crude form of philosophy, the soul or thinking principle is independent of the objects which it thinks about, just as the external world is independent of the soul. If one perishes, the other remains.

When I leave a room I leave the objects in it still existing, they do not vanish because I am gone.

From this point of view the mind may be treated as a blank sheet of paper on which are produced more or less permanent pictures of outside objects. These pictures are used by the faculties of memory, association, reflection and imagination in forming a body of knowledge. It is, as we have seen, a debatable point whether *all* our knowledge is derived from external impressions, or whether the sheet of paper contains some innate ideas or pictures which are added to those that come from without.

In the main, however, objects are considered as entirely different from, and independent of and outside, the thinking mind.

The idealist comes to disturb this common sense view by asking how the mind can know that a thing is "outside" it. May not what we take for objects be simply pictures produced, we know not how, in our minds? Are we sure that there is any "real" at all except the mere impressions which we receive? Suppose a seal be pressed against the skin. The seal is felt and treated as a reality. But when it is removed, an impression still remains for a time on the skin. What are we to say of this "impression"? It is of the same character as it was when the seal was there and produced the

impression of "reality." In what respect then does the impression felt, when the seal was there, differ from the impression which for a time remains after it is gone? If there is no difference, then how do we know that one of them is "real" and the other merely "ideal"?

By what right do we assert the reality of anything but ideas? Here we come to the second stage in thought to which Berkeley and Hume arrived.

We have now to advance another step. If we have no right to treat our supposed ideals as necessarily representing realities, have we any right to refuse to our ideals the character of realities? Call them ideas if you will, but the ideal red-hot iron is real enough when we feel it. From this point of view Hegel derives a completely realistic theory of ideas.

In the most emphatic language he says that everything we know must be experienced, and that we live in a real world. He has no objection to the use of ordinary language in the common affairs of life. Just as the "Nautical Almanac" is drawn up on the assumption that the sun, moon and stars go round the earth, so when we go to a tailor to order a coat we are thoroughly right in asking him to fit the coat outside us, instead of treating it as an ideal coat inside our mind. When, however, we begin to philosophise, the elementary and "barbarian" method of Bacon, Newton, and the English and Scottish "common sense" view must be laid aside. We must adopt the idealistic position and treat the whole external world as proceeding entirely from within. We must therefore be careful not to attribute to Hegel a crude idealism. It would be quite incorrect to say: *I make the objects*. This would be to give them an existence separate

from the ego. It would be to externalize them, whereas the effort of Hegel throughout is to internalize them. It would therefore be correct to say, not "thought produces the world," but the "whole world is thought."

So that here we adopt the position of Schelling, in which is proclaimed the identity of the ego, the thought, and the thing thought about. What is given to us in a perception is therefore not three things—a thinker, an object, and a thought—but one thing only. We can, of course, make three of it just as we can concentrate our attention on one end or the other of a stick or on the middle of it. But that does not the less make it a single object.

From this there naturally follows a system that is the reverse of dualism. The reality is not derived from a faculty for perceiving reality, as is urged by the Scottish School. The reality is not known through sensation, it is not seen by the eye of the body, but with the eyes of the mind. For the actual is not that which exists for the senses, but only that which has determination, that is to say, a concrete nature in itself.

By this it is meant that some of our real ideas present the characteristics of what in common language we call "here and now actualities," as the pen which I hold in my hand, while other of our real ideas present the characteristics of what in ordinary language we call mere ideas or memories, as my present idea of the pen which I saw yesterday. But both these pens are real from one point of view, both are ideas from another point of view.

In this view both ideality and reality are only a question of degree, and each is the other. The so-called "real" pen is after all an idea, the so-called "ideal" pen

has a certain degree of reality. The most shadowy idea still has an existence when once one can be got to see that it is impossible to make any true philosophical distinction between idea and reality.

The view thus taken by the idealists differs from the views of Plato or Aristotle. According to Plato, reality is given to things by participation in an Idea that is independent of them ; or, according to Aristotle, resides in each individual, or is "the substance" of them according to the schoolmen.

But Hegel sweeps all these views into his net by simply saying "the idea does not merely *represent* the real, it *is* the real ; and the real does not merely *produce* the ideal ; it *is* the ideal." The so-called "ideal" shades into the real and the real into the ideal. It is only possible in the crudest cases to separate them. I may call this pen "real" and I may call my idea of some new form of pen which has never been invented "an idea." The distinction is useful for practical purposes, but so far as true existence is concerned, is merely a relative distinction. This is seen directly other instances are taken. For instance, let us ask ourselves whether "charity" is a reality or an idea. We are bound to say it is both ; not in the sense of one word used for two things, but as something that is a real-ideal. You can "realize" it, you can "idealize" it. Extend this mode of thinking to all things and you have got more or less into the Hegelian position.

For suppose we take as an example some common (so-called) material object such as a tree ; our first impression is of a something, here and now. But very quickly one says, "This thing has a trunk and leaves." How do you know they are leaves ? "Why, of course I

know what a leaf is ; I have seen a lot of leaves." But this very answer shows that what you see in the tree is not only that piece of matter before you, but a piece of matter mixed up with all the leaves you have ever known. And as you go on and look, your idea of the tree grows. As you see the tree again and again your perception increases and with it the reality of the tree. Into it is introduced all the fancies of the ancients, the learning of the botanists, and a whole world of science, poetry and romance. The mere wood is dissolved into groups of molecules, the leaves become organized groups of cells, and the material becomes lost in a glorified ideal of science, poetry and art. And this new view is not a composite that can be torn to pieces, so as to say " this is material " and " that is ideal." Is the gravity which holds the tree to earth part of the material tree ? Or is it something else ? The electric force which binds the tree molecules as they whiz round in their little orbits, is that part of the tree, or part of something else ? The very colour of the tree belongs partly to the sun and partly to your eye, and partly to the ether that surrounds the tree ; the very smell depends partly on your nose, but for which there would not be a smell at all ; and as for the beauty of its form, it would not perhaps exist except for the work of Turner and his predecessors. Where then does your tree begin and end except in the ideal ; and where does it end and begin except in the real ?

But you may say the tree has material, it has *causes* of existence. Somewhere there is a reality as a foundation for *this* objective tree. True, but what right have you to separate that part out and call it the tree any more than any other of the multitude of ideas that go to make up the tree ?

Your only reason can be that you have been brought up to believe that every "here and now" has a *substance* behind it, separate from it, and which if taken away would leave only a ghost, an "idea." But this substance is itself a mere philosophical fancy.

This view disposes of the tree merely considered as a mass of wood independent of me and my thought. It makes the real tree dependent on my thought, and the real tree is to me what I think it. My thought is not merely a picture of the tree or an essence distilled from the tree, or infused into the tree, it is the very tree itself. But this immediately seems to show that the tree alters with the progress of knowledge, so that the tree is not the same tree to me that it was to my ancestors. Nay, it would also seem that a tree to a poet would be quite a different thing from the same tree to a botanist, and again, that no two people could apprehend the same tree.

But an objection to this view soon appears which at first sight seems fatal. For a partisan of the common-sense school might answer: "On the above principles, *my idea* of this real tree must differ from *your idea* of this same real tree; how then is it possible that in that case our two different ideas can both at the same time be the same identical real tree?"

This is a most legitimate objection. Unless it could be removed Hegelism must fall. It was made against the Pantheists; it was answered by them as it is answered by Hegel, by the supposition of a universal mind of which individual minds were mere partial individuations.

The true thought of the tree, that is the true tree in itself, is not your or my thought, but the thought of the

universal in which I and you are united. So that my tree, in-so-far-as it is my own individual concept of a tree, is only my aspect of the tree. The true tree is the universal tree ; universal, not only in the sense that it embraces all trees, but universal in the sense that it embraces all the thoughts of the universal soul about trees in general. And in this universal thought I may participate to a greater or less degree according to my powers.

For there may be a number of universals according as there may be a number of categories.

Thus there may be the tree of the botanists, as formed by the universal soul of the botanists. There may be the tree of the poets, the tree of the foresters.

Above all these things is, of course, **THE TREE**, such as is conceived by the universal mind that knows all, the one universal tree in the one universal mind, with respect to which all individual trees and all individual minds are but aspects. I was going to say phenomena ; but the word phenomenon suggests that the aspect or idea is not real, whereas in Hegel's system there is no such thing as a "phenomenon ;" all is reality. Hence, then, the individual trees have more or less of reality in them, according as the individual minds by which they are (imperfectly) conceived have more or less knowledge. It is this doctrine of a universal mind that has caused Hegelism to be confounded with Pantheism. Pantheism, however, rests on a theory of a universal substance, whereas Hegel has no need of the idea of "substance." Differences between the limited ideas of things due to differences of faculty for comprehending them, of course, involve Hegelians in "Relativity." The Aristotelian doctrine is that whatever differences there may be

about appearances, when you come to what really *is*, a thing must be either this or not this. It cannot be both at the same time and under the same conditions. But Hegel adopts the view of Protagoras that a thing may be at the same time both A and not A ; nay, more, that the further things are examined the more surely it will be found that A and not A are always appearing in combination.

To a dog, a tree has but little reality. To a cat, geometry has no reality at all. And yet the true tree and the true geometry have a real existence, dependent not on the thought of individuals, but on the universal mind.

From this point of view we must regard nature as formed not by, but out of mind. It is mind, developed and transformed.

The *tabula* is not *rasa*, but it is as if the universal mind were a photographic plate on which there was, undeveloped, the whole possibility of nature, of thought, and of everything, and which, by a process of gradual development, brought everything successively into reality.

Of course, in such a system a mere concept is not to be confused with a definite or concrete perception. Hegel nowhere says that the pen that I hold in my hand now is the same as the remembrance of the pen which I saw yesterday. "The hundred dollars which I hold in my hand has a reality quite different from the reality of the hundred dollars which I imagine and desire. I can imagine what I will, but that does not give it actuality. Being cannot be extracted from the notion. The true is that which is not merely individually subjective."

From these observations it will be seen that the

idealism of Hegel is quite different from that of Berkeley, whose idealism took an objective form ; separating the phenomena from the ego.

It was different again from that of Kant, to whom external objects appeared as if they were transformations of noumenal realities. To Hegel the thought is not a mere phenomenon appearing objectively to a mind, but it is the reality, and, as we have seen, it is not Pansubstantialism or Pantheism.

We now pass to the method of Hegel whereby he endeavours to show how, by a logical and consistent use of the reason, a concrete world can be created out of the most abstract ideas ; and, again, how from that concrete world there can be formed a consistent body of knowledge of science, art, and morality.

It may sound somewhat strange to talk of reason creating a world of realities, but our surprise will be abated when we reflect that to Hegel ideas are realities. For if this be granted, it is natural to expect that concrete realities can be formed from the use of logical processes of the reason.

The complaint which Hegel makes against previous philosophers is, that in framing their systems they took their logic, that is, their forms and laws of thought, at random. He describes Kant as hunting in a bag to find his forms of thought and at last by the merest chance discovering reason, just as a physicist might find a new power such as magnetism.

Hegel, on the other hand, demands that the process of thought whereby the world of being is brought into existence should be described and logically and systematically explained. And also it is necessary that it should be explained how a world of nature which this logical

process has created should, with the help of consciousness, give rise in its turn to a body of ordered knowledge ; and again, how this body of ordered and regulated knowledge applied to nature should produce what we term the world of spirit.

We must therefore conceive of two processes going on simultaneously. Unconscious thought is constantly creating nature ; nature is constantly producing conscious thought.

This logical deduction is not an absolutely necessary part of the idealistic philosophy. We might adopt absolute idealism without necessarily accepting the logic of Hegel. But his logic is so engrafted into his system as to make it difficult to separate them.

Like other logics, the logic of Hegel is the science of the laws of thought, but in the case of Hegel the thought produces not merely ideas, but real ideas, and hence, while it is the science of thought, it is also the science of reality.

It is far wider than the Greek logical system. In the Hegelian logic one must accept in the first place the reason, the universal soul, as the instrument by which logic is used so as to objectivise thought, and thus to form a real world ; and it is reason again which out of this world forms a body of conscious knowledge. For this process the reason suffices, the ecstasy of Plotinus and Proclus is not necessary.

In the next place we must get rid of the idea of Substance as different from the universal soul. The individual man is an aspect of the universal mind, and the universal mind is God. The world is therefore not created by an outside power, or evolved out of the substance of a separate world-soul. The " reason " both

of the universal mind and of the individual mind is the absolute. It is identical with what it produces.

From this it follows that the reason of the individual man is the same as the universal reason of the absolute, which corresponds to what we usually call God, only that, of course, the individual reason of man is infinitely less extensive.

It is this reason by which all concrete things are evolved out of the absolute, and again by which, by a reverse process, knowledge is constructed out of the concrete. These two processes, construction of realities and knowledge of those realities, are respectively called logic and phenomenology.

In the Hegelian logic, in passing from thought to existence, we commence with the most abstract ideas capable of formation. Here we have no distinction, difference, or definition. The abstract is without form and void, it is inconceivable, it is nothing definite, it is everything abstract. We are now to show that by the use of logic a cosmos or ordered world of "thought-being" can be evolved out of this void chaos.

In order that out of this void a concrete may arise, it is necessary that there should be determination or limitation. The absolutely unlimited is the unthinkable. Thus, for example, the unlimited in quantity is inconceivable; an unlimited "plus A" could for us have no reality. In order to make quantity into reality capable of being apprehended, it must be limited; that is to say, it must have a minus quantity added to it, or rather infused into it, depriving it of its infinity, so that *plus A, minus A'* = something. But this negative must not be conceived as different in nature from the positive which it helps to limit and modify. It is really the same

absolute. It is as though the absolute declined by degrees into the concrete.

This applies to every concept that the mind can form. Abstract "being," for example, joined with abstract "non-being," produces not nothing, but that sort of limited being which we term a concrete object.

It is very difficult to explain abstracts by means of merely concrete illustrations, but we may perhaps take the illustrations given by Hegel of the combination of light with darkness. Light and darkness are both a necessity for the formation of visual images. Pure light and pure darkness could never give us an object ; but unite them, and you have a picture. So again, I cannot conceive my own individual self or "ego," without at the same time thinking of what is not me. The mere *ego* alone could not think, it would have nothing to think about. But give it even itself to think about, and here you have two things : the thinker and its opposite, the thought. Try and consider matter as indivisible : you cannot. But to consider it as divisible, even when it has been divided to infinity, is equally impossible. But unite these opposites and you have a concrete of divisible-indivisibility.

The active cannot be real, unless it is joined with a passive. Action requires a passive thing to be acted on. Concrete determination is thus given to the abstract by its union with its opposite.

Further consideration shows us that the most abstract ideas of all are really identical with their opposites. Thus, for instance, the most abstract idea which it is possible to form is "existence." The opposite of this is "non-existence." But we cannot treat non-existence as a mere nothing. It is an idea, and therefore a reality.

If it were truly nothing, it could not even be an idea. Hence, then non-existence exists just as much as existence, and each may be said to be the other. The expression existence applies as much to non-existence as to existence. So again, to an idealist, the ideal is the real and the real is only the ideal; there is no difference between them. The very words "subject" and "object" to an idealist are only two ways of regarding the same thing.

This is called the law of Dialectic, or the reconciliation of opposites, and sometimes also, rather confusingly, as the identity of the identity and non-identity.

It is the most profound principle of abstract thought.

In proportion as the dialectical process is carried on, so does the abstract gradually verge away into the concrete. And as things become concrete, the dialectical process becomes more difficult to apply. For the characteristic of mere phenomena is that they do not present in a marked degree this principle of opposition.

Being is identical with non-being. But one could not say that because a solid was the opposite of a liquid, therefore solidity was identical with liquidity.

Nevertheless, even in the most concrete ideas some dialectical traces remain, and it is largely true that things are a union of opposites. Thus foolhardiness is the opposite of cowardice. United they form bravery, and each exhibits the character of a misapprehension of real danger.

In mathematics $A - A = 0$. But the zeros of the mathematicians are not real zeros. They build them up into concrete quantities. The zero of a circle is different from the zero of a straight line. And in real life, when we speak of "nothing," we invariably use it as meaning

something ; as when we say, " A man has nothing, and yet possesses all things."

This logical process must not be abused. We cannot say, "The moon is not the sun," and then treat the sun as the non-moon. There must be a logical relativity, a real opposition, between the opposites. It is only within the due restrictions of logic that the dialectic process can take place, which according to Hegel evolves the laws of " being " and then of concrete existence. There is a sense in which the doctrine of the Trinity might be regarded as an illustration of the union of opposites. But the Dogma of the Church is not a simple instance of dialectic.

We must therefore conceive of the whole body of nature and the laws of nature as being evolved out of void abstract " Being," by the concreting action of the dialectical process of thought. Thus, nature is not a mere changeless, eternal thing, nor a mere creation struck into existence by a blow, but it is an ordered evolution.

It is the result of the activity of the universal Ego. The spirit, by the process of self-contradiction or dialectic, " goes forth." (This expression is not happy, for it seems like going out to some external place. " Proceeds within itself " would be better.) As it proceeds, an external really existing world emanates from it by means of the union of its own Ideas with their negations. Thus, to continue the metaphors, the ideas united to their negations go forth and the ideal world becomes transformed from the chaotic abstract to the real and definite concrete. Exteriority, by which the world seems different from the ego, is only a form of thought. As such it is real enough, but its reality, like all reality, is only ideal.

From this it follows that the Ideal is the Real, and that the reason can by deductive action produce the whole world of nature out of ideas alone. In fact, this is what is and has been actually occurring since the beginning. Thought and nature have progressed together, for thought *is* nature. In his logic, Hegel attempted the exceedingly difficult task of the deduction of the forms of thought, that is, the enumeration of them and the showing how they evolved out of the simple notion Idea, or "universal Idea."

The simplest possible notion that we can have is that of pure being, or simple existence, as when we say that something "is." By introducing into this the Idea of negation or limitation or "not being" we get the Idea of "limited or determined being." This important step is an upward movement away from chaos and into reality.

By a series of evolutionary processes which are described in the logic, we obtain successively "being," "essence," with its corresponding Ideas of "substance," "causality," and "reciprocity." This again rises to "concepts," which from a subjective point of view give us the old Aristotelian logic with its "notions," "judgments" and "syllogisms."

This, again, on the objective or nature side, gives us the formal laws of "mechanism," "physical action," such as attractions and chemistry, and finally "Teleology."

The Idea, according to Hegel, is always pressing on to more and more complete realization from the abstract to the concrete. During the logical stage it has produced a series of forms like those of Kant. It is only a world of forms of thought-being. But it now goes further and

by means of dialectic it sets nature up against thought and the world of reality appears.

This world is only the Idea (as we may say by a metaphor) externalized. Here, then, is the great principle on which, by a definite orderly evolution, the world comes into being. The process may be called "thought," or "creation," or "evolution," or the transformation of "power" into "act," or "possibility" into "actuality," or what one wills; but it is an evolution, not fortuitous, but for which the word "spirit" or "thought" is preferred, partly because this great incomprehensible process more resembles our process of reasoning than any other process of nature, and partly because our own process of reasoning is only another application of the very same process of creation.

Thus the ideal-real world is formed.

But now a reverse process sets in. As and when the organic world is formed, the process of conscious thought commences, the internalized form unites with the externalized form.

This, unlike the logical process of world-construction, is the process of the formation of a knowledge of that world. It is dealt with in Hegel's phenomenology. Whereas the logical process was not accompanied by consciousness, this latter process is conscious. At first, on seeing an object, we have a vague consciousness of something here and now. But further knowledge shows that we are not conscious of the thing in itself, but only of its subjective qualities. What we know as sound is not waves of air, but subjective sensations. This teaches us to regard things as phenomena. We become idealists, but still objective idealists. Further reflection shows that even this objective idea is really subjective and that

the difference between the thinker and the thing thought about becomes a distinction without a difference. At the same time the self-consciousness of the individual now changes to a consciousness of the universal self, which is the nearest to the absolute to which reason can attain.

The original "object" has thus, in the process of conscious thought, been transformed by its subsumption under its opposite (the subject) into a phenomenon; and then by the subsumption of the phenomenon under the opposite of the phenomenon, the Ideal-Real into the thing as it really is. For in Hegel's view there is no true noumenon or phenomenon, there is nothing that is unknowable. The unknowable does not exist; there is only the unknown. For the reason reaches over the whole realm of being. There is nothing the reason cannot know.

Just as by the process of the unconscious reason the concrete world was evolved out of the abstract, so by the converse process of the conscious reason the concrete may be explained back again into the most recondite abstract. There is nothing in the abstract out of the ultimate range of ordinary reason. The forms of the idea given by logic again unite with the world which they have formed, and consciousness and the perception of spirit commences. Hence arise the sciences of Psychology, Morality and Law; and last, the highest production of the absolute spirit in Art, Religion, and Philosophy.

From all this it follows that thought can never contradict reality, for it is reality. Nature and our ideas of nature not merely resemble one another; they are the same thing. A body of ideas can never be a mere *representation* of natural facts, it *is* the natural facts. The science of

botany is the actual laws of plants. It is only by a series of errors that they could be imagined as not being identical. The ideas are the realities.

In ordinary language this seems a confusion of heterogeneous things. We must however remember that we are dealing with an Ideal Philosophy, in which the Real is the Ideal, or rather the Ideal is the Real. There is nothing more Real in a piece of matter such as a stone than in an Idea of the stone. Both of them are expressions of the absolute. It is important to distinguish between the views of Hegel and those of Plato and of Aristotle. The Ideas of Plato were independent of actual individual objects. They were, so to speak, patterns : they could exist though the objects perished. The Ideas of Aristotle only existed when objectivised in actual objects. Hegel repudiated the theory that Ideas could exist *apart from* objects ; or that they even exist *in* objects. The Ideas *are* the actual object world ; they are not a substance that is separate from it. "The implicitly and explicitly universal truly exist in the world."

This universal is to be apprehended by the Intellect, not by the senses (as Locke contended). Hegel quotes with approval the reply of Plato to Diogenes. Diogenes said : " I see a table and a cup, but I do not see table-ness and cup-ness " (which are the Platonic Ideas of table and cup). Plato replied : " You have eyes to see the table and the cup, but *you* have not the mind by which to see table-ness and cup-ness." According to Hegel, if the *table* were destroyed, the objective idea " table " would disappear with it, but that is because the Idea " table " is the Real table and not merely a sort of independent principle " table-ness " embodied in the table. The universal of Hegel is not an underlying

principle or substratum of reality, it is the actual reality itself. The universality and reality of it is not given in immediate perception, as would be contended by the common-sense Scottish School, nor is it obtained in any ecstasy of vision. The Reality is developed in the mind by apprehending knowledge. Reality is a question of degree. The more we know of things the more real they become.

Hegel is fond of representing Plato as having identical views with his own upon the subject of Ideas, but Hegel's system appears distinctly different from that of Plato, or Plotinus, or Spinoza.

Thus, for example, the Idea of man on Hegelian principles would be the average man as we know him. The Platonic Idea would be perfect humanity ; an Ideal, rather than an Idea. The only Idea of Hegel that could resemble the Platonic Idea would be an abstraction from which all defect and all limitation had been removed ; this, however, being a pure abstraction could not be concrete. Hegel's view of Ideas seems to be a fusion or "reconciliation" of the Ideas of Plato and Aristotle, by subsuming them both under a higher concept.

In this system most of the old philosophical Ideas are submerged ; thus, what has been known as "substance" has gone. "Substance" is objective, it is outside the mind, it is a thing that can be distinguished as "not mind," and therefore has no existence of its own. It is a mere concept or temporary scaffold in the process of construction of a system of philosophy.

Again, there is no such a thing as phenomenon, unless by it be meant a mere temporary way of looking at a thing. The whole of nature and thought is real from beginning to end. Nor does the ding-an-sich, the thing

in itself, the "noumenon" of Kant, receive at the hands of Hegel better treatment. "The noumenon of Kant is incomprehensible to reason; we call a noumenon that which we believe that no human reason will ever be able to understand. But if there is no such noumenon, there are no limits to what the reason can understand. So far as its value to philosophy is concerned the noumenon is 'old rubbish,' for which the administrators and executors of the Kantian system are unable to find a purchaser."

The difference between the philosophy of Hegel and that of Spinoza is that Spinoza's absolute was objective and in no way dependent upon the ego.

Thus, then, we must treat the concrete world as an evolution out of the abstract; not an evolution in time, for the absolute is not limited by time, but a logical evolution. Simultaneously a movement in the reverse direction is taking place from the concrete to the abstract; and just as concrete objects are formed by the limitation or determination or setting bounds to the abstract, so the abstract is in its turn reformed by generalizing, or universalizing, or removing bounds from the concrete. This last process is the formation of Science, Philosophy, Art and Religion. It is accompanied by consciousness; so that we must treat nature and knowledge as two branches of reality produced by reverse processes, one unconscious, as when nature is being evolved and formed, the other conscious, as when nature is being known.

Hegel highly praised Spinoza's system. "Thought," he said, "must rise to the level of Spinoza before mounting higher. If you wish to be a philosopher begin by being a Spinozist. You can do nothing without that. You must first bathe in the ether of the one universal and

impersonal substance in which the soul purifies itself from all individuality and rejects absolutely everything which it had previously believed. One must arrive at this negative position which is the emancipation of the Spirit." But on the other hand, Hegel complained that Spinoza's substance was lifeless substance, not capable of being apprehended as subject as well as object.

The theory of Fichte emphasized the opposition of the non-ego to the ego, but provided no logical means of accounting for the result of the reunion of the non-ego with the ego. In the system of Fichte such reunion would, by destroying the opposition, have destroyed the non-ego altogether, instead of, as in Hegel's system, producing a Reality by means of dialectic.

The fault of previous idealists, such as Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, was that the objective idea was not sufficiently subjectivised. It still was an object other than the ego, instead of, as in Hegel's system, being the Ego itself.

The philosophy of Hegel may be parodied by saying that it is an attempt to account for what is outside of a man, by making his own inside examine itself. It requires, vulgarly speaking, the sort of effort intended when a little boy tells a cyclist to "get inside." But it is the legitimate goal of Idealism; any other Idealism is only a half-way house. But while Hegelism is apparently the utmost limit of Idealism, it is, as Lord Haldane has shown (in the "Pathway to Reality"), nothing but the most real of Realisms. From one point of view it might be treated as a reversed sort of materialism, and it has served as a point of departure for many of the materialistic systems of Germany.

The idealism of Schelling is the nearest to that of Hegel, but Hegel complained of it as unsystematised and

assumed without any proof or reason, or, as he expressed it, "suddenly shot up as out of a pistol instead of being logically evolved."

It has been shown how essentially Hegel's system was based on the idea of orderly and systematic development. He therefore rejected the idea of Empedocles that "the world was originated by chance, which had produced many things, which, however, disappeared because they were not constituted to endure." This hypothesis was not in accordance with Hegel's philosophy. To him, nature appeared to be working towards an end, and evolution by means of thought appeared to him to proceed on definite lines ; a "self-identity," a "self-effectuating idea," an "actuality," which originally existed in a potential form from the beginning.

In this view he differs from Spinoza, who rejects the idea of design or aim on the ground that all that is and ever has been is the work of the Deity, and as a system is already perfect.

It may be desirable to conclude with a short précis, the material of which is drawn from the last of Hegel's lectures on the History of Philosophy, in which he endeavours to give a general view of his system. Two sides, nature and spirit, are each of them recognised as representing the totality of the Idea, not only as being in themselves identical but as producing the identity from themselves. . . . "The craving of the Spirit is to find itself in what lies outside itself. . . . The result is the thought which is in unity with itself, and embraces all nature and converts it into a thought world. This theory is the result of nearly twenty-five centuries of earnest striving of spirit to become objective to itself in order to know itself. The opposition of the subjective

and objective, when pushed to the absolute extreme, becomes reconciled, and science is the knowledge of the unity of this opposition. Nature is the unconscious work of spirit, but the life-action of communities of men in History and in Art is produced consciously. Only in scientific knowledge does spirit know itself as spirit. The history of philosophy is not a fortuitous progress . . . the succession of philosophies is not due to accident, it is a succession of necessary stages . . . the latest philosophy contains all that preceded it. . . . We must raise ourselves above our small individual opinions and above our personal vanity, for individuals are like blind men who are driven forward by the spirit which dwell in them as a whole."

It will thus appear that the characteristic features of Hegelism are :

(1) The identification of thought and being as contrasted with those philosophies which treat the thinker and the objects thought about, the soul and the world, as separate and distinct entities.

(2) A special logic or theory of creative evolution by which concrete realities are evolved out of contradictory abstracts by the operation of unconscious thought and are again generalised into abstracts by the use of conscious thought, the first operation resulting in the formation of an ordered nature out of chaos, the second in the formation of a body of knowledge and science.

The Hegelian system, of course, entirely differs from the window-theory, which separates thought from things thought about. It differs again from the idealism of Berkeley, who, though he treated the objective world as phenomenal, did not identify the phenomenon with the mind that perceived it.

(3) The Hegelian system differs again from materialism which treats man as a machine. For instead of regarding consciousness as a mere concomitant of mechanical action, as if we were to say that a steam engine could think, it treats material objects as *actual* thoughts, and not as a cause from which thoughts are produced. It is quite a different thing to say that thought is a mere product of matter, than to say matter is a mere form of thought.

But Hegelism very easily degrades into materialism, for it is easy to represent a system which identifies thought and being as a system which makes matter the only real form of existence, and, hence, to contend that the difference between Hegel and Hæckel is only a question of words.

The very reality given by Hegel to his system of nature makes it easy to represent him as a materialist.

(4) The adoption by Hegel of the Neoplatonic theory of a universal mind severs his philosophy from that of the Schoolmen and of the English, Scottish, and French Schools of common-sense reality.

This universality of thought seems absolutely necessary to an idealist who cannot otherwise explain how it is possible for two egos to be present in two different men, each as non-ego to the other.

(5) Hegelism differs from Pantheism in that it does not represent thought and being as modes, or attributes, or products of one absolute "substance," but regards them as being themselves the absolute, the notion of substance being treated as a mere concept. Thus, while a disciple of Plotinus could not treat man as a *modification* of the One, Hegel can treat the ego as a mode of the absolute mind, or the universal mind individualised.

To the Pantheist, man is produced out of the substance of the absolute and is consubstantial with the absolute ; to a Hegelian everything, man included, is the absolute.

It is, of course, possible to reject Hegelism and to adopt the Cartesian dualistic system of an ego distinct from the external world, and "thought" as different from "matter." But when once Idealism has been adopted it seems impossible to avoid being driven logically into the position of Hegel.

CHAPTER XV

SCHOPENHAUER AND NIETZSCHE

SCHOPENHAUER was the son of a banker. He first studied the system of Kant and then attended lectures under Fichte, and finally came under the influence of Schelling, Hegel and Goethe. His system bears the impress of all those thinkers, although he expressly criticised and repudiated them.

It is based upon Kant, but it differs from the philosophy of Kant in the following points. In the first place, the unknowable noumenon, or thing-in-itself of Kant, is replaced by the active will, which according to Schopenhauer is the true foundation of mind and matter, of thought and being. The will differs from Kant's noumenon in that the will is not unknowable. We have the most intimate experience of it, not only by our faculty of feeling, but also by the intellect, to which it is presented under the forms of space and time. These forms do not, however, completely transform it, they only modify it, so that the will in-so-far-as it is known, is a reality. This adoption of the will as the universal substance, of course involves Schopenhauer in Pantheism. The will is universal; present, entire, and undivided in every object of nature and in every living being.

The next point is that this will must be regarded as much wider than any individual will. For an individual

will, here and now, is only phenomenal and subject to time, whereas the true will is independent of space and time and of individuality. It is not mere desire for action, it is action itself. It is not necessarily conscious, nor has it, in its crude form, thought, intention, design, or aim. It objectivises itself by its self-developing activity ; by objectivation is meant that the vague and universal takes form and becomes an object capable of being apprehended by the intellect or senses. The first result of this objectivation, or creation, is the formation of Platonic Ideas, or models of nature. These are the possibilities and aims by which the will expresses the direction of its activity. It first creates the laws and principles according to which it is going to create an objectivised nature. Here, then, we have the will expressed as Idea.

The will now evolves a world not according to patterns due to God or any designer, but only according to its own Ideas. The world, the realm of material nature, thus comes into being.

This objectivised world becomes known to man, as has been said, under the forms of space and time ; a knowledge which, though it is only partial, is much more than the merely representative knowledge of Kant. For the mind when contemplating its own will "is placed within the fortress, which it was impossible to take from without." The will is not a mere object, but a subject-object. "In this inner knowledge the thing-in-itself has partly thrown off its veil, but still does not appear altogether naked." The will is apprehended as a world of material objects subject to space and time. Whence it follows that reality is given to us more truly by our feelings than by our intellect.

Above all, the will is not only free, but autonomous, that is to say, subject to no law but its own.

There are two meanings to freedom ; one, the liberty to act without outward constraint. This, however, is consistent with an absence of real freedom, for though our actions are unimpeded, yet if they can be accurately predicted when the surrounding circumstances are known, we are the children of circumstances, and just as subject to the law of cause and effect as mere dead matter. A man who is a slave to his passions is not really free, even though he has health, and unlimited time and money. On the other hand, the will is said to be autonomous when it cannot be predicted what it will do, nor is subject to any law of cause and effect. It is thus a "law unto itself." It may be opposed, restrained, or vanquished by surrounding circumstances ; it may have struggles with other wills, or even internal struggles with itself, but it is still autonomous. And it is in this last sense that Schopenhauer means that the will is autonomous. It is not free in any other sense. The world is a scene of struggle of wills, of contest between different objectivised wills, such as animals struggling for their lives. For though the will is universal, yet once objectivised, it becomes phenomenally split up into individual things and individual men, who can fight with one another. The contest is only an apparent one, though it may entail much suffering. It is as though the will, like a reservoir, burst its dam. Individual streams of water may, in rushing out, dash against and impede one another, but the total outrush of the flood is one great movement, in spite of the apparent opposition of individual parts of it.

Thus, then, we have an active principle, ever pushing,

taking directions which are followed up by the production of all sorts of forms of material and spiritual life, fighting for survival. This will is no phenomenon, but a reality ; it only becomes phenomenal when individualised into this object or that object, or this or that individual man. This " will " becomes known to us directly by our capacity for feeling, but less directly by the intellect, through the forms of space and time and the laws of the reasoning faculty. It is like a great universal flood. For this reason feeling is in more intimate connection with the will than intellect, and it is by feeling more than by mere intellect that the phenomenal will of each individual man rules his life and drives him into action ; whence, then, it is the inner deep unconscious will that really governs man, and the intellect is of a subordinate nature. We might almost say that the unconscious will really directs man, while the intellect performs the part of the friendly solicitor who shows man how to carry out that which the imperious will has resolved to do, or else of the advocate who teaches man to argue in favour of it. In this respect the work of Schopenhauer is very interesting, abounding as it does in observations of the greatest acuteness, and paving the way for the philosophy of the inconscient.

Thus, for instance, what appears as ideal love is merely the product of the will-to-live of the unborn children, and a man in choosing a wife is not governed usually by any motives except the inconscient will, and therefore can rarely justify his choice to others or explain it to himself.

In matters of art, man is in direct contact with will, so that he is unable to explain his tastes by intellectual considerations ; indeed, those motives which he puts

forward as the reasons of his actions are in general mere pretences. Instinct is only another way in which the will induces action by deluding the individual will to serve the ends of the will itself.

Schopenhauer's philosophical system might logically have stopped here. But his mournful character caused him to superadd a pessimism which seems in no way necessary to it. His life had not been a happy one. He quarrelled with his mother, and was deeply chagrined by the public neglect of his great work, "The Will as World and Idea," which he knew to be a masterpiece; added to this he lost most of his fortune and was obliged to give lessons in order to support himself.

He regarded the striving of the phenomenal wills as producing a world full of sorrow and suffering, so that for each and all of us it would be better never to have lived.

When once the veil of Maya has been partly removed, man becomes aware of the wretchedness of life. At first he endeavours to alleviate this misery by satisfaction of his desires, but he soon sees that it is only by the renunciation of desire that suffering can be removed both in himself and others.

It is only the highest minds that can perceive this truth and make this renunciation. And this cannot be done by suicide, which is only a flight from the battle. It must be done by the "surrender of all property, deep unbroken solitude, self-inflicted torture. Self-starvation is not suicide if done in a proper spirit." "A man who, after many bitter struggles with his own nature, has finally conquered the will, continues to exist only as a pure knowing being. Nothing can trouble him more, nothing can move him. He will have done his part in

the repression of the will. The Ideal will have suppressed the Real. Thought will have overcome the objective world, the painful struggle will have ended."

It is important not to misunderstand the pessimism of Schopenhauer. At first sight one might mistake it for Buddhism, which originated in a country in which life must have been profoundly wretched. Buddhism advocates the attainment of peace by the annihilation of all desires, friendships and affections, and finally of thought itself.

But the philosophy of Schopenhauer is not the flight of a cowardly Epicurean from the battle of life. It is a severe conflict, in which the Ideal endeavours to suppress the material part of man, and to replace the mere will to enjoyment by the will to be virtuous. It is thus akin to Stoicism.

In practical life two alternatives are offered to man, either to endeavour to satisfy his desires or to strive to overcome them. These are the only two roads to peace. To nurse our desires without being prepared to take action to satisfy them is productive of a degradation of character and of unhappiness. Hence the part of the wise man is to learn to forgo those pleasures which he cannot attain, or which even if attained are worthless.

Schopenhauer's moral system must therefore not be regarded like Buddhism, as a wholesale condemnation of all activity of the will, but of a subordination of the grosser pleasures to the higher. It is true that he desired to make us esteem lightly the objects for which most of us strive, such as money or position, but he never despised the higher ones, and only advocated the subordination of the Real to the Ideal.

To distinguish what is really worth having in life from

what is worthless is the art of living, and it was with a deep meaning that the old fablists put the saying "the grapes are sour," not into the mouth of the ass, but into the mouth of the fox, the animal usually chosen to typify shrewdness and practical wisdom.

In hours of depression Schopenhauer was inclined to think all pleasures as worthless, but it does not appear that he attempted to put his pessimism into actual practice. On the contrary, in his last years, when that recognition came for which he had so longed, and which his works so richly deserved, he went every day to dine at an officer's mess in Frankfort, because then he got a good dinner at a reasonable price. This is not the conduct of an advocate of mere ascetic Buddhism.

For clearness, wit, and acute if rather sceptical criticism, hardly any other philosophical writer can compare with Schopenhauer. If he had explicitly adopted an optimistic moral system instead of a pessimistic one he would have been more generally popular than he is, and more true to nature. For to most men life is worth living, and few of us are so wretched that we would be willing to extinguish our desires, even if we were able to do so. Our very struggle is itself a pleasure.

The most obvious criticism upon the whole system is that the use of the word "will" for his "absolute" is apt to be misleading. Yet it is difficult to suggest a substitute. The word "absolute" does not give the idea of force and activity that is displayed by the will. The "thing-in-itself" suggests something wholly unknowable, which is contrary to Schopenhauer's system.

"Universal substance" does not give an adequate idea of Schopenhauer's meaning, and the word God quite misrepresents his theory. The will has not the

definite aim and intelligence that we usually associate with the idea of God.

The portion of his work which lays stress on the fact that a large part of human thought and action may be unconscious is a most valuable contribution to psychology.

In the hands of certain of his followers the theory of Schopenhauer developed into the advocacy of mere violence.

Nietzsche is a utilitarian, in the sense that he desires the human race to develop as far as possible. This development he believes will be accomplished by the "will to power," by which he means the driving force urging mankind in a path of evolution into new forms, when men shall become stronger, wiser and more powerful over nature. So far his aim is common to all wise utilitarians and, indeed, to every school of moralists that admits the desirability of improvement.

The distinguishing character of his philosophy is the adoption of the theory of Schopenhauer, that the development of the world is a phenomenon of that which in the lower forms of matter we call force, but which in the higher forms of life we call "will." The impersonal will ever strives to force itself into new and varied forms. Its efforts create the whole world of matter and mind.

It is not as a philosopher but as a moralist that his views are remarkable. After an examination of the history and present condition of Europe, he came to the conclusion that true development has been and is now being retarded by a wishy-washy sentimental humanitarianism. The marks of this system are the rule by democracies, in which the most stupid is set to rule the wiser and the weaker to rule the stronger. Hence

democracy is treated with scorn. Furthermore, all sentimental pity is condemned which stands in the way of progress. The weak, stupid, incapable, the "bottom dogs," ought to be wiped out, painlessly, if it can be done, though often Nietzsche uses language which might induce one to believe that he would like to do it without any regard to suffering. The superman, the "laughing lion" of the future, would smash the incapable as we kill rats.

The whole of the philosophies, religions and political theories of to-day are infected with this vice of bottom-dog humanitarianism.

Christianity is the worst offender. The philosophy of Spencer is no better, with its advice to "adapt the organism to its surroundings," when man ought by force to mould his surroundings. Hegelism, Kantian morality are all treated as sneaking attempts to "intellectualise" and find a foundation for a rotten system. The theories of God, immortality, the beauty of self-denial, asceticism, are only so many catchwords to disguise what is in reality merely truckling subservience. These theories and this philosophy only derives its support from a host of paid priests and paid professors. In this point of view Rousseau and Robespierre are as bad as Schopenhauer; and Wagner, of whom Nietzsche once entertained hopes, slid back into canting, sneaking religion in his "Parsival." The weak, the downtrodden, not only shelter themselves by concealing themselves like slaves, but they actually claim credit for it, as if humility were a virtue. The doctrine of a "soul" has enabled the majority of mortals to practise the sublime self-deception of interpreting weakness as freedom. Impotence which does not retaliate is falsified into "goodness"; subjection to

those one hates as "obedience"; cowardice is called "patience"; inability to revenge is called "forgiveness"; "people talk of love for their enemies and perspire in doing so." The dogs which are liked best are beaten, their wretchedness may be a "preparation"; a "test"; a "schooling"; perhaps a "blessing." But these good people are not without human feelings. What they want is not revenge, not the "drunkenness of sweet revenge," as Homer calls it, but "the triumph of the just God over the Godless," and they live in "love" and "hope." In hope of what? That their hour may come, and that, as St. Thomas Aquinas says, "Their joy will be great as they witness the torments of the damned." What is wanted is scientific Atheism. Helvetius is praised as the best of the moralists.

In the last part of "Zarathustra," when the Nietzschean prophet speaks to the intellectuals of to-day, he says: "In you there are still concealed traits of the populace. Though you are of a higher type, much in you is crooked, there is no smith who can hammer you out. You are only bridges. . . . May higher ones pass over you—higher men, more triumphant men, merrier men, laughing lions must come. . . . But all his audience were silent and stood still astonished."

The doctrine therefore of Nietzsche is that we should throw aside all the English cant, with its pretence of sympathy for the most unfit; and abandoning Christianity and the fiction of God and a future life and every form of sentimental philosophy, boldly work for the evolution of the superman, treading into the dust every scruple of existing morality.

The system of Nietzsche is essentially aristocratic, and his utilitarianism is not "the greatest happiness of the

greatest number." We have to acquiesce in the sacrifice of a legion of individuals for the sake of the existence of a select higher race. But the select race must not be selfish. Selfishness is the mark of sick, not of healthy, souls. Our aim should be not mere will to live, or for money, or pleasures, but will to power, to action.

Nor must we imagine the world is to be a wilderness of wolves and sheep, or a scene of cruelty and violence. Men would fall naturally into castes : the intellectuals, the warriors and administrators, and the mediocre class of business men, shopkeepers and artisans. The last class reposes on a soundly constituted mediocrity. To the mediocre it is happiness to be mediocre. Specialisation or mechanical efficiency in one thing is to them a natural instinct. Ideas and books which are suitable to one caste would be poison to the others.

Coriolanus, as drawn by Shakespeare, is a truer picture of what Nietzsche intended as a superman than a mere robber baron of the feudal ages.

Nietzsche somewhat inconsistently detests deceit as a way of evolving the superman. He seems to forget that his hero, Napoleon, instead of being always a " laughing lion," was often rather like a hyena, and we may well ask why, if we can produce a superman by means of fraud, we are not at liberty to produce him ? Why is the financier who cheats a man out of his money worse than the highwayman who robs him on the road ? For the highwayman, of course, we feel a little of the sympathy that the ladies felt for Claude Duval, but Nietzsche does not explain why that ideal is to be adopted as the model of our superman, for he has flung to the winds almost all the ordinary ideals of humanity.

The question is whether any good is to be got out of

this bacchanalian revel of moral theory. The answer ought, I would suggest, to be in the affirmative.

Every one must desire the reconstruction of a Society that reposes on inherited wealth or position, without any corresponding services to humanity, or, on the other hand, supports an idle and egotistical proletariat. But so much hypocritical cant has been lately put forth from pulpit, platform and on paper, about the sacred rights of the downtrodden ; the equality of Bushmen with the white races ; government by the most stupid ; and the " bottom dog " ; that we are in danger of digging up the subsoil of Society and putting it on over the top soil ; a result that will be fatal to progress. A protest against the growth of this opinion was therefore needed ; a protest of this character is to be found, but in a sane and reasonable form, in the speeches and letters of Theodore Roosevelt.

On the other hand, Nietzsche undervalues the utility of Altruism. The human race is not like a number of isolated crocodiles or spiders which work alone. It works in packs, and work in a pack can only be done by looking to the safety of the pack as well as the leaders of it.

The philosophy of Nietzsche, therefore, while it has performed a useful function, does not sufficiently allow for the part that may be played by the altruism which it despises in the attainment of those ideals to which it aspires.

CHAPTER XVI

EVOLUTION AND DESIGN IN NATURE

THE latter half of the nineteenth century has seen a profound change in philosophy, owing to the recent advance in science, but especially to the theory of evolution.

The old view had been to regard the types of existence as fixed. Man and animals were considered to be now what they had always been since life appeared upon the globe. But the labours of Lamarck and Darwin upset this view, and the whole of animated nature, including the vegetable world, is now generally believed to have been evolved out of the lowest types. Nay more, even the various forms of matter have recently been shown to have evolved from more simple structures, and the atoms and electrons of which matter is composed to have obeyed the law of evolution.

Traces of this theory are to be found in Greek Philosophy, and its application to sociology has been partly seen by a number of thinkers, from Vico to Hegel. It was not, however, till the time of Lamarck and Darwin that its application was shown to animal and vegetable life. Nor was evolution arranged into a regular philosophical system before the time of Herbert Spencer. To his writings, and the writings of others who have succeeded him, we must refer those who desire to know the proofs

adduced in favour of the theory. It may, however, be desirable to give one argument which may serve as a specimen of the whole.

The evolutionary hypothesis asserts that man has been evolved from some very elementary form of sea creature and has come down through fish, lizards and apes in a regular ancestral progression. If we examine the skeleton of any animal we find evidence of a very strong character in favour of this supposition. For on comparing the skeleton of a horse with that of a man, a striking similarity is found between them. Take, for instance, the back leg. Figure 1 and Figure 2 correspond.

The heel of a man becomes the hock of a horse, the knee of the man becomes the hind shoulder of the horse, and the horse walks on the tip of one of his toes, which has been enlarged and furnished with a huge nail which is his hoof. And the curious point is that these legs, when examined, are bone for bone the exact counterparts. Thus there are two bones in the leg of a man below the knee, there are two bones in the corresponding thigh of a horse; and every single one of the complicated bones of the foot of man are to be found, either atrophied to mere nothings, or else drawn out in the lower part of the leg of the horse, the hock corresponding to man's heel. And this similarity of structure goes through the whole kingdom of mammals. Nay more, it is found on dissection that man has a rudimentary tail.

It is particularly interesting in comparing the organisms of two different creatures to observe that in every case the size and arrangement of the structure has been adapted to its use by moulding out a common design. A bone is sometimes lengthened to a long shank, sometimes shortened down to a mere point, sometimes diminished

so as to be a mere rudiment. It is in each case as if the creator of these forms had always started with one type and then moulded the parts about as a sculptor would mould clay, till he had got what he wanted; never troubling to invent a new form of organism, provided he could get what he wanted by adapting the old.




FIG. 1.




FIG. 2.

It is, of course, arguable that all animals have been made on one pattern, which was selected as the best, and that mere similarity of structure does not necessarily involve ancestral relationship. If similarity of structure were the only argument in favour of the evolutionary hypothesis, the theory could not be considered proved.

But on every side confirmation appears. The arrangement of life displayed by fossils shows that as the world grew older, successive types appeared of a higher and higher organisation; nay more, that as an animal of any sort grows from the embryo or egg it successively puts on all the types characteristic of the supposed ancestral march, from the most rudimentary jelly-fish to finished man.

The links that are needful to join up the forms into a regular chain are often missing. This, however, is accounted for by the very reasonable supposition that races of animals tend in the struggle for existence to destroy the lower types which more immediately conflict with them, just as savages disappear before the advance of more civilised men.

Moreover, experiment seems to confirm the theory. For the heredity which it presumes is a certain fact. Both men and animals inherit the characteristics of their progenitors, even to minute details of feature and colour; even tricks of manner are hereditary.

And by breeding flowers, pigeons, dogs and race-horses, it has been shown possible to create new types.

When the artificial selection ceases, the animals tend to revert to their original types. But this is explained by showing that what we call the original types have been fixed by centuries of evolution, and may be expected to be more permanent than our selected types, which comparatively are only things of yesterday.

The theory of development of higher forms from lower, which was only applied by Lamarck and Darwin to living things, was treated by Spencer as of universal application.

For example, it was applied to politics, law, religion,

morals, architecture, and in fact shown to be the universal law of change from the less organised to the more organised, and characterised by growing complexity, by specialisation of organs and by gradual disappearance of useless parts. Even dress was shown to come under the law, so that the two buttons on the waist of our coats at the back represent two buttons formerly used to support a sword-belt, just as the little fold at the top of our ears represents the shape of the ear when it had a larger and more pointed form.

The principles upon which this development depends are, first, persistence or conservation of type, so that progress once made is secured. This in living things is the principle of heredity. The second is the principle of development by use, so that the use of a particular organ tends to develop and strengthen it ; and the third is selection by the weeding out of the most unfit for the conditions in which the creature is living.

Lamarck, who was the first to suggest the theory of development from lower forms, attributed change in types of animals to the effect of use of their organs. Thus, an animal that lived in dread of enemies and had to fly from them, would constantly prick up its ears, which by repeated action would enlarge. Its need of hasty flight would cause its legs to elongate, and these characteristics being transmitted to its offspring would gradually become embodied in the species and form a new animal.

Darwin, on the other hand, laid weight on the effect of chance variations. If an animal such as above mentioned had a number of children, those who happened to have the largest ears and the longest legs would survive, the others would fall a prey to their enemies and not live to transmit their deficiencies to future generations. Thus

by a process of natural selection the race would change. Selection might also be artificial, as when man selects those animals to breed from which best fulfil his requirements. The principle of adaptation by use is minimised and denied by some schools of naturalists, who maintain that it is only by means of selection that races alter. The consequence of this denial would be that it would follow that mere exercise of organs will not effect any improvement in the race. If a man studied mathematics all his life, his son, it is said, would not in the least have more innate capacity for mathematics.

If selection is alone to be relied upon, then in order to secure the survival and improvement of any race it will be expedient to prevent people being born except from the best parents. The production of the survival of the inferior beings among any class, whether it be brought about by charity or by State action, does harm instead of good. A misdirected system of artificial equalisation of men or animals is like putting back bad specimens into the breeding-pen.

The followers of Lamarck would therefore advocate education as the means of improving races. The followers of Darwin would rely on selection and the breeding from the best.

The bearing of these rival theories upon politics and sociology is obvious. They serve as the foundation of the most opposed political systems.

It now becomes needful to consider the effects of the theory of evolution upon the reign of law in nature and upon the question of "design."

There are three rival theories as to the reign of law in nature. One considers the world of nature as developing under the influence of pre-existing laws, which are

independent of the objects which are being evolved under their influence.

Another theory recognises the rule of law, but considers the laws not as imposed upon objects from without, but as depending on the qualities and properties of the things that are being evolved, so that each thing develops in accordance with its own character and nature.

The first of these theories is derived from the Platonic Realists, according to whom the whole universe is governed by Ideas. These Ideas may be represented to us either as types of existence or as laws. They are independent of objects, which as they come into existence come under existing laws, like newly arrived strangers in a foreign land. The laws are the eternal principles of existence.

The second view is that there are laws, but only intrinsic in the objects which, so to speak, embody their own laws in themselves.

On this theory, instead of saying that a thing is subject to such and such a law, we say it has such and such qualities or properties.

This theory is obviously derived from the nominalistic view of concepts, according to which, types, laws, and ideas are embodied in existing individual objects, but do not subsist apart from them.

The difference between the two views above mentioned, therefore, depends upon the rival philosophies of the Platonic Realists and the nominalists.

Both of them seem to lead to fatalism, for in each case evolution, once started upon a given basis, would pursue its appointed path, and reach its destined end strictly according to the law of cause and effect.

In opposition to these two systems we have the opinion

of Democritus, which in various forms has been adopted by many philosophers and which ascribes the formation of the world to the fortuitous concourse of atoms.

But this view in its extreme form is impossible. A world governed entirely by chance would be a mere chaos. Without the reign of law there could be no uniformity of action, and the world as we know it could not possibly exist. Such a hypothesis is utterly untenable.

But yet we speak of "chance" when dealing with natural phenomena. It has been introduced into mathematics, and the changes of type upon which Darwin's theory of beneficial selection is founded is based upon slight variations of type produced by "chance."

It is therefore necessary to determine what is meant by "chance." Superficial examination shows that it stands for two very different things.

If a chimney falls down, and going through the roof of a house breaks some valuable china that "happens" to be there, we say "What an unlucky chance." But, in truth, there is no chance about the matter. The whole series of events is governed by the law of causation, from the character of the chimney and the competency of the builders down to the notions of ornament of those who put the china in a place where it got broken. To carry this further, the ball on a roulette table is spoken of as falling into a particular hole by mere "chance." But there is really no chance about it. If we knew all the data, the shape and size of the table and ball, the strength and character of the croupier's arm and the state of his mind at the time of casting, we could foretell the result. To some extent we can foretell this. Cricket is partly a game of chance, but mostly a game of skill. Whist is also of the same order, and when we ascribe results to

chance, all we mean is that they are results of causes so remote and impossible to calculate that it is useless to pretend that any one could predict them. Whence, then, in a realm governed rigidly by the law of causation chance cannot exist. It is only a name for ignorance, and we can speculate upon and bet upon ignorance just as well as upon chance. Two men can make a bet on a race which has already been run and in which "chance" is over, just as well as on a race that is going to take place. The only necessary condition to make the bet fair is that they shall both be ignorant of the result, in the one case from absence of news, in the other from inability to predict it.

Hence, then, to speak of a world which is in reality governed by rigid law as being governed by "chance" is a contradiction.

Darwin is sometimes represented as basing his theory of development by selection upon "chance" variations from the parental type. It is clear, however, that what he meant was not "uncaused" variations, but only variations so slight as to be incapable of being explained, accounted for, or predicted. That is the only sort of "chance" that is necessary to his hypothesis. We may also remark that the evolutionary theory reposes on the existence of laws of nature in accordance with which the evolution takes place. Evolution could not take place in a world in which "chance" was a leading factor.

Because "chance" contradicts the law of causation, it does not follow that there may not be occurrences in the natural world which are not subject to the law of causation, and which therefore may for some purposes be capable of being treated as truly fortuitous.

These exceptions to the law of causality are not

produced by chance, but are due to the autonomy of the will. This is one of the facts of consciousness. Whether it is a Reality or only a phenomenon is, as we have seen, a disputed fact. But it takes its place among the world-forces. Its characteristic is that the results it occasions are incapable of prediction, not merely on account of our ignorance, but because they do not depend on causation. The possibility of such action makes the possessor of the power of autonomous action into a creator, who can produce an effect without a cause. It plays an important part even in the physical world. It cuts a canal at Panama and alters climates ; it produces a race of fowls which each lay two hundred and fifty eggs in a year instead of fifty, and no one can foretell the results which it is going to produce in the future. It is treated by some thinkers as an illusion, by others as the very basis of active life.

The question whether there is evidence of design in nature depends to some extent upon the view we take of law, of chance, and of free will.

If chance, and chance only, rules the world, then design is obviously impossible. But if the world is governed by law, then it is always reasonable to infer that there is design in nature. For even if chance or autonomous will to some extent prevailed, still the appearance of a world governed in the main by law would always suggest a design in nature, and an end which was being aimed at.

We can only judge of things from a point of view which appears reasonable and logical to our intellect, but when we see a mechanism so extraordinary as that of the world of nature, we cannot consider it as a machine that has been made without a purpose.

We may believe that what we call chance has played and is now playing an important part in its evolution, but it is only by a strong effort of mind that we can consider nature as having no design, for to consider nature as having no design, end, or purpose, is to figure it as the work of a power either blind or unconscious, or else as the work of a creator who made an enormous number of animals of the most discordant character, and put them together into a cage without a keeper, and let them fight it out without the least idea or care as to what the result was going to be. And it requires us to believe that all our effort and suffering is in vain, for the world and all that is in it, both mind and matter, is destined to be swept into nothing.

To argue that there is no design because the world exhibits imperfections is an obvious error. Some thinkers, like Leibnitz, pronounced it the best of all possible worlds ; others, like Voltaire, pronounced it the worst of all possible worlds, though upon the whole he managed to extract a good deal of amusement, if not of enjoyment out of it. The struggle was not for him, as for Schopenhauer, a source of suffering. One hardly knows what he would have done had he been deprived of the pleasure of a fight with somebody.

But we are not in a position to judge fully the intentions of the designer any more than private soldiers can judge of the strategy of a campaign. Even if our intellect were competent, we do not know the facts. We condemn pain, and ask why God permits a war, but we do not know what part pain really plays in the organisation of the world, any more than we know whether the biting east wind brings to cities health or sickness. We do not know enough of what Divine goodness is, to

judge whether God is good or no. We only know what human goodness is, and even as to that we are divided in opinion.

To sum up the thorny question, we may say that there are three conflicting views upon the question of design: one, that mere chance, without law or order, evolves things out of chaos. This seems inconceivable.

Another view is that some intelligence, whether conscious or not, originated certain laws, by the action of which forces were started which were allowed free play to develop as best they could, but without further interference.

A third view is that intelligence is still at work interfering in the evolution, and from time to time modifying the original design.

Our scientific training of the last two hundred years tends to make us adopt the second view, to attribute all events to the operation of natural and invariable laws, and to deny the possibility of any interference with them. For the direction of science has constantly been to show that events which in earlier times were supposed to be dependent on the will of the gods were really only the natural effects of pre-existing causes. Storms and good harvests depended on cosmical phenomena and not on the will of some deity.

But it may be that we are carrying this assertion of the reign of law too far. In our own individual lives we feel that we have a creative autonomous power within certain limits to interfere with the order of nature. This may, of course, be an illusion, but on the other hand it may represent the truth. We are not in a position to deny that the supreme creative power or process by

which the world is carried on is not subject to similar interference, or that the design and ends of evolutionary actions are not being constantly modified. In other words, that there is what we should term an intelligence still at work in nature.

CHAPTER XVII

BERGSON

THE philosophy of Bergson is a revival of the system of Descartes, but framed upon evolution and with an infusion of the pantheism of Plotinus.

The most salient characteristic is a separation of matter from spirit. For though Bergson admits that both matter and spirit may have one common origin, yet in his opinion each can subsist without the other.

Spirit is regarded as synonymous with life, so that the dualism of Bergson opposes vitality to materiality.

Life is regarded as a rush of vitality. It is not a thing, it is more like a rushing torrent of force pressing its way into matter. It is of the nature of an explosion or series of explosions, for it lets loose reservoirs of energy, most of which has been drawn from the heat of the sun and stored up by plants, and appropriated by the two great branches of beings which can move about, namely, insects and vertebrate animals. By eating an animal or a plant the consumer appropriates the stored-up energy of the creature that he consumes.

The main characteristics of life are heredity and the growth of consciousness.

Consciousness involves memory of the past and anticipation of the future, for no state of conscious thought

is possible without the two. The difference between a dead thing and a stream of rushing life is that if you know the present condition and constitution and properties of the dead thing, you can accurately predict its future from its present. It is subject to the law of cause and effect, of fatalism and determinism. But life has "durée," that is to say a persistence in the present of the whole past life of itself and its ancestors ; as it goes, it gathers together its own past like a snowball, and the past thus becomes part of itself. It lives, and as its vital rush diminishes in power, it dies. It changes by mere effluxion of time. It has not the unchangeable character of matter. Its very essence is change.

The material world, including man's body, is the sphere of action of Spirit. Each individual ego must be regarded as a part only of a great main stream. Properly regarded, the sphere of action of a man's spirit is not only his body but the whole external world around him. When he takes a tool in his hand, for a time the tool becomes part of him. He can influence it and use it. The great difference between insects and men is that man makes his tools out of the matter around him. His spear is of wood with a stone or iron top. But insects fashion their swords, and very terrible ones, out of their own bodies. Again, when we perceive our own body and the world around it, we are in the habit of asking where the perception is ? In the hand, or the eye, or the brain ? The true answer is that the perception is in the thing perceived. The body being material, as also its nerves and fluids and muscles, the act of perception and consequent action is entirely mechanical. In its simplest form there is nothing spiritual about it. Some outer object sends out some impulse of light or sound which

affects a nerve of our body. An impulse is sent on through the nerve to a brain centre; here the afferent or incoming character of the impulse is changed into an efferent or outgoing impulse, the chain is continued to some active part of the body and mechanical action results. Mind might be asleep all this time, and probably is so in the lower animals. But as consciousness comes into existence a factor of enormous importance arises. The brain centre becomes no longer a mere transmitter, but comes into contact with spirit which is able to direct action into channels into which it would otherwise never flow.

This is the special function of the brain, which is thus our main instrument of head-quarters action. Its functions are to supply instinct and intelligence, and thus direct the action of our bodies. It enables us to exert true choice, so that our actions are no longer like mere mechanisms, subject to determinism, but are truly original and creative. For the power of choice involves autonomous free will. Thus, in proportion as life becomes of a higher order, so do consciousness and free will develop, and the living being instead of being an automaton becomes a real creator, ever evolving new and unpredictable forms of action.

The character of vitality is entirely different from that of matter. Matter has no memory. It may change its form over and over again, but each change leaves no essential trace behind it, when once the old form has completely disappeared. But in a living being the old forms can never disappear. They remain, and the future development of the being depends upon them. It can only progress in accordance with its past life-history. Heredity is a characteristic of life, but not of

dead matter. In Bergson's opinion the past is not a sort of material library stored up in the brain, but is non-material. So that if a brain were dissected down to the last molecule, arrangements might be found due to past experience and calculated to facilitate repeated actions of a lower order, such as walking or heart-beating, but one would not find stored up pictures of places that had been seen, or of poems that had been learned by heart. The memories of these are quite non-material.

For suppose some extraordinary instrument could be arranged with a window in a man's head through which the innermost workings of his brain could be perceived, as one looks through a window at bees in a hive making honey; and suppose that adequate means of observation were provided. A materialist might maintain, nay, would be obliged logically to maintain, that you could see the whole process of inventing and putting into words a poem. Not so Bergson. According to him, all that the observer would be able to see is the play of the shuttle that wove the tapestry, but the work of the designer would be altogether out of the scope of any material changes in the brain.

This is a very important contribution to philosophy. Spinoza had maintained that every thought was always accompanied by some corresponding material change in extension. But here we see the possibilities of ideas of thought to which no material counterparts need exist.

The rush of life has what Bergson calls *durée*, or enduringness, and the power of a stream of life depends upon the force and magnitude of the *durée*. At first, in the history of our race, the "choice" of man was

limited to things needful to preserve his existence. But at last a time arrived at which man (alone amongst all the animals) was able to break the chain that bound his choice down to such things as were merely preservative of life, and set himself free to be a creator on a wider scale.

Here we might say that the higher life of the soul began, and resistance was offered to the demands of the body, which constantly urges the spirit to concern itself with bodily cares, instead of taking a higher range.

It is, of course, possible that by means of chemistry we might succeed in making an organic substance, even without having unknowingly entangled some set of real life into our experiment. But it does not seem possible to imagine that mere lifeless matter would ever be able to produce a living thing that in its turn could hand on the rush of life to its descendants, still less that the true phenomena of memory could ever be produced by mere matter.

Inasmuch as the mental activity of man surpasses his mere brain-activity, and inasmuch as other functions of thought are quite independent of the mere material organisation of the brain, it is open to conjecture that after the disintegration of the material body personality may be conserved and even intensified. For if the work of the brain corresponded exactly to the totality of consciousness, as in the case of the lower animals, and there were complete parallelism and reciprocity between brain action and thought, then consciousness might no doubt follow the destiny of the brain and perish with the body.

But in man mental life goes far beyond cerebral life,

which only translates into movement a small part of the soul's activity. Hence the probability of immortality becomes very great.

Thus in place of mere metaphysical speculation upon the immortality of the soul (as when, for instance, we argue that being a simple substance it cannot be dissolved), we get on the firmer ground based upon actual observation and experience.

The metaphysical views of Bergson are founded upon a very instructive criticism of former methods of philosophy. Life, according to him, being a change and a rush, cannot be adequately imaged or represented to our minds by concepts of stationary things or stationary periods.

The doctrine of Parmenides, that "being" is permanence, is not altogether true of matter; it is wholly false as regards mind.

The old logic of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, shaped by the Schoolmen and adopted by every thinker from Descartes to the present day, while adequate to deal with matter and mere mechanical motion is totally inadequate to explain life. It begins by dividing nature into genera by means of rigid concepts, and actually glories in its rigidity.

Later on, as these genera involve us in a rebellion on the part of the nominalists, the old logic substitutes "laws" for genera, and now instead of nature being governed by "essences," "forms," and "potentialities," we have the reign of rigid law. All well enough when you are dealing with matter and attraction and energy and motion. The method in such cases has rendered splendid service.

But try and get a law of social life, or of religion, into

logical boots, and at once either the subject is cramped into extinction, or the boots are split asunder. You cannot take a single human emotion or sentiment and get it into the form of a concept. Justice, Honour, the Good, the Beautiful, mock at your efforts to confine them in logical bottles and mix them like chemicals. Hence, then, the old philosophy, when applied to the problems of vitality and morality, is worse than useless. Utilitarianism, Hedonism, Altruism, when translated into metaphysical forms of the old type, become mere mummies.

For if the old method of concepts is capable at all of representing evolution, it can only be by taking a great number of stationary pictures and then by flashing them in succession upon the mind as is done by a cinematograph, trying to persuade ourselves that we have got a moving picture. But we cannot get the photographs, let alone put them together. In the moral world we have no reason to think that two and two makes four, or that the mere category of number is possible. Instead of "law," we are presented at every turn with antinomies, or lawlessnesses. And as a consequence the moral systems founded upon philosophies are very unsatisfying. Kant has to abandon the pure reason and take to the practical reason. Spencer never gets outside mere materialism, and his system is as if one tried to put a young tree into a flower-pot.

Bergson does not seem to claim to be able to come forward with a new logical system applicable to the phenomena of life. He and his disciples represent this as the work of the future. But he may claim to have given us a trenchant and valuable criticism on old

methods, and in some respects to have effected what the Germans call a "clearing up."

The reader of philosophy will hardly have failed to observe how largely the illustrations and language used are derived from material objects. Mental states are talked of as "within" the mind, concepts as "including" one another; and when Aristotle is discussing the Ideas of Plato he takes a "bed" as an illustration. The most idealistic philosophy is constantly materialised. Everything is spoken of in terms of space and mathematics.

In Bergson's opinion there is a reason for this, which becomes apparent on an examination of his views upon space and time.

He starts from Kant's position that space is to be distinguished from the matter that fills it, and that uniform space is a form of sensibility of man, animals having this form in a very minor degree, and thus probably not distinguishing themselves from other animals or other natural objects.

The characteristic of this space is its divisibility and its capacity for being measured. In fact, measurement is only possible by expressing the thing to be measured in terms of space. When, however, we come to consider time, Bergson differs from Kant. He regards it as a form of sensibility, but he complains that Kant improperly applied to time conceptions which truly ought only to be applied to space. Thus, for example, Kant treated time as measurable. But strictly it is only measurable by treating it as if it were spatial. For example, if one wishes to measure time, one is obliged to have recourse to space. The circumference of a circle is divided into sixty parts and the passage of a

needle over them is noted. If we please, we may substitute for this the movement of the earth round the sun, but, try as we will, duration cannot be treated mechanically or mathematically except in terms of space.

But yet in its essence space is devoid of time. The consequence is that when we endeavour to represent historical events as occurring in time, all we can do is to conceive a series of stationary states occurring in succession at measured space intervals. This is only a travesty of a true time history. Time, as it truly is, is only given in our inner consciousness of the flow of life. Matter never grows old by the mere efflux of time. Life grows old and dies. To take an illustration of Bergson's. When we dissolve a lump of sugar in water, it appears to take time to dissolve. Does this not warrant us in treating matter as subject to time? The answer is that the time of dissolution is really only subjective to the observer. It is measured by his impatience. The sugar is in a different state when dissolved from what it was in the lump, but the difference between lump sugar and dissolved sugar can be conceived without any reference to time at all. Take duration of time away and the whole material world is an eternal "now." Differences may exist in it objectively, but not time-changes.

Again, our memory supplies us with different states of consciousness which we now have, and have had in the past. But the form of time presents those as interpenetrated and blurred into one another. If I desired to count them and determine, for example, how many times I had tasted sugar in the last month and compare one sensation with the others, I should have

to isolate them, and exteriorise them, and this would of necessity bring in the form space with the wider character which Bergson assigns to it.

Duration, therefore, is capable of quality, but not of quantity or number, and our attempts to treat psychology by means of mathematics and chemistry must always be one-sided and incapable of giving us true views.

If we listen to the start of a petrol motor, at first we hear a separate series of explosions. Here we are in the "extension" stage. Gradually the noise of the separate explosions ceases to be distinct and settles down into a hum. Here we are reaching the time condition. At each instant we take note, not of one single explosion, but of a blend consisting of all the prior ones, and are conscious only of a continuous sound. This resembles consciousness as given to us by *durée*. For in our ego there is succession without exteriority, whereas outside us there is exteriority without succession. Our notion of homogeneous measurable time is an illusion, a sort of fourth dimension of space which we create for the purpose of measuring what is really unmeasurable.

There is a real space, without time, in which phenomena appear and disappear simultaneously with our states of consciousness. There is a real time, the stages of which blend together, but each stage of which can be referred to a state of the external world, which is contemporaneous with it, and thus can be separated from other stages.

Thus, then, we see that the philosophy of Bergson, while founded on the common sense school of Descartes, has also taken in the main features of Kant, except that Kant's view of the form time is much more objective and that number and measurement which Kant assigns to the time-form is by Bergson referred to the form space.

The philosophy of Bergson, while highly idealistic, is also highly realistic, its main feature being the well-marked separation between life and dead matter.

The similarity between some of his views and those of Schopenhauer can hardly escape attention.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE INCONSCIENT

IT will have been noticed that the subjects treated in this book under the head of philosophy relate almost exclusively to being, reality and appearance, together with our sources of knowledge of them. They thus embrace little more than the sphere of speculative ontology or speculations as to the character of existence. But philosophy really covers a much larger field. It includes, for example, the laws of sensation, together with the experiments of Wundt and others who have tried to reduce them to a science. Other branches of psychology, the various systems of logic, and the theory of the will, as also the laws of biology, and even to some extent the laws of physics, seem also to fall within the scope of philosophy.

But the word philosophy, at all events up to the middle of the last century, was used in a narrower sense, and the works of the great philosophers, from the time of Parmenides and Socrates up to the present day, have mainly treated of ontology and the knowledge we have of "being."

There is, however, one branch of psychology that is so nearly connected with ontology as to render it necessary to transgress the ancient limits, and to give some

outline of its general features. This is what we now call the "inconscient," or sometimes the subconscious self.

The first thinker who raised the theory of the inconscient to an important position was Schopenhauer. He was followed by Hartman, and since then an increasing number of writers, some from an idealistic and some from a materialistic point of view, have endeavoured to cope with the subject.

The science of the inconscient is unknown to us, we are only groping after it, it is at present in the domain of speculative philosophy.

What we know of consciousness is attendant on some of our thoughts and actions, but absent from others. And it is sometimes absent and sometimes present in connection with our sensations, thoughts and actions.

Thus, for example, under chloroform consciousness ceases under conditions in which great pain would have been consciously felt but for the anæsthetic. Again, whole trains of thought sometimes take place with little or no consciousness accompanying them. When awake we are conscious of the action of our lungs in breathing ; when asleep we have no consciousness of it. If a fly settles on a sleeper, he will often brush it off without waking or having any consciousness of his action.

These facts, of which an enormous number has been observed and noted, lead to the theory that our conscious self only gives us a small part of our real life. If this be so, many of our ideas which rise into consciousness may be the result of inconscient mental processes.

For example, let us suppose that two countries have been for years in rivalry. They perhaps differ in race, in religion, in customs and in their theory of life. Most of the individuals hate and, perhaps, despise one another, and their commercial relations are not cordial. At last, by a mere chance, a subject of one state insults or kills a subject of the other. The matter is taken up by the respective governments; arbitration fails and war results. Now, if you ask a statesman of one of them as to the cause of the war, he would reply that it was because the government of the other had connived at the murder of one of his own countrymen, and had refused redress. But an ignorant peasant would answer, "We hate that nation and we are going to put them under our heel; we don't know why exactly, and we don't care whether this is a just war or not. It has to come and one of us must go under."

Now here you have an illustration of the inconscient. The inconscient souls of those nations have determined upon war and the politicians have had the task of expressing the fact to the reason of other nations. The diplomatic papers resemble the conscient reason of man; the force and violence of the war cannot be explained by these papers only. To get to the truth of it one must search the inconscient.

Again, how invariably successful are poets and orators who bring out into conscious words the dim inconscient in the minds of their readers and hearers. A great picture is really an expression of what we all feel, but which the painter has taught us to say. And music is a mixture of the conscient and the inconscient, here rising into definite melody and obeying the conventional laws of harmony as a reasoned argument obeys the laws of logic, there

plunging into the inconscient, where only the feelings can follow it.

The prose writings of Wagner, who in his theological ideas upon music was a follower of Schopenhauer, show this. Wagner's dramatic music was an attempt to give to the inconscient a new language ; so that instead of following the old fashion of writing operas, according to which the musician fitted music to words already chosen by some other person, the artist was to evolve a union of speech, music and gesture, the faculties all working together simultaneously and harmoniously to give expression to the inconscient.

In our life we are, therefore, amphibious. Those people are unwise who endeavour to ignore the inconscient, and to frame every action of their lives according to the square rule and plumb of dogmatic reason. But those are equally foolish who allow themselves to be blown about by the tempestuous inconscient, and decline the salutary office of the critical reason.

If we accept this view of psychology, it raises another question of supreme importance. Does the inconscient follow in its sentiments and reasonings the laws which apply to conscious sensation and conscious logic ?

May it not be that consciousness introduces into our cognition forms akin to the forms of the Kantian system ? Nay more, may it not be that it is only our conscious reason that obeys the Kantian laws relating to space, time and the categories of the understanding, and that the inconscient has another set of laws of its own ?

A familiar illustration will help to clear this supposition, Our present forms of space and laws of logic compel us

to believe that it is impossible to get a ball out of a closed box without opening the lid, or making a hole in a side.

But that is because the box is a three-dimensional box, and we are three-dimensional beings.

A fourth-dimensional being could perform the feat, which to us would seem a miracle—not because it was one, but because no exercise of our three-dimensional intellect could conceive how it was done.

If there were before us a two-dimensional being, a flat man floating about on flat-land, then a ring would to him be a closed box. He could detain a flat prisoner by enclosing him in a ring.

Then comes a three-dimensional being who performs the apparent miracle of getting the prisoner out, by lifting him out of flat-land into a space of which the people of flat-land were absolutely ignorant.

If our inconscient self is under a set of laws of its own, then the only knowledge of it that we can have in *conscious reasoning* is conditioned by the laws of our sensations, and of our logical faculties. Our sciences will be translations into our ordinary scientific language of the deeper and wider science of the inconscient. And consequently, just as a poet finds it sometimes impossible to translate a poem from one language into another, so does he find it impossible to translate his own inconscient into the language of his earthly life.

The bearing of the theory of the inconscient upon the question of innate ideas is obvious. For it may well be that many of our ideas which appear innate are really the results of the operations of inconscient thought. The results are there, but we cannot explain them. For example, Kant affirms the existence of an innate idea of

duty. It is not derived from sensation. It cannot be explained or accounted for by the conscious intellect ; may it not be a product of inconscient experience and thought ?

Again, is it not possible, nay, even probable, that the inconscient plays an important part in the life of the body ?

A large and increasing number of people have adopted " suggestion " as a means of modifying states of mind and states of body. The methods of suggestion appear much the same in all cases, though the philosophical reasons given in support of these methods are very widely different. The theory is that states of body and mind can be affected by conscious thought, so that thinking things so, makes them so. It is not a question of will. According to most of the professors of these methods, the will is an instrument of strife. If you *will* to get well, it only induces you to think yourself ill. Do not *will*, but simply *think* that you are better, and the thought will make you better. The conscient self would here act on the inconscient self and vice versa, without being able to explain the reasons why it had been able so to operate. Indeed, the effect of many medicines is largely suggestive, for cases are known in which cures have been effected by means of bread pills. If this influence of suggestion upon the human mind and body can only be proved true in the moral as well as the physical world, what a theory of education it shadows forth ! We are here reminded of Robert Owen's proposal that prisoners should be encouraged to believe themselves good, and to sing songs arranged for that purpose. Without carrying it so far as to say that our thoughts

could affect physical objects outside our own bodies, but limiting it to the spheres of mind and body, which we already know interact on one another, this theory of suggestion offers a most interesting field for investigation. It is now being earnestly studied, and already seems to be yielding valuable results in the treatment of nervous diseases.

Many other instances may also be cited in which the theory of the inconscient may have important scientific consequences. For example, we know that the only apparent means of communication between different human beings is by our five senses, but that intellectual ideas are almost exclusively conveyed by sight or sound.

That telepathic communication should be possible from mind to mind, otherwise than through the organs of sound and sight, by something akin to wireless telegraphy, is rather probable than otherwise. When we reflect on the extraordinary complexity of the brain, and the wonderful character of nervous impulses, and the known fact that nervous impulses give rise to electric currents, and vice versa, and when we think that a few yards of wire and some little bits of metal can transmit speech across the Atlantic, it seems surprising that man has not yet accomplished mental telegraphy. Insects seem to have done something, for some, like the oak-egger moth, become aware of the presence of the opposite sexes at extraordinary distances, and some are provided with large branching antennæ just like miniature wireless stations.

It is quite open to conjecture that if men are in possession of powers other than those revealed by

consciousness, communications may take place otherwise than by speech or visual signals. It is true that here we are in a field of enquiry that seems to reek of imposture.

Remains exist in the Island of Malta of what are believed to have been echoing-oracle-caverns in the Stone Age. There is no doubt that soothsayers in Egypt and, indeed, in every country, made use of optical illusions, of stupefying drugs, and acoustic devices to deceive the ignorant.

But through the ages there runs a steady thread of belief in some form of knowledge gained otherwise than by the exercise of our conscious powers, and of action of a kind that appeared miraculous. It seems impossible to sweep away the whole of the supernatural now and in the past by the dictum of Hume, that when anything miraculous is said to have occurred, it is always more probable that the evidence should be false than that the fact should be true.

At first sight prophecy seems impossible, for how can we know as a fact something that has not yet happened? Marvellous anticipation may be possible, but not true prophecy. To this it may be replied that if time is only a form of the sensibility, then in the inconscient all time may be an eternal "now," and that which is to be is as that which is now, and has been.

Interesting as these speculations are in connection with psychology, biology and medicine, there is another side on which they rise to supreme importance.

For if it is true that a large part of human mental action is inconscient, and that the inconscient may not be bound by the fetters imposed by the laws of the psychology of conscious thought, then it may well be

that we have here an explanation of the apparently inexplicable character of Mysticism and Religion.

In this view dogmatic religion and creeds would be an attempt to express in logical form and language truths of the inconscient which could only be shadowed, not explained in words.

We might account for the extraordinary transformations of religious feeling both in individuals and nations of which we possess such abundant record, by ascribing them to the action of the subconscious soul.

Or perhaps a better term to use would be to say that here we were witnessing the effects of the workings of the supra-conscious soul.

If this position can be admitted as reasonable, we seem to be dealing with phenomena which may not be reducible under the ordinary laws of our conscious reason, such, for example, as the laws of cause and effect, and what seems miraculous to the ordinary reason might become, if not explicable, at least possible.

It is curious to observe how almost all our great philosophical thinkers have hankered after some such explanation. The "demon" of Socrates which, perhaps partly in irony, he affirmed inspired him on critical occasions ; the realities of Plato which only the higher mind could conceive ; the ecstasy of the Neoplatonists ; the *scientia intuitiva* of Spinoza ; the practical reason of Kant ; the "moral sense" of the English Ethical Schools ; the will of Schopenhauer ; all indicate a belief that somewhere there is a Super-reason which lies above and commands the reason of consciousness.

The biographies of religious thinkers and the meditations of the mystics all tell the same tale.

Musicians, poets, artists, almost without exception

claim to be under the influence of some powers which follow laws different from those of mathematics and mechanics.

And even men of science, when they leave the observation and registration of phenomena, or the designing of machines, and endeavour to deal with causes, seem to find themselves in the presence of something unknowable by ordinary sensation and logical reason.

In the face of so varied and weighty testimony we dare not say that the last word has been spoken upon this vital question, nor can any scientific mind presume contemptuously to sweep it all aside as though it were a mere accumulation of credulous superstition.

And lastly, there is the testimony of those who claim to have seen ghosts and received communications from people whose bodies were then dead.

Many, even most, of these accounts are given by or revealed through sources which do not command our confidence. But so many minds of a very high order have been impressed by them, that we cannot afford to laugh them out of court. We have seen too many wonders to be ultra-sceptical.

These revelations come within the scope of communications to our conscient perceiving and reasoning faculties, but how far they are dependent partly on inconscient powers it is impossible to tell.

We can only, perhaps, sum up this matter by saying that the field of the inconscient offers a most interesting subject of study. We can never fully grasp it by the use of the intellectual conscious reason, and for that reason Religion, Mysticism, and a good many kindred subjects, will probably ever be beyond our merely intellectual

powers. But perhaps by diligent endeavour some corner of the veil of Maya may be lifted, and we shall have learned that mere mathematics, physical science and ordinary logic cannot set bounds to the possibilities of "being."

CHAPTER XIX

CONCLUSION

KNOWLEDGE, as distinguished from the technical arts, has three main branches : Science, Philosophy and Religion.

Religion is distinguished from science in that it refuses to submit its dogmas to the test of science or to the conditions of philosophy. It claims to be given to man immediately, or if conveyed by means of teaching not to rest on mere authority, but to depend on revelation to each individual soul. For even the Roman Church, strong in its assertion of authority, recognises the direct communion between God and man by means of prayer.

As has been already pointed out, there is no sharp line of demarcation between science and philosophy, for philosophy is the speculative side of science.

Auguste Comte, seizing on these differences, condemned both religion and philosophy as waste of time and energy. He represented thought as passing through three stages. First, when we attribute events to the volition of a personal God. This is the religious stage.

Second, when we attribute them to "principles" of nature. This is the second stage, in which we indulge in the "isms," such as Materialism, Idealism, Spiritualism, Realism. This is the philosophical stage and is equally futile and useless as the religious stage.

Last, there is the scientific stage, which simply arranges and reasons from facts, without Religion or Metaphysics ; the stage in which one says " Opium sends one to sleep because it does."

The defects of Comte's theory is that no sharp line can be drawn between philosophy and science, or between what is speculative and what is positive, so that in many cases we do not know what to accept as science and what to reject as metaphysics. Is the theory of the electron science or philosophy ? What are we to say of Einstein's theory of relativity ? No bounds can be placed between science and philosophy because from one point of view all science is speculative ; there is no part of it that is so absolutely positive that we cannot insinuate a doubt whether it is in reality of the speculative order.

Hence it is that the vast work of Comte has left little permanent impression. Pyrrhonism existed before his time, and his " Religion of Humanity " has completely perished.

This may be a convenient place to mention Pragmatism, a philosophy which professes to be founded not necessarily on truth, but to be adopted as the nearest approach to truth which it is in our power to make.

The fundamental principle underlying the philosophy of James is thoroughgoing nominalism. This leads him to deny the existence of universals except as mere classifications of phenomena. Each individual object has a substance of its own, and substances may differ one from another. James' dislike of unification leads him to deny purpose in nature and to adopt Darwin's view that nature has been produced by the fortuitous action of atoms and forces, and not according to design. The Ideas of Plato and all universals are consequently

rejected. William of Occam's razor is by James applied unsparingly.

James naturally adopts empiricism as his theory of the origin of knowledge. But he is not either a materialist or an atheist. On the contrary, in various lectures and in his works (e.g. "Varieties of Religious Experience") he has shown great width of feeling for the human and divine in man. His philosophy is termed Pragmatism. This is equivalent to philosophical utilitarianism. For just as the utilitarians made utility to the human race the ground of moral action, so do the Pragmatists regard utility in the widest sense as the test of philosophic truth. This view is open from a philosophical standpoint to objections exactly analogous to those which Kant used against utilitarianism in morals. Truth, it may be argued, is quite a different thing from utility to man ; nay more, the truth of a philosophy is not even established by its consistency and harmony. A framework of lies might be consistent. And, on the contrary, a system that to our intellect presented contradictions might still be true.

It is reasonable to adopt for practical purposes any system or combination of systems that appears to present the greatest features of truth. It is akin to the position of Pyrrho, who regarded all philosophical systems as equally false and equally true, and therefore implies philosophical agnosticism.

Religion, Philosophy and Science are therefore not so much different spheres of thought as different points of view, and while they overlap in many places they are not to be confounded.

As a support to Religion, the aid that Philosophy can give is mostly of a negative order. Thus it can establish

the truth that there is nothing in science or in speculative philosophy which negatives the possibility of the existence of God. Nay more, most systems attempt to use philosophy to establish God's existence.

In this view it is quite reasonable to suppose that the world, instead of being governed by mere chance, is developing according to an intelligent design.

Again, while science seems bound down to the assertion of cause and effect, so that it presents the aspect of complete fatalism, philosophy opens up to us the possibility of reconciling the determinateness of science with the autonomy of the will, and thus preserving the power of doing right and wrong, and hence the foundations of personal responsibility.

And, lastly, though many philosophies have repudiated the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, yet there is not one of them with which immortality is not perfectly consistent.

For suppose we have adopted Pantheism and treat the individual ego as a mere phenomenon. There is nothing in this to preclude the idea that after the dissolution of the phenomenal body the phenomenal soul may not survive it. The soul has existed in this world as a phenomenon, there is no reason why it should not continue to exist as a phenomenon in another world, unless one adopts the opinion that the soul is a sort of matter and therefore must perish, but as to that we do not know that matter in certain forms can ever perish, nor what "matter" itself is.

To these observations we may add that the new fourth dimensional theory of space, by which an entirely new meaning is given to time, has a direct bearing upon the philosophy of being. It seems to show that the fleeting

character of time, as we know it, is only phenomenal, and that in reality being is permanent, while our knowledge of it is all relative. So that should these views prevail, philosophy would seem to be ending where it began, in the assertion of Parmenides that the real is the permanent, and of Zeno that motion and change are only relative and phenomenal.

There are therefore two views that may be taken of man. One that he is wholly material in mind and body, and subject to the law of causation ; the other, that he is not a mere mechanism, but possesses autonomy of the will, by which the most important parts of his actions are removed from the laws of cause and effect.

This raises him to the position of a moral being whose actions are not directed merely to a successful struggle for personal survival or success, or even for the survival of his race. One view reduces him to the position of an intelligent perishable animal, the other considers him as an immortal spirit. Philosophy so far from endorsing the first view has in the vast majority of systems inclined to the second.

Hence the dread of philosophy as tending to undermine the Ideas of God, Freedom, and Immortality is unfounded. It is true that philosophical criticism has destroyed many theories ; but it has never been an enemy to truth, and if it has sometimes appeared to conflict with extreme idealism, it has also refuted crude materialism.

It has abandoned the extravagant pretensions of the Schoolmen, by which it was regarded as capable of affording a proof of Religion. The philosophical arguments for immortality derived from the nature of the substance of the soul are out of date. But philosophy still continues to afford Religion this service : that it

reproves and destroys the vulgar view that things which seem impossible or difficult to conceive must needs be false. "You will never make *me* believe that," is a mark more often of folly than of wisdom. By analysing our ideas and showing how superficial in reality are many of the opinions that we consider the highest "common sense," Philosophy may prepare the way, not only for natural science but for inspired Religion.

Philosophy does not pretend to dogmatise ; if it did, it would be either Science or Religion, it would not be Philosophy. Its sphere is the Speculative and the Ideal. It is the link that binds together the material, the human and the divine.

That which we see we do not know,
That which we know we cannot see ;
The mist wraps all the vales below,
Only the mountain-tops are free.

George Leveson Gower.

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